State v. WestState v. West
- Appellate courts review joinder issues in three steps: whether joinder was statutorily permitted, whether the district court abused its discretion in granting or denying joinder, and whether any error prejudiced a party‘s substantial rights.
K.S.A. 22-3202(1) permits joinder of crimes that are of the same or similar character, arise from the same act or transaction, or arise from acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Whether a statutory basis for joinder exists presents a mixed question of fact and law, with factual findings reviewed for substantial competent evidence and the legal conclusion reviewed de novo.- Crimes need not be identical to be of the same or similar character for purposes of joinder. Nevertheless, joinder must be supported by multiple commonalities between the offenses and not merely by broad similarities or a shared classification.
- Joinder under
K.S.A. 22-3202(1) does not depend on whether evidence of the joined crimes would be independently admissible as other-crimes evidence undеrK.S.A. 60-455 . - Claims of instructional error are reviewed under a three-step framework: whether the issue is reviewable, whether the challenged instruction was legally and factually appropriate, and, if error occurred, whether the error requires reversal. In determining whether an instruction was legally and factually appropriate, an appellate court exercises unlimited review of the entire record and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party.
- An instruction is legally appropriate when it fairly and accurately states the applicable law. An instruction is factually appropriate when sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, would support giving the instruction.
- Whether an evidentiary ruling violated a defendant‘s constitutional right to present a defense is subject to unlimited appellate review. The right to present a defense is subject to the rules of evidence and procedure and is violated only when relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise admissible evidence supporting the defense theory is excluded.
Matt J. Maloney, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STANDRIDGE, J.: This is Laroy West‘s direct appeal following his convictions for first-degree premeditated murder and two counts each of aggravated assault and criminal possession of a weapon resulting from two separate incidents. West raises several claims of trial error, alleging the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the charges, in instructing the jury in several respects, and in excluding evidence relevant to his claim of self-defense. West also argues for relief under the cumulative error doctrine.
We affirm West‘s convictions. The district court correctly denied severance because the charges from each incident were of the same or similar character under
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 10 p.m. on May 5, 2021, a Black man wearing a blue baseball cap and carrying a backpack entered a Wichita QuikTrip on North Broadway, blaring music on a Bluetooth speaker. Will Robinson, a QuikTrip security guard, confronted him about the
Lаw enforcement responded to the scene, where they discovered Robinson unresponsive with blood covering his face. Robinson was wearing a gun belt with a firearm and a taser. The pistol was still in its holster, and there were no weapons in Robinson‘s hands. Robinson was transported to the hospital, where he later died from injuries sustained as a result of the gunshot wound.
Law enforcement‘s investigation led them to review surveillance video inside and outside the QuikTrip. Attempting to identify the suspected shooter, investigators circulated still shots from the QuikTrip video to other law enforcement officers in the area. A detective recognized the shooting suspect as matching the description of the suspect in an unsolved aggravated assault case that also occurred on North Broadway a few weeks before the shooting.
In that case, Edward Sebastian, an owner of La Chinita Mexican restaurant reported that he went to the restaurant with his stepson, Fernando David Mendez, on the afternoon of March 28, 2021. The restaurant was closed to the public because it was a Sunday, but Sebastian and Mendez werе there to work on a catering order. Upon arrival
On both occasions, the Black male suspect was carrying a backpack and was wearing a blue baseball cap, jeans, and boots. Based on the suspect‘s description, law enforcement identified and arrested West. The State charged him in a single complaint with six crimes between the two incidents. For the March incident at La Chinita, the State charged West with two counts of aggravated assault and a single count of criminal possession of a weapon. For the May incident outside QuikTrip, the State charged him with first-degree premeditated murder, aggravated assault, and criminal possession of a weapon.
West moved to sever the March and May charges. At a hearing on the motion, the district court considered evidence and oral argument from the parties before denying West‘s request to sever the charges.
