56 A. 918 | N.H. | 1903
1. It is contended in behalf of the respondent, that as the statute (Laws 1903, c. 95) known as the license law did not go into effect until after May 12, the action of the voters of *397 Manchester on that date, in accepting the provisions of .the act, was unauthorized and void. Section 31 of the act provides that "from and after the third Tuesday of May, 1903 [May 19], it shall be lawful to engage in the traffic in liquor under the terms of this act, in all cities and towns in the state as shall have accepted . . . the provisions of this act as herein provided. The officers of every city or town whose duty it is to call a special meeting of the legal voters of their respective cities or towns shall call a meeting according to the statutes made and provided, on the second Tuesday of May next [May 12], at which special meeting . . . the sense of the voters shall be taken by secret ballot upon the following question: `Shall licenses for the sale of liquor be granted in this city or town under the provisions'" of chapter 95, Laws 1903? Upon an affirmative vote, the license commissioners are directed to issue licenses according to the provisions of the act, "to be exercised in such city or town."
It is obvious from this language that the legislature intended that the act should take effect "from and after the third Tuesday of May, 1903," in such towns and cities as should, at special meetings held on the second Tuesday of May of the same year, vote to accept its provisions. Whether it should be in force in Manchester on May 19, depended upon the previous action of the voters at the special meeting held, as provided in the act, on May 12. No substantial reason has been suggested why, if such was the intention of the legislature expressed in apt language, it was not effective. So much of the statute as authorized special meetings of the voters to be held on May 12 was necessarily intended to be in force on that day. The legislature did not intend to expressly provide for an unauthorized and void act; and the language used is, in respect to the point under consideration, plain and unequivocal. It is not essential, in the absence of a constitutional requirement, that all parts of a legislative enactment should go into effect at the same time; different provisions may acquire the force of law at different dates, according to the will of the legislature expressed therein. Plummer v. Jones,
2. It was proved that in December, 1902, the defendant admitted that he was then guilty of illegally selling liquor; that is, in effect, that he was then illegally keeping liquors for sale. State v. Welch,
In the case at bar the evidence was that the defendant admitted that in December he was illegally keeping liquors for sale; that is, that he was then violating either section 15, chapter 112, Public Statutes, which imposes a penalty of fifty dollars for illegally keeping spirituous liquors for sale, or section 17, which imposes a penalty of ten dollars for illegally keeping malt liquors for sale. Before the commission of the offence alleged in the indictment, the legislature made a radical change in the law, and provided that "whoever, in a city or town wherein the provisions of this act are in force, shall sell or keep for sale liquors contrary to the provisions of this act, shall be punished by a fine of two hundred dollars and by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years." Laws 1903, c. 95, s. 33. In December the defendant had an intent to dispose of the liquors he then had, in violation of the statute which declared the act to be a misdemeanor only. Does that criminal intent warrant the inference that at another time, not too remote, in doing the same physical act he had a criminal intent to violate another statute which declared the act to be a felony? State v. Felch,
3. The exception to the charge cannot be sustained. The instruction is unobjectionable as a legal proposition. State v. Simons,
The result is that the first and third exceptions are overruled, while the second is sustained.
Verdict set aside.
All concurred.