80 Kan. 222 | Kan. | 1909
The opinion of the court was deliverd by
The state brought a suit against Henry Werner to enjoin him from maintaining a place where intoxicating liquors were sold and kept for sale in violation of law. When the suit was begun the district judge was absent from the county, and hence the petition and verified application were presented to the probate judge, who granted a preliminary injunction, or restraining order. The défendant was duly served with summons, and'also with-the order of injunction. Later the defendant was cited before the court to answer an accusation that he,was still maintaining a nuisance in violation of the injunction order previously issued by the probate judge. His answer to the charge of contempt was that the probate judge had no authority to grant an injunction or restraining order, and, as the order issued by him was void, there was no contempt. On a demurrer to the answer the court sustained the contention of defendant and dismissed the contempt proceedings. The state complains of this ruling.
The statute authorizing a proceeding by the state to abate and enjoin the nuisance above mentioned provides that an injunction may be granted at the commencement of the suit without requiring a bond, and that any person violating the terms “of any injunction” granted in such suit shall be punished for contempt. There appears to have been a contention by
The statute providing for abating and enjoining a nuisance, as will be observed, does not undertake to prescribe methods for enforcing the remedy of injunction in this class of nuisances, and hence the general-provisions of the code! regulating the granting of injunctions apply. The kind of injunction to be issued at the commencement of such a .suit is not stated. The code provides for perpetual and provisional -injunctions. Of course, it was not contemplated that a perpetual injunction should be allowed at the commencement of the suit. The provisional injunctions provided for in the code are divided into temporary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. It can hardly be contended that because one of these is designated as a restraining order it is not to be re
What is designated as a temporary injunction may ordinarily be issued at the commencement of the suit, with or without notice, as the court or judge may determine; but as such injunction remains in force until the final hearing, or until it is set aside by the court, it is rarely granted without notice. Then, again, an order allowing or refusing a temporary injunction may be reviewed in the supreme court before the final hearing of the cause, and in that way the life of the order may be greatly extended. Instead of granting an order of such duration or effect the court or judge may require notice to be given to the defendant of the application for a temporary injunction and in the meantime grant a temporary restraining order which shall •only remain in force until the time fixed for the hearing upon notice. (Civ. Code, §240.) After a party has answered a temporary injunction can not be issued except upon notice, but even in that case a temporary restraining order may be issued which will remain in force until the decision of the application for an injunction. (Civ. Code, § 241.) The order so issued is in junctional in character, and has the same efficacy while it is in force as any other injunction. It falls within the statutory definition of an injunction; that is, it is “a command to refrain from a particular act.” (Civ. Code, § 237.) It is made ’to be obeyed, and the disobedience of the same is necessarily contempt.
The temporary restraining order allowed by the
The legislature, having brought nuisances under the prohibitory law within the scope of the remedy of injunction without providing specific methods for it’s enforcement, manifestly intended that the general rules of procedure should control so far as they were applicable. Nothing in the act is inconsistent with the rule providing for the allowance of restraining orders, and when such an order is granted it must be obeyed, and the disobedience of it is punishable as a contempt.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. .