West testified in his defense, asserting his actions in both cases were justified by self-defense. West said that when he arrived at QuikTrip on the night of May 5, Robinson came outside, “approached [him] in a very aggressive manner,” and accused West of interfering with his drug customer clientele. West testified that he had previously encountered Robinson, who he claimed had a reputation as a bully. Once inside the store, West said Robinson was angry and aggressive, telling him to turn his music down and leave. When West tried to leave, Robinson walked next to him saying, “[Y]ou always wanna fight,” and threatening to “beat [West‘s] ass to death.” West alleged that Robinson continued to threaten him after West crossed the street to get away. He said that Robinson became enraged and followed him across the street. According to West, Robinson punched him, yelling that he was “gonna beat [West‘s] ass” and beat West “to death” while West begged Robinson to let him go. West said that Robinson shoved him, put something on his hands, and then moved toward him again with his hands up in a “fight stance.” Claiming he was in fear for his life, West unzipped his backpack, pulled out his gun, and fired once. West said he fled the scene because he did not want to explain to the police that he had just shot an officer for attacking him. West denied punching, taunting, or calling Robinson a coward. West admitted that Robinson never pulled out a gun during the encounter.
West similarly maintained that he was forced to defend himself during the Marсh incident at La Chinita. West testified that he was walking through the parking lot, trying to avoid any interaction with Sebastian and Mendez, when Mendez threatened to “stomp [West‘s] head down on the concrete.” West said that both men moved towards him; fearing for his safety, he lifted his shirt up to show his gun. West claimed that when he started to leave, he believed Sebastian had a firearm, so he drew his gun to defend himself.
West directly appealed his convictions to this court. Jurisdiction is proper. See
ANALYSIS
West makes several arguments on appeal that may be combined into the following issues: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to sever the March and May charges; (2) the district court erred in issuing an initial aggressor instruction and in instructing or failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser inсluded offenses; (3) the district court erroneously granted the State‘s motion in limine, which prevented admission of evidence relevant to West‘s claim of self-defense; and (4) the cumulative effect of these errors resulted in an unfair trial. We address each issue in turn.
I. Motion to sever
West argues the district court erred in denying his motion to sever, claiming that improper joinder of the March and May charges prejudiced his substantial rights and deprived him of a fair trial. The State responds that the district court correctly denied severance of the charges.
An appellate court reviews potential joinder errors using a three-step analysis, applying a different standard of review at each step. First, the court determines whether
Second, because
Third, if an error occurred in the preceding steps, we determine whether the error resulted in prejudice, i.e., whether the error affected a party‘s substantial rights. See
Discussion
A. Step one: fact-specific statutory conditions that permit joinder
We begin our analysis by engaging in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the March and May crimes were properly joined in a single complaint.
At a hearing on West‘s motion to sever, the State presented testimonial evidence from Wichita Police Detective Donald Moore. He testified about his response to the scene of the May shooting, the collection of evidence at the scene, and law enforcement‘s investigation to identify a suspect. This investigation included taking still shots of the suspect from the QuikTrip surveillance video and emailing them to the law enforcement community in Sedgwick County. In response, another Wichita police detective contacted Moore and advised that the suspect was likely involved in one of his cases—the March La Chinita incident that had occurred about five weeks before the shooting and just a few blocks away from the QuikTrip. Detective Moore also testified that whеn he presented the May case to the district attorney‘s office for potential charges, he presented the March case alongside it because evidence from both cases helped to identify West as the suspect in each case. Detective Moore noted that the suspect in both cases had the same physical appearance, wore the same hat and similar clothing, and used a firearm. Finally, Detective Moore testified that after West‘s arrest, one of the La Chinita victims identified him as the suspect in that case.
“[B]oth of these incidents occur in public areas, businesses, dealing with employees of businesses, LaChinita on the one hand, Quik Trip on the other. Both on North Broadway area, within a few blocks of each other. Additionally, they both involve, initially anyway, aggravated assault type allegations, they are these confrontations, verbal confrontations initially, in these public areas, outside оf these businesses. In both cases there is a firearm and there‘s evidence to believe the same firearm in each of these offenses that is alleged to be a part of the crime.
“So it‘s a situation where there‘s an angry interchange that escalates, allegedly, to criminal conduct, aggravated assault, murder, death. So when you look at these what‘s going on, what‘s being charged, it is crimes—or allegations, let me say that, that are the same or similar character. This is the same type of scenario, very similar, very close in time, five weeks.”
The judge also found joinder was proper under the third condition of
“I also am going to find that the third basis for joinder is here, as well, that two or more acts constituting a common scheme or plan. And again, I think what is going on here is a situation where the State—the common scheme here, the common plan is a confrontation with a business owner or business employee, on the North Broadway area, that gets escalated and allegedly involves threats and a fireаrm used or brandished as a part of it.
