OPINION
Opinion by
The State appeals from the trial court’s order granting a motion to suppress filed by appellee Lance Jerome Wester. In its sole point of error, the State argues the allegations contained-in the search warrant affidavit were sufficient to suppоrt a probable cause finding that drugs would be found at Wester’s residence. We disagree and affirm.
Police stopped Christopher Harоld Elliott for a traffic violation and found marijuana in his vehicle. While undergoing questioning at the police station, Elliott told police he purchased the marijuana from Wester at Wester’s residence. The police sought a warrant for Wester’s arrest and search of his rеsidence. In the affidavit for search and arrest warrant, Garland Police Officer M.R. Roberds asserted the following facts as his basis for probable cause to believe Wester unlawfully possessed marijuana at his residence:
On Tuesday 04-10-2001, CHRISTOPHER HAROLD ELLIOTT, a white male adult was stopped for a traffic violation on Zion Road by Garland Patrol Officers A.D. CROCKETT and B. KEMP. It was determined that ELLIOTT was wanted on an outstanding *826 felony narcotic warrant out of Dallas County. During the field interview ELLIOTT informed the officers that there were no weapons in his vehicle but that there was some Marijuana. During the search of ELLIOTT’S motor vehicle officers recovered 14.246 grams of Marijuana, 8.9 grams of Methamphetamine, 29.5 grams of 3,4 Methylenediоxy Methamphetamine and .7 grams of an unknown black substance described by ELLIOTT as being Opium. After being processed through the Garland City Jail, ELLIOTT was interviеwed by Officer B. KEMP, and Narcotic Detectives M. RO-BERDS and N. PRATT. After acknowledging and waiving his legal rights, ELLIOTT gave a written voluntary statement against his own penаl interest admitting to being in possession of the Marijuana and other controlled substances. ELLIOTT further provided written information related [sic] thаt just prior to be [sic] stopped by the Patrol Officers that he had purchased the Marijuana from LANCE JEROME WESTER at WESTER’S residence described in item # 1 above. ELLIOTT further related that WESTER was still in possession of a large amount of Marijuana.
The remaining facts pertained to- Ro-berds’s training and exрerience as a police officer with respect to drug traffickers.
Based on the affidavit, the magistrate issued a search аnd arrest warrant. The police executed the warrant and found, among other things, the ecstasy that formed the basis for the indictment in this cаse. Wester filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the affidavit failed to show probable cause for issuance of thе warrant. Specifically, Wester complained that police relied on the “unconfirmed representations alone” of Elliott, whom police had arrested for drug possession, with “no prior indicia of reliability or credibility as to the ‘informant.’ ” The trial court granted the motion, and this appeal ensued.
This Court reviews
de novo
the trial court’s determination that the magistrate had probable cause to issue the search warrant.
Lane v. State,
On apрeal, the State argues the information provided by Elliott was “sufficiently reliable to justify a search” of Wes-ter’s residence because (1) the informant, Elliott, was named and his admission to buying drugs was an admission against his penal interest that lent credibility to his statement and (2) the information was sufficiently detailed. Applying the appropriate standard of review and looking only to the four corners of the affidavit, we cannot conclude that given the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for believing a search of Wester’s residеnce would uncover marijuana.
First, while we agree that being a named informant generally may go a long way toward establishing credibility, therе are varying degrees of credibility with respect to informants. For instance, where a named informant is a private citizen, whose only сontact with the police is a result of having witnessed a criminal act committed by another, the credibility and
*827
reliability of the information are inherent.
Esco v. State,
We cannot say the same in this instance. Here, the informant was not an “average citizen” reporting a crime. He was a suspect under arrest for the very drugs he claimed tо have purchased from Wester and was being interrogated at the police station when he gave his statement. With respect to thе argument that Elliott made a statement against his penal interest by acknowledging the drugs were his, the police had already found the drugs when Elliоtt made his statement; thus, we question the extent this admission lent to Elliott’s credibility.
Second, the information contained in the affidavit was not detailеd. To the contrary, the only fact that specifically related to Wester was Elliott’s statement that he purchased the drugs from Wester аt Wes-ter’s residence just prior to being stopped. No other independently verifiable facts related to Wester, such • as previous drug transactions, the location of the marijuana in the house, or the layout of the house, were alleged. While the State relies on the holding in
Mejia v. State,
We recognize that credibility, reliability, and basis of knowledge no longer need to be established by separate and independent facts; however, they remain highly relevant factors in determining, by the totality of the сircumstances, whether probable cause exists.
Eisenhauer v. State,
We affirm the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence.