OPINION
{1} Dеfendant was indicted for three counts of criminal sexual contact of a minor (CSCM). Defendant subsequently filed a pretrial motion to dismiss, arguing that the corpus delicti of CSCM could not be proved solely by his extrajudicial statements and that the State would fail to present any independent evidence that would otherwise establish the corpus delicti. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that Defendant’s statements were trustworthy and that additional independent evidence helped to establish the corpus delicti of CSCM. We reverse the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss. We also take this opportunity to clarify the law regarding extrajudicial statements and thе application of the trustworthiness standard in New Mexico.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
{2} Although the parties present slightly different chronologies of the events in this case, the material facts are undisputed. In 2001, Defendant was diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease. Huntington’s Disease is a fatal hereditary disease that affects motor skills and also causes judgment, memory, and other cognitive functions to deteriorate into dementia. Not long after he was diagnosed, Defendant told his girlfriend (Mother) that God was punishing him with Huntington’s Disease because of what he did to their daughter. At that time, their daughter was two years old.
{3} When pressed by Mother, Defendant admitted to inappropriately touching their daughter and making their daughter touch him, but he did nоt disclose the exact areas of body contact. Defendant made similar statements to a counselor at the Veteran’s Administration (VA) Hospital. The VA Hospital reported the allegations to the New Mexico Children, Youth and Families Department (CYFD). CYFD investigated the matter and criminal charges were filed against Defendant. During the criminal investigation of Defendant’s statements, Defendant again made statements concerning his daughter to the police officers who interviewed him in his home.
{4} Not long after filing a police report, Mother took the daughter to the S.A.N.E. (Sexual Assault Nurse Examination) Program at St. Vincent’s Hospital where the daughter was examined by a nurse. The exаmination revealed no physical evidence of sexual abuse. However, Mother did report to the S.A.N.E. nurse that the daughter was exhibiting several changes in her behavior, including nightmares and withdrawal from strangers, particularly male strangers. Of the twelve behaviors that could be corroborative of sexual abuse listed on the S.A.N.E. form, the nurse noted that the daughter experienced only these two behavioral symptoms.
{5} On the basis of Defendant’s statements and the daughter’s behavioral symptoms, Defendant was indicted for three counts of CSCM. Defendant subsequently moved to dismiss the criminal charges against him, arguing that the State failed to prove that the CSCM actually occurred. The State аrgued that Defendant’s statements were themselves sufficiently trustworthy that, in addition to evidence that the daughter was exhibiting various behavior symptoms indicative of abuse, the corpus delicti of CSCM was established in this case. The district court agreed with the State and denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
{6} After the denial of his motion to dismiss, Defendant entered a conditional no contest plea to the three counts of CSCM, expressly reserving the right to appeal the district court’s ruling on the motion. This appeal follows.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{7} To the extent that Defendant admits the veracity of the facts alleged in the State’s pleadings and argues that such facts cannot establish the corpus delicti of CSCM as а matter of law, we will review the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss de novo. See State v. Roman,
DISCUSSION
{8} On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court erred in concluding that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish the corpus delicti of CSCM. Defendant argues that corpus delicti of CSCM cannot be proved solеly by his extrajudicial statements regarding his daughter. Rather, Defendant argues that the State must prove that his daughter was the victim of criminal sexual contact by at least some evidence independent of his extrajudicial statements. We agree that the corpus delicti of CSCM was not established in this case, and we reverse the denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
{9} We begin our opinion with a discussion of the term “corpus delicti” and the corpus delicti rule, which has traditionally governed the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions. Second, we address the rejection of the corpus delicti rule by the federal courts and numerous state courts in favor of the trustworthiness standard. Third, we discuss New Mexico’s adoption of the trustworthiness standard and how it is applied by our courts. Finally, we apply New Mexico’s standard to the facts of this ease and conclude that the corpus delicti of CSCM was not established by the State.
A. The Traditional Corpus Delicti Rule
{10} The corpus delicti rule provides that “unless the corpus delicti of the offense charged has been otherwise established, a conviction cannot be sustained solely on [the] extrajudicial confessions or admissions of the accused.” State v. Paris,
[generally the prosecution bears the burden of proving three elements in a criminal trial: (1) that loss or harm occurred, (2) that someone’s criminal agency caused the loss or harm, and (3) that the “someone” was or included the defendant. It is currently the rule among most jurisdictions requiring proof of the corpus delicti as a condition for admitting the defendant’s confession that the “body of the crime” comprises the first two elements and not the third.