“So it seems like it falls into that, it‘s this common—allegedly common scheme, common plan, common way that is being alleged that Mr. West relates or ways that he behaves in these public areas, on North Broadway, when there is disagreement or
disharmony or miscommunication, or bad exchange, an angry or hostile exchange or encounter. So I think it constitutes a common scheme or plan.”
Finally, the judge discussed the difficulty in separating the March and May crimes, given the overlapping evidence between the two sets of crimes in proving West‘s identity:
“So one of the other difficult things with this identity is on multiple levels. One is the LaChinita case, March case, the identity comes out of the investigation in the May case, the Quik Trip case. And so just for the jury to understand and be able to follow the evidence and not be confused as to oh, that‘s how this happened, because otherwise it may look like, really identify? I mean, that doesn‘t make sense, or what context, all of that, I think, requires that.
“We also have the same hat, same clothing, the DNA evidence that‘s on the hat that‘s seen being worn by Mr. West in thе March case, that needs to—the State needs to be able to present that for identity to hey, this hat where we‘ve got DNA, it is associated with Mr. West and it looks like it—in this video from the May case, it looks like it might be from the March case. And again, the evidence gets—the type of evidence, the common scheme or plan, similar character—same or similar character, it gets mixed together. So for those reasons, I‘ll deny the motion to sever.”
1. Condition one: same or similar character
West first challenges the district court‘s ruling that the March and May crimes were of the same or similar character. He does not contest the court‘s factual findings on this factor, so the issue before us is whether those facts support consolidation.
In discussing whether crimes are of the same or similar character to permit joinder, this court has said: “‘Several separate and distinct felonies may be charged in separate counts of one and the same information, where all of the offenses charged are of the same
West contends that the district court‘s stated reasons for finding the crimes were of the same or similar character were not sufficient to warrant joinder. He focuses on the differences between the March aggravated assault charges (use of force in threatening with a gun, a severity level 7 felony) and the May premeditated murder charges (use of deadly force in shooting a gun, an off-grid crime). Other than the fact that both incidents involved a firearm, West claims the crimes are not of the same or similar character because they differ both in conduct and in the intended rеsult and also require different evidence to establish each crime.
But West‘s arguments ignore the many commonalities between the two sets of crimes. On both occasions, which took place approximately five weeks apart, West was on private business property on North Broadway in Wichita when he became involved in a verbal altercation with an employee. Each time, West was asked or told to leave the premises. Rather than comply, West continued to argue with the employee. West was armed and displayed the same firearm on both occasions. Although West shot no one
Indeed, this court has regularly upheld similar “commonalities” as sufficient to permit joinder under
Based on the uncontested facts set forth above, we find substantial competent evidence supports the district court‘s legal conclusion that the March and May crimes were of the same or similar character.
West also challenges the district court‘s ruling that the March and May crimes were part of a common scheme or plan. Because the March and May crimes were properly joined as offenses of the same or similar character under
B. Step two: abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever
Having found a statutory basis for joinder, we must next determine whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever. See
To that end, West argues the district court committed an error of law by failing to consider whether joinder of the crimes would be prejudicial. He claims that allowing the March and May incidents to be tried together lowered the State‘s burden to disprove his claims of self-defense and led to the prejudicial admission of other-crimes evidence under
But this court has routinely rejected West‘s argument that failure to sever resulted in the prejudicial admission of other-crimes evidence under
C. Step three: prejudice
Absent any error, there is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different as the result of an error. Hurd, 298 Kan. at 564. And even if this court were to agree that the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the prejudicial effect of the joinder, we may readily conclude that no prejudice occurred as a result. The jury was instructed that each crime charged against West was a separate and distinct offense and that it “must decide each charge separately on the evidence and law applicable to it, uninfluenced by your decision as to any other charge.” We have routinely held that such an instruction negates any jury confusion or prejudicial effect of trying a person on multiple counts. See, e.g., Cruz, 297 Kan. at 1057-58; Gaither, 283 Kan. at 687; Barksdale, 266 Kan. at 510. We presume that juries follow the instructions given. State v. Perez, 306 Kan. 655, 672, 396 P.3d 78 (2017). And it appears the jury did so here, given that it acquitted West of the May aggravated assault charge. See Cruz, 297 Kan. at 1058 (“Sometimes, we view acquittals as compelling evidence of a jury‘s ability to differentiate between charges joined for trial.“); Bunyard, 281 Kan. at 401-02 (rejecting defendant‘s argument related to “jumbling defenses“; such a claim was “inscrutable” when jury acquitted defendant of two of three counts).
D. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude substantial competent evidence supports the district court‘s legal conclusion that the March and May crimes were of the same or similar character under
II. Jury instructions
At trial, the district court instructed the jury on West‘s claim of self-defense. Over West‘s objection, the court also issued a related instruction that limited West‘s ability to claim self-defense if thе jury found he was the initial aggressor.
In addition, the court instructed the jury on three lesser included offenses of premeditated first-degree murder, including intentional second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter under the “unreasonable but honest belief” theory of that offense, and involuntary manslaughter committed as the result of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. The court declined West‘s request to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter.
On appeal, West raises three claims of instructional error: (1) the initial aggressor instruction was legally and factually inappropriate, (2) the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, and (3) the involuntary manslaughter instruction was legally deficient.
We follow a multi-step framework when addressing claims of instructional error. First, we consider whether the issue is reviewable; in other words, whether there is appellate jurisdiction and whether the issue is sufficiently preserved for our review. Second, we decide whether the challenged instruction was legally and factually appropriate. In doing so, we exercise unlimited review of the entire record and viеw the evidence in the light most favorable to the requesting party. Third, upon a finding of
A. Initial aggressor instruction
At trial, the district court instructed the jury on West‘s claim of self-defense:
“Defendant claims his use of force was permitted as self-defense. Defendant is permitted to use physical force against another person, including using a weapon, or threaten by words or actions to use physical force against another person, including a threat to cause death or great bodily harm, or display to another person a firearm, when and to the extent that it appears to him and he reasonably believes such physical force, threat, or display is necessary to defend himself against the other person‘s imminent use of unlawful force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief. Defendant is permitted to use against another person physical force that is likely to cause death or great bodily harm only when and to the extent that it appears to him and he reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself from the other person‘s imminent use of unlawful force. Reasonable belief requires both a belief by defendant and the existence of facts that would persuade a reasonable person to that belief. When use of force is permitted as self-defense, there is no requirement to retreat.”
At the State‘s request, the court also issued a related instruction on provocation, referred to as an initial aggressor instruction:
“A person is not permitted to provoke an attack on himself with the specific intention to use such attack as a justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person he provoked and then claim self-defense as a justification for inflicting bodily harm upon the person he provoked.”
On appeal, West renews his objection to the initial aggressor instruction, claiming it was not legally or factually appropriate.
At the first step of our framework for jury instruction issues, West objected to the instruction and requested the additional language, thus preserving the issue for review.
At the second step of our framework, we consider the legal and factual appropriateness of the instruction, using an unlimited standard of review of the entire record. See Holley, 313 Kan. at 254.
1. Legal appropriateness
To be legally appropriate, a jury instruction must fairly and accurately state the applicable law. State v. Broxton, 311 Kan. 357, 361, 461 P.3d 54 (2020); see State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 161, 283 P.3d 202 (2012) (An instruction that does not fairly and accurately state the law is legally infirm.). This court exercises unlimited review in deciding the legal appropriаteness of an instruction. State v. Wimbley, 313 Kan. 1029, 1034, 493 P.3d 951 (2021).
This court “‘strongly recommend[s] the use of PIK instructions, which knowledgeable committees develop to bring accuracy, clarity, and uniformity to instructions.‘” State v. Hollins, 320 Kan. 240, 244, 564 P.3d 778 (2025) (quoting State v. Zeiner, 316 Kan. 346, 353, 515 P.3d 736 [2022]). When a court follows the PIK instructions, “more than likely the instruction will be legally correct, not because of any independent legal significance of the pattern instruction, but because the committee usually writes an instruction that accurately reflects the law.” Wimbley, 313 Kan. at 1031. But a district court may modify or add language to a pattern instruction if warranted by the circumstances of a particular case. Hollins, 320 Kan. at 244; Wimbley, 313 Kan. at 1031.
West argues that, without his requested definition of provоcation, the initial aggressor instruction failed to accurately state the law because it did not tell the jury that the provocation must be legally sufficient—that is, sufficient to objectively warrant the victim‘s attack. And he contends the instruction misled the jury, allowing it to disregard his claim of self-defense and the lesser included offenses.
