STATE OF OHIO v. JASON WEST
C.A. No. 28668
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
November 8, 2017
[Cite as State v. West, 2017-Ohio-8474.]
HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR-2014-10-3052
HENSAL, Presiding Judge.
{1} Jason West appeals a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
{2} Mr. West pleaded guilty to 17 counts of telecommunications harassment, one count of menacing by stalking, one count of obstruction of official business, two counts of intimidation of a crime victim or witness, and one count of intimidation. The trial court sentenced him to a total of 10 years imprisonment. This Court upheld his convictions on appeal, but vacated his sentence in part and remanded the matter so that the trial court could properly impose post-release control. Meanwhile, Mr. West petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel were ineffective, that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas, that he was deprived of the right to a fair and unbiased trial, and that a certain investigator should not
COURT ERRED IN DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF CLAIM FOR WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA.
{3} Mr. West argues that his trial counsel‘s ineffectiveness deprived him of the opportunity to withdraw his plea before sentencing. He, therefore, argues that his petition for post-conviction relief should be granted and that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. “[A] trial court‘s decision granting or denying a postconviction petition filed pursuant to
{4} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. West must establish (1) that his counsel‘s performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that but for his counsel‘s deficient performance the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an objective standard of reasonable representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. A court, however, “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
{5} According to Mr. West, before his sentencing hearing, he told his attorney that he wanted to withdraw his plea. His attorney allegedly spoke to the trial judge about it in chambers and was told that the request was denied and that Mr. West would have to raise the issue on appeal. Mr. West contends that, when he attempted to speak during the sentencing hearing, his attorney silenced him. He also contends that his appellate counsel refused to argue the issue on appeal because there was no record of the conversation in chambers and no motion to withdraw was made during the sentencing hearing. In support of his argument, Mr. West submitted an affidavit from his wife that corroborated Mr. West‘s recounting of his conversation with his attorney after the attorney spoke to the trial judge in chambers.
{6} We will begin by examining whether Mr. West was prejudiced by his counsel‘s representation because it is dispositive.
{7} In his petition and appellate brief, Mr. West has not provided any explanation of the reason he wanted to withdraw his plea before the sentencing hearing. He has not alleged that he discovered some new information following his plea hearing or that the trial court did not comply with
COURT ERRED IN DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF USING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED POST CONVICTION RELIEF MOTION IN REGARDS TO THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR AND UNBIASED TRIAL BASED ON THE FACT THAT A VICTIM WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN AS THE CHIEF INVESTIGATOR AND THE INVESTIGATOR WAS ALLOWED TO REMAIN AFTER THE OFFICE HE WAS EMPLOYED BY WAS REMOVED.
{8} In his first assignment of error, Mr. West argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that his arguments were barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, he
{9} “Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding, except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have been raised * * * on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93 (1996), syllabus. Regarding Mr. West‘s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument, we conclude that, because his argument was without merit for the reasons explained earlier, any error in the trial court‘s res judicata determination was harmless. See
{10} Regarding Mr. West‘s investigator-recusal argument, Mr. West has not explained why he could not have made this argument on direct appeal. To the contrary, he acknowledges that “this was addressed with the recusal of the Summit County Prosecutors Office.” He also acknowledges that “the matter of [the investigator] being a victim * * * was brought up in the direct appeal.” Upon review of the record, we conclude that Mr. West has failed to establish that the trial court incorrectly determined that his argument that the investigator should have been removed was not barred under the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court, therefore, did not
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF IN REGARDS TO THE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS THROUGH INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF BOTH COUNSELS.
{11} In his fifth assignment of error, Mr. West argues that both his first and second trial counsel were ineffective. Regarding his first attorney, Mr. West argues that, if the attorney had performed better, he would not have moved to withdraw his first guilty plea. His attorney, however, allegedly was unprepared for the size of the audience that was at his sentencing hearing, causing Mr. West to move to withdraw his plea. According to Mr. West, if he had not withdrawn his guilty plea at that time, he would not have faced the additional charges that were filed against him after he withdrew the plea. Regarding his second attorney, Mr. West argues that he failed to file a motion for change of venue because a fair trial was not possible in Summit County. He also argues that his attorney should have moved to have the lead investigator removed from his case. He further argues that his second attorney failed to go over discovery with him, failed to develop a defense, and failed to move to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing.
{12} Although Mr. West alleges that his attorney should have filed additional motions on his behalf, he has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that any of them would have been granted. He has also not alleged that, but for his attorneys’ deficient conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty to the charges filed against him. He also has not pointed to anything in the record that suggests that additional charges would not have been filed against him if he had not withdrawn his initial guilty plea. Even if those offenses had not been added to
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING A MOTION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WHICH CONTAINED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS FOR THAT RELIEF WITHOUT HOLDING A HEARING.
{13} Mr. West also argues that the trial court should have held a hearing on his petition before dismissing it, citing Section 2953.21(C). Interpreting that section, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained that “[a]n evidentiary hearing is not automatically guaranteed each time a defendant files a petition for postconviction relief.” State v. Broom, 146 Ohio St.3d 60, 2016-Ohio-1028, ¶ 29. “A trial court has the discretion to deny a postconviction petition without discovery or an evidentiary hearing if the petition, supporting affidavits, documentary evidence, and trial record do not demonstrate ‘sufficient operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief.‘” Id., quoting State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279 (1999), paragraph two of the syllabus. “To warrant an evidentiary hearing in a postconviction proceeding, a petitioner must submit evidence outside the record that sufficiently establishes that the petitioner is entitled to relief on one or more asserted constitutional grounds.” Id.
{14} In support of his argument that the trial court should have held a hearing, Mr. West points to his ineffective assistance of counsel arguments and his argument about the investigator of his case. This Court has already determined that those arguments were either barred by res judicata or without merit. We, therefore, conclude that the trial court exercised
{15} Mr. West‘s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J. CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
JASON WEST, pro se, Appellant.
MIKE DEWINE, Attorney General, and MICAH R. AULT, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.