Thomas A. Mullen, Rule Without Reason: Requiring Independent Proof of the Corpus Delicti as a Condition of Admitting an Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F. L.Rev. 385, 388 (1993) (footnotes omitted); cf. State v. Nance,
{11} For example, in the present case, the corpus delicti of CSCM is established by evidence proving that (1) the daughter’s intimate parts were touched by someone or that the daughter was forced to touch someone’s intimate parts, and (2) that this harm was caused by someone’s criminal agency. See McKenzie,
{12} According to the corpus delicti rule, the corpus delicti of a charged crime can be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, State v. Maestas,
{13} The corpus delicti rule first developed in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. David A. Moran, In Defense of the Corpus Delicti Rule, 64 Ohio St. L.J. 817 (2003); Mullen, swpra, at 399. The rule has its roots in a notorious English case in which an individual was convicted of murder solely on the basis of a confession, only to have the murder victim later appear alive. See Mullen, supra, at 400 (describing Perry’s Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 1311 (1660)). A similar case in Vermont led to the adoption of the rule in the United States. See Moran, supra, at 829-31 (describing The Trial of Stephen and Jesse Boom, 6 Am. St. Tr. 73 (1819)). While the corpus delicti rule only applied to homicide crimes in England, its application was expanded in the United States to cover most crimes. State v. Mauchley,
{14} The initial purpose behind the corpus delicti rule was “to prevent the conviction of thоse who confessed to non-existent crimes as a result of coercion or mental illness.” Moran, supra, at 817. Those who support the rule’s continued application argue that the rule serves an additional purpose as well: “promoting better police work by requiring the prosecution to prove its case without the aid of confessions.” Mullen, supra, at 401. The rule’s opponents point out that modern constitutional and procedural safeguards now serve these same purposes, arguably better than the corpus delicti rule, and assert that the corpus delicti rule is a relic of the common law that should be abandoned. See, e.g., People v. McMahan,
B. The Trustworthiness Doctrine
{15} In recent decades, the corpus delicti rule has been abandoned in the federal courts and in a number of state courts. Moran, supra, at 818. In Opper v. United States,
{16} Adherents to the trustworthiness doctrine believe that the doctrine serves many of the same purposes of the corpus delicti rule, only better. Parker,
C. New Mexico’s Adoption of the Trustworthiness Doctrine
{17} Ten years after the decisions in Op-per and Smith were announced, the New Mexico Supreme Court announced that it had adopted the trustworthiness doctrine and rejected the corpus delicti rule. See Paris,
{18} We therefore conclude that Paris did not adopt the trustworthiness standard in its entirety, because the rule still seems to require that at least some evidence independent of a defendant’s confession actually touch upon the corpus delicti. See State v. Buchanan,
{19} Subsequent decisions by our courts raise questions as to whether the Paris rule is still applicable in New Mexico. For example, just five months after the decision in Paris, the Court in Nance cited to pre-Paris cases to conclude that “[wjhen there is, in addition to a confession, proof of the corpus delicti established by independent evidencе, the defendant’s voluntary confession will support a conviction.” Nance,
{20} In Doe,
{21} Justice Easley, with Justice Payne concurring in dissent, argued that the majority incorrectly applied the Paris rule and that there was substantial evidence to corroborate Doe’s confession. Doe,
{22} While the dissent in Doe certainly raises questions as to what rule is applied in New Mexico, we are not convinced that the majority decision was a radical departure from the Paris rule. Rather, we interpret the disagreement in Doe not as a dispute over the proper rule, but as a dispute over the quantum of independent evidence needed to corroborate a confession and/or independently establish the alleged loss or injury in a given case. See Brian C. Reeve, Note, Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1985: State v. Parker: North Carolina Adopts the Trustworthiness Doctrine, 64 N.C. L.Rev. 1285, 1299 n. 131 (1986) (interpreting the difference between the majority and dissenting opinions in Doe as a disagreement over how much evidence is needed to establish the trustworthiness of a confession). We therefore conclude that the Paris rule survived Doe. See Sanchez,
{23} We observe that while the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in Sosa once again appears to signal a return to the corpus delicti rule, we do not interpret that decision to be a repudiation of the Paris rule. In Sosa, a man was shot in the face and died as a result of his wounds.
{24} Although thе Court in Sosa did not cite to Paris in its discussion of the corpus delicti of a homicide, we observe that the corpus delicti was clearly established in Sosa by independent evidence such that the defendant’s extrajudicial confession was unnecessary for purposes of establishing the corpus dehcti. Id. ¶¶ 15-20. Further, we note that the Court did not state that the corpus dehcti of a crime must be established solely by evidence independent of the corpus dehcti, but rather, simply that where there is no independent evidence of the corpus dehcti, a defendant’s extrajudicial statement cannot be used to estabhsh the corpus dehcti. Id. ¶ 16. This is consistent with the rule in Paris, which still requires some independent evidence of a loss or injury before a defendant’s statement can be used to help estabhsh the corpus dehcti. Paris,
{25} Finally, we observe that neither Defendant nor the State have argued that the rule in Paris is no longer applicable. Additionally, the district court clearly applied the Paris rule, albeit incorrectly, in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. We are therefore satisfied, based on our review of New Mexico ease law and the arguments of the parties and court, that the Paris rule is the proper rule to use with respect to Defendant’s extrajudicial statements and thе corpus dehcti of CSCM in this case. Having determined the proper rule to apply, we now must address whether the district court erred in concluding that Defendant’s statements were sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence and that the independent evidence produced by the State established that the loss or harm aheged in this case actually occurred.