In reviewing a district court‘s denial of a request to modify a pattern instruction, an appellate court does not view the added language in isolation. “Rather, the appellate court
This court has long held that an initial aggressor instruction is a correct statement of the law. See Hunt, 257 Kan. at 391-94 (affirming district court‘s decision to give self defense and initial aggressor instructions; reasoning that instructions correctly stated the law, question of whether defendant was initial aggressor was for jury and, if jury found defendant was not initial aggressor, jury was free to “disregard the limit on the defendant‘s right to use self-defense“); State v. Beard, 220 Kan. 580, 581-82, 552 P.2d 900 (1976) (initial aggressor instruction was correct statement of law; informed jury of law related to limits on asserting self-defense).
Contrary to West‘s argument, the initial aggressor instruction did not undermine his theory of defense because the district court separately provided a self-defense instruction that correctly stated the law governing his self-defense claim. See
Because the instructions issued by the district court properly and fairly stated the applicable law on self-defense, the initial aggressor instruction given in this case was legally appropriate.
2. Factual appropriateness
In determining whether an instruction was factually appropriate, courts must determine whether there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the requesting party, that would have supported the instruction. See State v. Mendez, 319 Kan. 718, 727, 559 P.3d 792 (2024).
West argues the initial aggressor instruction was factually inappropriate because the evidence did not show that he intended to provoke Robinson. West contends that the evidence that he taunted Robinson and called him a coward did not constitute adequate provocation to warrant the instruction. West suggests that an initial aggressоr instruction is only appropriate in circumstances where the defendant first makes physical contact with the victim and that mere words or gestures cannot constitute adequate provocation under
West‘s argument is undermined by a long line of cases in Kansas finding that a defendant need not initiate physical contact to provoke a victim within the meaning of
Based on the evidence that West left the verbal altercation with Robinson before taunting him and calling him a coward from across the street, the jury was entitled to decide whether West provoked Robinson. See State v. Smith, 278 Kan. 45, 50, 92 P.3d 1096 (2004) (“Some evidence of provocation is enough to support the [initial aggressor] instruction.“); State v. Adam, 257 Kan. 693, 702-03, 896 P.2d 1022 (1995) (initial aggressor instruction justified although evidence of provocation by defendant was slim); Hunt, 257 Kan. at 394 (question of whether defendant was an aggressor is a fact question for the jury); Beard, 220 Kan. at 582 (“Whether defendant was an aggressor remained a question for the jury.“).
3. Conclusion
Because the initial aggressor instruction was legally and factually appropriate, the district court did not err in giving it. As a result, we need not consider whether any error requires reversal.
B. Heat of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction
At the first step of our jury instruction analysis, West requested the instruction and thus preserved this issue for our review.
At the second step, where we evaluate legal and factual appropriateness, the requested instruction was legally appropriate because voluntary manslaughter is a lesser degree of homicide when compared to the charged first-degree murder. State v. Thille, 320 Kan. 435, 438, 570 P.3d 18 (2025) (voluntary manslaughter instruction legally appropriate as lesser included offense of first-degree murder); State v. Pulliam, 308 Kan. 1354, 1362, 430 P.3d 39 (2018) (“An instruction on a lesser included crime is legally appropriate.“); see
Thus, the question before us is whether the instruction was factually appropriate. In general, an instruction on a lesser included offense is factually appropriate if “there is some evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, emanating from whatever source and proffered by whichever party, that would reasonably justify the defendant‘s conviction for that lesser included crime.” State v. Berkstresser, 316 Kan. 597, 601, 520 P.3d 718 (2022); see
Again,
Heat of passion killings require a showing of sufficient provocation under an objective standard. State v. Gentry, 310 Kan. 715, 722-23, 449 P.3d 429 (2019) (Reducing a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter requires “‘adequate provocation that deprives a reasonable person оf self-control and causes that person to act out of passion rather than reason.‘“). Ongoing and protracted interactions do not typically provide factual support for a heat of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction. State v. Lowry, 317 Kan. 89, 95, 524 P.3d 416 (2023); see, e.g., Bernhardt, 304 Kan. at 476-77 (victim slapping defendant during ongoing argument not objectively sufficient to warrant heat of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction); State v. Johnson, 290 Kan. 1038, 1044, 1045-46, 236 P.3d 517 (2010) (lengthy and protracted disagreement did not constitute evidence of a sudden quarrel sufficient to support voluntary manslaughter instruction); compare State v. Graham, 275 Kan. 831, 838-40, 69 P.3d 563 (2003) (heat of passion voluntary manslaughter instruction warranted where quarrel that immediately led to murder occurred suddenly and stabbing occurred during physical altercation that immediately followed sudden quarrel); State v. Hill, 242 Kan. 68, 72-73, 76, 744 P.2d 1228 (1987) (failing to instruct on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter was error
West argues the jury could have found sufficient provocation existed here based on Robinson‘s sudden physical attack after Robinson ran across the street and began punching and shoving West while threatening to “beat [his] ass” and “[beat him] to death.” West notes that the surveillance video time stamp shows that he fired the gun at Robinson about a minute and a half after the physical attack began and only three minutes after the men first engaged inside the QuikTrip.
But West‘s focus on the suddenness of Robinson‘s attack in the alley ignores the totality of the circumstances present here. The altercation between the two men began inside the QuikTrip when Robinson confronted West about his loud music and escorted him out of the store. The argument continued as they walked through the parking lot to the edge of the street. After West crossed the street into the alley, the argument did not stop. Instead, it appears that West taunted Robinson into crossing the street, where the two men began fighting or wrestling before West shot Robinson. But the shooting was not immediate. Just before the shooting, a witness saw Robinson gesture with his hands in an apparent attempt to calm West down. And West testified that before shooting Robinson, he prepared to defend himself by unzipping his backpack where he carried his firearm because he believed doing so was necessary to protеct his own life. This testimony reflects a deliberate decision by West to shoot Robinson, not that he shot Robinson because he suddenly lost control.
Despite the short window of time between West‘s first interaction with Robinson and the fatal shot, the evidence does not reasonably support a conviction for heat of passion voluntary manslaughter because the ongoing confrontation between the two men cannot be described as a sudden quarrel and West‘s actions were not done in the heat of
C. Involuntary manslaughter instruction
As another lesser included offense of first-degree murder, the district court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense involuntary manslaughter based on the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner. West does not contend the district court erred by giving an involuntary manslaughter instruction or by including the statutory phrase “lawful act in an unlawful manner.” Instead, he argues for the first time on appeal that the instruction was legally incоmplete because the court did not provide additional language defining that phrase.
This issue is governed by the same multi-step standard of review set forth above. Holley, 313 Kan. at 253. But at the final step, we review for clear error because West did not request the additional language or object to the involuntary manslaughter instruction at trial. See
When a party challenges the omission of unrequested additional explanatory language in a jury instruction, the question is not whether the omitted language would have been legally correct in the abstract. Instead, we consider whether the instruction—viewed as a whole—fairly and accurately stated the law without the proposed definition and whether the additional language was necessary to prevent the jury from being misled.
West correctly notes that Kansas courts have described involuntary manslaughter under
The district court‘s instruction accurately tracked both
Considering the instructions as a whole, the jury was properly and fairly informed of the applicable law.
West argues the district court erred in granting the State‘s motion in limine because it prevented him from introducing evidence relevant to his claim of self-defense.
Additional relevant facts
Before the preliminary hearing, West filed an amended motion to dismiss based on self-defense immunity. The district court held a combined preliminary hearing/hearing on the motion to dismiss. At the preliminary hearing, a police investigator testified that she collected Robinson‘s personal property from the hospital, which includеd a set of brass knuckles. During cross-examination of multiple police witnesses, defense counsel elicited testimony that Robinson was a former Wichita Police Department officer and that officers are not trained to use or authorized to carry brass knuckles. Counsel also asked these witnesses if they knew that Robinson carried brass knuckles. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties presented their arguments on the motion to dismiss. Defense counsel argued, in relevant part, that Robinson was the aggressor and that he was “down for a fight” when he ran across the street to fight West:
“I don‘t know what happened to these brass knuckles, there‘s no evidence that Mr. Robinson was wearing ‘em, but let‘s look into his mind, Mr. Robinson‘s mind when he crossed that street.
“What was he there for? Mr. Robinson‘s down for a fight. He‘s down for a fight so much that he runs across the street, almost getting hit. He‘s down for a fight so much he carries brass knuckles. I‘m not saying he used ‘em that day.”
After considering the parties’ arguments, the district court denied the motion to dismiss and found there was probable cause to support the State‘s charges against West.
