Thе defendant, Delvin White, appeals his convictions following a jury trial of one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault, see RSA 632-A:2, II (Supp. 2006), and one count of felonious sexual assault, see RSA 632-A:3 (Supp. 2006). He contends that the Trial Court (Barry, J.) erred by permitting the State to introduce: (1) a statement allegedly made by the defendant to the victim’s sister; and (2) the confession of a man who had been previously accused, but acquitted, of assaulting the victim and her sister. Wе reverse and remand.
The following facts were either adduced at trial, or are not disputed on appeal. On March 2, 1996, the defendant spent the afternoon with his friend Wayne, Wayne’s girlfriend Marguerite, and their children. Wayne *121 had two daughters, M.E. and M.G., aged twelve and eight respectively, and Marguerite had two sons, one about fifteen, D.G., and the other only an infant.
After spending the afternoon with Wayne, the defendаnt was invited to return for dinner. By the time dinner was over, he had consumed at least five beers and it was agreed that he should spend the night rather than drive home. Later in the evening, after M.E. had gone to bed, the defendant was seated on a couch in the playroom with M.G. and D.G. At that time, the defendant allegedly said to M.G., “I lived to kill and molest little kids.” D.G. testified that he did not remember the defendant saying anything.
A short time later, M.G. went to Wayne and Marguerite in another room and told them that the defendant had sexually assaulted her. Marguerite took the children to a neighbor and contacted the police. When the police arrived, they spoke with M.G. about the assault and suggested that both girls be taken to a hospital for a physical examination. The examinations did not confirm or disprove the sexual assault claims. M.E. later accused the defendant of sexually assaulting her earlier in the day.
In 1997, the defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting both girls. We affirmed that conviction on appeal.
See State v. White,
Upon retrial, the defendant was convicted of two counts involving M.E. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s statement to M.G. and in permitting the State to introduce the confession of another man accused, but acquitted, of assaulting both girls.
As to the defendant’s second argument, during his first trial the trial court prevented him from cross-examining the girls about prior accusatiоns they had made against other individuals, including a man named Roger Houston, because the defendant had not shown the prior accusations to be “demonstrably false.”
White,
*122
The defendant then sought a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the conduct of his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because he was prevented from cross-examining the girls regarding their prior accusations. Eventually, the First Circuit granted the defendant’s writ, ruling that he was entitled to cross-examine the girls with regard to their prior accusations.
Coplan,
The First Circuit ruled that, while the requirement that the defendant meet the “demonstrably false” standard was not “always and everywhere infirm,” in this case it was improperly applied. Id. at 26. According to that court:
We are concerned here with an attempt to pursue by crоss-examination prior past accusations of a quite similar character to the present one; with a ruling ... that the prior accusations (or at least two of them) were false to a reasonable probability; with a resulting plausible inference of a motive to deceive that could infect the present testimony of the two vital prosecution witnesses; and with a defendant who had virtually no оther way to defend himself. This is the unusual situation and, to us, an extreme case.
Id. at 27 (quotation and brackets omitted). According to the First Circuit, the defendant was entitled to cross-examine the girls because “[w]e are dealing here with something far more potent than ‘general credibility’ evidence which, under confrontation clause standards, may have a lower status.” Id. at 26. The First Circuit, therefore, vacated the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 27.
In ruling that the defendant was entitled to cross-examine the girls on their prior accusations, the First Circuit stated that it was not endorsing an open-ended constitutional right to offer extrinsic evidence. Id. at 26. “Such an excursion requires more witnesses and documents, and so greater risks of confusion and delay; to say that impeachment here would cast light on a motive to lie is not to suggest that рrior false accusations are the kind of evidence for which extrinsic evidence has traditionally been admitted.” Id.
Prior to the defendant’s retrial, he moved in limine to be permitted to introduce extrinsic evidence to the extent that either of the girls, during cross-examination, alleged to have no memory of the prior accusations. Following a hearing, the trial court permitted the defendant to introduce extrinsic evidence but specifiсally stated that, to the extent such evidence created a misleading advantage, the State would be permitted to introduce rebuttal evidence.
*123 During trial, the State elicited, on direct examination of M.E., that she had previously accused Houston of sexually assaulting her. On cross-examination, the defendant elicited testimony from M.E. that she had accused Houston and testified against him, but that he was found nоt guilty. The defendant then asked M.E. if she had, in her deposition, stated that the jury in Houston’s trial decided that her accusation was false. M.E. stated that she had so described the jury’s verdict during her deposition. Upon redirect examination, M.E. testified that although she had, during her deposition, believed that a not guilty verdict meant that the jury believed her accusations were false, she now understood a not guilty verdict to mean that there was not enough evidence to prove that Houston was either innocent or guilty. M.G. also testified on direct examination that Houston had sexually assaulted her, but the defendant did not cross-examine M.G. regarding that accusation.
Following the testimony of M.E. and M.G., the State sought to introduce the testimony of Officer James Winn of the Manchester Police Department. The State represented that Winn would tеstify that Houston had confessed to him that he had assaulted the two girls, but that he later recanted his confession. The State contended that Winn’s testimony was appropriate because the defendant, by eliciting testimony from M.E. that she thought the jury in Houston’s case believed her allegations to be false, had created a misleading impression which opened the door to this rebuttal testimony. Therefore, Winn’s tеstimony that Houston confessed would, the State contended, counter M.E.’s misleading testimony. Over the defendant’s objections, the trial court permitted the State to introduce Winn’s testimony, which was consistent with the State’s representations.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the testimony he elicited from M.E. did not create a misleading impression and thus did not open the door to Winn’s testimony. Additionally, the defеndant contends that even if the door was opened, Winn’s testimony was inadmissible under
Crawford v. Washington
The admissibility of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Gibson,
*124
We have recently clarified that the “opening the door” doctrine subsumes within it two doctrines governing the admissibility of evidence.
State v. Morrill,
In order for this doctrine to apply, a party must introduce evidence that provides a justification, beyond mere relevance, for the opponent’s introduction of evidence that may not otherwise be admissible. Id. at 550. The initial evidence must, however, have reasonably misled the fact finder in some way. Id. The rule thus prevents a party from succеssfully excluding evidence favorable to his opponent, and then selectively introducing this evidence for his own advantage, -without allowing the opponent to place the evidence in proper context. Id. The fact that the “door has been opened,” however, does not permit all evidence to pass through because the doctrine is intended to prevent prejudice, аnd is not to be subverted into a rule for the injection of prejudice. Id.
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the doctrine of specific contradiction does not apply because the defendant did not create a misleading impression. The trial court, when ruling on the admissibility of Winn’s testimony, found that the defendant had opened the door “by [his] opening statement indicating that [hе was] going to cross-examine these young people with regard to the false allegations, and [he] used false allegations in [his] opening statement.” The trial court further stated to the defendant:
You have brought in the fact that these allegations in your mind are false. The witnesses said they weren’t. They said he was found not guilty because the State didn’t prove its case. I think that you have created a misleading situation with regard to what happened. I think the State is entitled to counter by presenting the fact that Houston confessed.
*125 Thus, the trial court specifically noted that the defendant elicited testimony that the jury in Houston’s case might have found him not guilty because it believed the allegations were false, and the State elicited testimony that the jury might have found him not guilty because the State had not proven its case. Therefore, each side elicited beneficial admissible evidence about M.E.’s understanding of Houston’s acquittal. In light of the fact that each side elicited admissible testimony favorable to its theory of the case, we can not agree with the trial court that the defendant’s examination of M.E. created a misleading impression.
During oral argument before this court, the State contended that merely intrоducing the fact that Houston was acquitted misled the jury. According to the State, the jury was misled because, after the initial direct and cross-examination, all the jury knew was that M.E. had accused Houston, but that he was acquitted. The State’s argument, however, like the argument in its brief, overlooks that on redirect examination M.E. stated that she understood that Houston was acquitted, not necessarily because the jury did not bеlieve her, but because the State had not met its burden in some way. Thus, as noted above, the State introduced admissible evidence countering any potential misunderstanding by the jury in the defendant’s case about the accusations against Houston and his subsequent acquittal and had placed M.E.’s testimony in a proper context. For the above reasons, we hold that the defendant did not create a misleading impression and thus did not open the door.
Because we hold that the defendant did not open the door, we must determine whether the testimony the State sought to introduce was inadmissible. The defendant contends that Winn’s testimony is barred by his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation as explained in
Crawford.
Because the defendant raises no claim under the State Constitution, we confíne our analysis to the defendant’s federal constitutional claim.
See State v. Panzera,
In
Crawford,
the Supreme Court ruled that the testimonial statements of declarants absent from trial are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Crawford,
*126
Under the
Crawford
analysis as outlined in
Maher,
we must first determine whether Houston’s confession is a “testimonial” statement. While it refrained from providing a comprehensive definition of testimonial statements in
Crawford,
the Supreme Court recently clarified its definition in
Davis v. Washington,
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Id. at 2273-74. Here, the statement at issue is a confession given to police during an interview sometime after the events described. There is no allegation that at the time of Houston’s interview there was any ongoing emergency or other similar circumstances. We hold that the statements here are testimonial because they were given under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to establish past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Because Houston’s confession is testimonial, it is only admissible if he testified, or if he was unavailable and had been subject to prior cross-examination by the defendant, or if it is offered for some reason other than its truth.
See Maher,
As noted above, in order for the defendant to meet his burden to show error by the trial court, he must show not оnly that the evidence was improperly admitted, but also that the decision to admit it was unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.
See Gibson,
Finally, the State contends that any error in admitting Houston’s confession does not require reversal because such error was harmless. According to the State, Winn’s testimony had no direct bearing upon the dеfendant’s guilt or innocence and was only used to rehabilitate M.E.’s credibility after it had been impeached. Also, the State argues that there was other evidence bearing upon the defendant’s guilt and that therefore, this evidence was inconsequential. We disagree.
“It is well settled that the erroneous admission of evidence is harmless only if the State proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the vеrdict was not affected by the admission.”
State v. Thompson,
Given the disposition of this appeal, we need not address the defendant’s other argument. Because the issue may arise on remand, however, we briefly discuss it. One of the defendant’s primary concerns regarding the admission of the statement he allegedly made to M.G. is that the limiting instruction given by the trial cоurt was insufficient to ensure that the statement was not used for an improper purpose.
The trial court need not use the specific language requested by the defendant and has discretion to decide whether a particular limiting instruction will assist the jury in reaching a verdict.
State v. Dixon,
Reversed and remanded.