D. Application of New Mexico’s Rule to the Present Case
{26} Our statutes define CSCM as “the unlawful and intentional touching of or applying force to the intimate parts of a minor or the unlawful and intentional causing of a minor to touch one’s intimate parts.” NMSA 1978, § 30-9-13(A) (2003). As previously mentioned, the corpus dehcti of CSCM is established by evidence proving that (1) the minor’s intimate parts wеre touched by someone or that the minor was forced to touch someone’s intimate parts, and (2) that this harm was caused by someone’s criminal agency. See McKenzie,
{27} In concluding that the corpus dehcti of CSCM was established in the present case, the district court found that
[t]he State has identified certain independent circumstantial evidence (be it somewhat tenuous in nature) which tends to verify and support the corpus delicti. This circumstantial evidence (consistent bеhavioral symptoms by the child/victim) identifies some proof of the corpus delicti and would corroborate the trustworthiness of the Defendant’s confessions.
In order to determine whether Defendant’s statements can be considered sufficiently trustworthy in order to estabhsh the corpus dehcti, we must first decide whether the district court was correct in concluding that the independent evidence presented by the State “tend[s] to estabhsh the trustworthiness of [Defendant’s extrajudicial] statement[s].” Paris,
{28} Initially, we observe that the State argued below that timing and circumstances of Defendant’s statements tended to estabhsh the statements as trustworthy. More specifically, the State argued that thе multiple confessions and Defendant’s disease tend to estabhsh the trustworthiness of Defendant’s statements. Although the district court based its decision on the behavioral symptoms of the daughter, we first briefly address these two arguments in order to determine whether the corpus dehcti of CSCM is met in this case. See Maralex Res., Inc. v. Gilbreath,
{29} With respect to the timing and circumstances of Defendant’s statements, Defendant argues that the fact that he made multiple statements concerning his daughter is not in itself sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of an extrajudicial confession. Defendant also argues that his diagnosis with Huntington’s Disease does not bolster his statements, but instead raises additional doubts about the truthfulness of his statements.
{30} We do not think that the fact that Defendant made multiple extrajudicial statements concerning his daughter is sufficient to establish the trustworthiness of his statements. “A second confession adds nothing to prove the crime admitted in the first.” Mullen, supra, at 417; see also United States v. Northrup,
{31} It is for that same reason that we do not believe that the fact that Defendant was suffering from Huntington’s Disease at the time of his statements helps to bolster the trustworthiness оf his statements. As we noted above, evidence of Defendant’s disease merely describes the circumstances surrounding his extrajudicial statements; such evidence does little to corroborate the essential facts of Defendant’s statements. Compare Lee,
{32} Aside from the timing and circumstances of Defendant’s statements, the State argues that the daughter’s behavioral symptoms, i.e., her nightmares and withdrawal from strangers, independently prove the injury to daughter and therefore also establish the trustworthiness of Defendant’s statements. Although the district court found such evidence to be rather “tenuous,” it nevertheless concluded that the daughter’s behavioral symptoms sufficiently bolstered the trustworthiness of Defendant’s confession and provided sufficient independent proof of the harm or injury in this case. We disagree.
{33} In its brief, the State argues that changes in the daughter’s behavior appearing after Defendant’s confession and subsequent arrest are consistent with sexual abuse and therefore prove the alleged injury to the daughter, thereby corroborating Defendant’s confession. Defendant argues that the daughter’s behavioral symptoms are equally consistent with the stress of living with a parent suffering from a debilitating disease or with simply being a toddler. Additionally, Defendant argues that the State’s concession below that the daughter’s behavioral symptoms do not independently establish that the daughter was the victim of sexual abuse lends further support for his argument that the State did not prove the alleged injury to the daughter.
{34} We are not convinced that the daughter’s behavioral symptoms provide adequate proof of the alleged harm to the daughter in this case. In the аbsence of physical evidence of the abuse, we believe that the circumstantial evidence used to independently prove the loss or injury must be more than a small number of behavioral symptoms susceptible to different inferences. See, e.g., Doe,
{35} For example, in Commonwealth v. Villalta-Duarte,
at the same time that the defendant was present at his apartment during the day, the preverbal victim began to cry hysterically when brought to the apartment, developed an intractable diaper rash, and had scratches on her face. These symptoms, which were initially repeated at the home of a new day care provider, disappeared after a few weeks at that provider’s home.
Id. at 1148. Similarly, in Lee,
{36} In this case, the daughter’s behavioral symptoms are simply not sufficient circumstantial evidence that a crime did occur, particularly where the symptoms are susceptible to multiple inferences. See Ray,
CONCLUSION
{37}' We reverse the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{38} IT IS SO ORDERED.