Before trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to prevent West from eliciting testimony about or referring to the brass knuckles found in Robinson‘s belongings at the hospital. The State argued such evidence was irrelevant because there had been no showing that Robinson wore brass knuckles during the altercation, and West never claimed he saw Robinson wearing them. The State noted it was just as likely that Robinson had found them on the QuikTrip premises or confiscated them from someone in his capacity as a security guard. Finally, the State claimed that mention of the brass knuckles would improperly prejudice the jury by making it appear that Robinson was carrying or using an unauthorized and potentially illegal weapon at the time of the shooting.
In response, defense counsel argued that the brass knuckles evidence was relevant to West‘s claim of self-defense because it constituted circumstantial evidence of Robinson‘s mindset as the initial aggressor who placed West in fear for his life.
The district сourt granted the State‘s motion, ruling that evidence of the brass knuckles was irrelevant absent a showing that West was aware of their presence before or during the encounter, or that Robinson had displayed or used them during the incident.
At trial, defense counsel proffered a photograph of the brass knuckles to preserve the issue for appellate review. The district court confirmed its prior ruling that the evidence was inadmissible. Despite the court‘s ruling, West repeatedly testified that he saw Robinson put something on his hands during the encounter in the alley and also said that Robinson “was found with brass knuckles.” After sustaining the State‘s objection, the district court instructed the jury to disregard West‘s comment. The court later said it
Discussion
A defendant has a constitutional right to present the theory of his or her defense. A defendant‘s fundamental right to a fair trial is violated if evidence integral to that theory is excluded. But the right to present a defense is subject to statutory rules and caselaw interpretation of rules of evidence and procedure. State v. Smith, 320 Kan. 62, 80, 563 P.3d 697 (2025).
Whether an evidentiary ruling has violated the defendant‘s constitutional right to present a defense is subject to unlimited appellate review. See State v. White, 316 Kan. 208, 212-13, 514 P.3d 368 (2022). “‘To constitute error, the excluded evidence supporting the defense theory must be relevant, noncumulative, and admissible.‘” Smith, 320 Kan. at 80 (quoting State v. Waldschmidt, 318 Kan. 633, 657, 546 P.3d 716 [2024]).
For conduct to be statutorily justified based on a claim of self-defense, it must meet a two-part test. The subjective prong requires a showing that the defendant sincerely and honestly believed it was necessary to use deadly force to defend himself or herself, while the objective prong requires a showing that a reasonable person in the defendant‘s circumstances would have perceived the use of deadly force in self-defense as necessary. See
When a defendant raises a claim of self-defense, evidence of the victim‘s violent or turbulent character may be relevant to establish the defendant‘s state of mind. State v. Walters, 284 Kan. 1, 10-11, 159 P.3d 174 (2007). To establish relevance, however, there must be some logical connection between the asserted facts and the inference or result
West does not allege that the brass knuckles evidence was relevant to his state of mind. Nor could he credibly do so, because there is no evidence in the record showing West was aware that Robinson had brass knuckles on his person or that Robinson otherwise used or displayed them before or during their encounter.
Instead, West contends the brass knuckles evidence was relevant to his theory of self-defense because it constituted circumstantial evidence tending to prove Robinson‘s state of mind at the time of their encounter and to rebut the State‘s claim that Robinson only crossed the street because he was provoked by West.
West‘s argument is unpersuasive because Robinson‘s state of mind is not material to the issue of whether West is entitled to claim self-defense. And there is no logical connection between the brass knuckles and Robinson‘s state of mind. West seeks to use Robinson‘s possession of the brass knuckles to infer that Robinson was the aggressor, but as discussed by the State in its motion in limine, we do not know how the brass knuckles came into Robinson‘s possession. We can only speculate about whether they belonged to him or whether he found or confiscated them in the course of his duties as a security officer. Simply put, the brass knuckles evidence is neither probative nor material and it was therefore irrelevant. The district court did not err in granting the State‘s motion in limine to exclude this evidence.
West‘s final argument is that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Cumulative trial errors, considered collectively, may require reversal of a defendant‘s conviction when the totality of the circumstances establishes that the defendant was substantially prejudiced by the errors and denied a fair trial. State v. Guebara, 318 Kan. 458, 483, 544 P.3d 794 (2024).
Because we find no errors by the district court, West‘s cumulative error argument necessarily fails. See Lowry, 317 Kan. at 100 (The cumulative error rule does not apply if there are no errors.).
Affirmed.