1 N.J.L. 424 | N.J. | 1790
There are three grounds upon which the counsel for the prisoner found their application for a new-trial.
íst It has been contended that the Judge who presided at the trial misconceived the law, when he charged the jury that to excuse the commission of homicide as done se defendiendo, it ought to appear the killing was through mere necessity, and to prevent his own destruction; otherwise it amounted' to manslaughter. The counsel have urged that this principle was laid down by the court in too broad and unlimited a manner: that the apprehension of an enormous battery would equally excuse the killing of an adversary; and the circumstances of this case warrant the application of this principle of defence.
2d The Judge was wrong in admitting parol evidence of a confession of the prisoner, variant from the written confession, taken in a more solemn and authoritative form.
3d That evidence of the general characters of the prisoner and the deceased was improperly overruled.
Upon the second point the court was unquestionably right» No authority has been adduced by the prisoner’s counsel to support the doctrine for which they contend, and the argument that has been offered is far from convincing. I take the law to be that parol evidence of the confession before the Justice would be improper; blit confessions made at another time and place, although different from that made before the Justice are evidence. Indeed upon any other principle this monstrous consequence would ensue, tbat if a criminal had twenty times acknowledged the commission of a fact, and should afterwards refuse to confess it, upon an examination before the Justice, for the very purpose of preventing any proof of his former acknowledgements, he would by his own act defeat the ends of Justice. Fearshire’s case Leach 446. and The King v. Jacobs & al Ibid 285. establish this fully.
We now come to the most material question in this case, viz. whether the offence proved to have been committed by the prisoner comes up to the legal signification of the wort! manslaughters — -and I am of opinion it does.
A reference to NailoFs case
In the present case, the attack of the deceased was without any kind of weapon that might have rendered it necessary for the prisoner to avail himself of the instrument which occasioned the death. On his own confession, much less would have been sufficient, and I consider it therefore as clearly manslaughter.
What I particularly allude to, is the declaration of the prisoner to the witnesses who have been sworn, made soon after the affray, that he- could manage the deceased as he pleased, and that he was no more than a child. These declarations show there could have been no necessity for the weapon, and they are proper to be relied upon. See also the case of Rex v. Oneby 2 Ld. Ray. 1485.
The observations I have made render it unnecessary to enter further into the discussion of the question that has been raised, than to remark, that in,my opinion, no man is justified or excusable in taking away the life of another unless the ne'cessity for so doing is apparent as the only means of avoiding his own destruction or some very great injury, neither of which appears to have been reasonably apprehended in the present case.
Upon the whole case I am of opinion that there should be no, new trials for if justice has been done, and if the result of another trial ought to be the same as this, and the court are decidedly of this opinion, though the Judge may have direct»
In considering this question, I have purposely avoided mentioning many circumstances which operate strongly against the defendant; — which show that he was full as eager for the combat as the deceased; — -that he manifested no inclination to decline the affray, which led to the unhappy circumstance which has brought down a just but severe punishment upon himself»
New Trial refused,
Fester 2?8.
2 T. E. 4»