143 Minn. 403 | Minn. | 1919
Lead Opinion
Defendant was convicted of the violation of chapter 260, p. 358, Laws 1915, prohibiting the sale of narcotic drugs. The particular charge was that on January 21, 1918, he sold six grains of morphine to Frank Chandler. Defendant is a licensed physician. Chandler was an habitual user of the drug. Defendant admitted that on January 21, 1918, he gave to Chandler six grains of morphine and received four dollars from him. The evidence on the part of the state was that defendant sold the morphine to Chandler without any pretense of professional treatment. Defendant’s claim was that he had been treating Chandler since September, 1917, for the drug habit by the gradual reduction method, which consists in administering the drug in gradually diminishing quantities to a point where the habit-may be more easily cured, and that the transaction on January 21 was part of this treatment.
Section 1 further permits the “administration, sale, or disposal” of such drugs “by a legally licensed physician * * * to a patient upon whom he is in professional attendance,” provided the physician shall beep a record of the name and address of the patient, the date of sale or disposal, and the amount of the drug transferred, and the drug must be delivered in a container, labeled with the name of the patient, the date of delivery, and the name and address of the dispenser.
Section 2 provides: “It shall be unlawful for any physician or dentist to furnish to or prescribe for the use of any habitual user of the same any of the substances enumerated in section 1 of this act; provided that the provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent any legally licensed physician from prescribing in good faith for the use of any patient under his care, for the treatment of a drug habit such substances as he may deem necessary for such treatment; provided that such prescriptions are given in good faith for the treatment of such habit.”
Defendant questions these instructions. He claims that under section 2 a physician may both prescribe and furnish the drug to an addict if done in good -faith and for purposes of treatment. The question of the correctness of this construction of the statute is the crucial question in the -case.
We think the court correctly construed the statute. There is a plain difference between “prescribe” and “furnish.” To prescribe is to give medical direction, to indicate remedies. To furnish is to supply or provide. This is the ordinary meaning of these terms. Both words are used, obviously with this distinction as to meaning, in the Federal AntiNarcotie Law, Act of March 3,1915, 38 St. 817. The context makes plain the intention to so use the words in our statute. In section 1 the word “prescription” is used repeatedly in the sense mentioned and with accurate direction as to the manner in which the prescription may be filled by a pharmacist. ' It is quite clear that the word “prescribe” was used in the same sense in section 2, and when that section first made it unlawful for a physician to “furnish to or prescribe for” the habitual user of the drug mentioned, and then provided that he might “prescribe” in good faith “for the use of” such habitual user, it used the term “prescribe” in ordinary sense, and it is used in that sense throughout the act. If we need look for the reason, it is doubtless found in the purpose to require two persons to be concerned in the supplying of narcotic drugs to addicts under the conditions as to publicity which the statute requires in case of prescriptions. In view of the strict requirements of section 1, as to the record to be kept by a physician administering the
Defendant contends that all reasonable doubts as to construction are to be resolved in favor of the defendant and cites State v. Walsh, 43 Minn. 444, 45 N. W. 721. This is true enough, but “if the language be plain it will be construed as it reads.” Bolles v. Outing Co. 175 U. S. 262, 20 Sup. Ct. 94, 44 L. ed. 156. The language is plain in this case.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I dissent.