Lead Opinion
¶ 1. Defendants in these consolidated appeals contend the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress evidence seized from a vehicle in which they were passengers. The trial court found that the vehicle’s owner voluntarily consented to the search. Defendants contend: (1) the finding of voluntariness must be reviewed de novo on appeal; (2) the consent to search was not voluntary; and (3) the consent was tainted by the owner’s unlawful de facto arrest. We agree that the finding of voluntariness is subject to de novo review, but conclude that the consent was neither involuntary nor tainted, and therefore affirm.
¶ 2. The facts may be summarized as follows. On the evening of September 15, 2009, a Vermont state trooper monitoring traffic on Interstate 91 observed a vehicle traveling northbound without its rear license plate illuminated. The officer stopped the vehicle and approached it on foot from the passenger side. The vehicle was occupied by three men, later identified as Timothy Stone, the driver and owner; defendant Michael Weisler, the front passenger; and defendant Raymond King, the rear passenger. The officer asked for Stone’s license and registration, and inquired as to his travel plans. In the process, the officer observed what he believed to be “marijuana flakes” on Weisler’s shirt. The officer asked Stone to exit the vehicle, frisked him, and ordered him to be seated
¶ 3. The officer asked for Weisler’s identification, and was told that it was behind the seat. The officer thereupon asked Weisler to exit the vehicle. As Wеisler reached under the seat, the officer observed on the floor a box of cellophane wrap and a clear baggie of white powder consistent in the officer’s opinion with cocaine. Based on this observation and concern for his own safety, the officer ordered the men out of the vehicle, drew his handgun, and loudly shouted commands at both Weisler and King to get down on the ground and not to move. Both men were handcuffed and searched. The officer agreed that Stone had an opportunity to observe these events from where he was seated in the cruiser, and the police videotape clearly captures both the audio of the encounter and a subsequent visual of the men in handcuffs being searched.
¶ 4. The officer subsequently returned to the cruiser, informed Stone that there was “a big bag of cocaine” in his car, assured him that none of the men were under arrest, and told him that he would like to search the car “with your consent.”
¶ 5. All three men were charged with possession of cocaine. They filed a joint motion to suppress, asserting that Stone’s exit order was unwarranted by any reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, and that his subsequent consent to search was effectively coerced by the show of force against King and Weislеr. Following a hearing in which only the investigating officer testified, the court issued a written ruling denying the motion. The court found that the exit order was supported by a reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity, and that Stone’s consent to search was uncoerced and voluntary. Weisler and King entered conditional pleas of guilty and filed separate appeals, which we consolidated for review. Stone’s case remains pending.
I.
¶ 6. Defendants renew their claim that Stone’s consent to the warrantless search of his vehicle was involuntary, and that all of the evidence seized therefrom must be
¶ 7. In considering this issue, we do not write on a blank slate. The same question arose in connection with consent to search in State v. Sprague,
¶ 8. While thus seemingly settled, the standard-of-review issue nevertheless conceals layers of complexity largely unexamined in our earlier decisions. Indeed, our approach to date has been somewhat more reflexive than reflective, relying on the characterization of questions as “factual” or “legal” or a “mixed question” of law and fact without significant attention to the reasons for deferential or independent review in a particular context. Lack of clarity on the topic is not unique to this jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court has itself acknowledged that “the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive,” and that it has “not charted an entirely clear course in this area.” Miller v. Fenton,
¶ 9. As we recognized in Sprague,
¶ 10. At the same time, many state courts have adopted the two-step approach set forth in Sprague, deferring to the trial court’s underlying findings of historical fact while independently deciding as a matter of law whether they ultimately demonstrate that the defendant’s consent was voluntary and not the product of police duress or coercion. See, e.g., Woods v. State,
¶ 11. As so often with the law, tracing the source of a rule can yield unexpected insights. One leading criminal-law commentator notes that the clearly erroneous standard is most often “attributed to the Supreme Court’s assertion in
¶ 12. Context here is critical, because the standard of review governing the voluntariness of confessions — at the time of Schneckloth and since — is generally de novo. See Miller,
¶ 13. More recent Supreme Court decisions, starting with Miller v. Fenton, offer additional guidance. There, the high court specifically rejected the government’s claim that the “case-specific” nature of the “voluntariness” inquiry undermined any basis for independent review of confessions in habeas proceedings.
¶ 14. The Court proceeded to explain that determining whether, in a given case, a suspect’s consent was given voluntarily and in compliance with due process implicates a “complex of values . . . [that] militates against treating the question as one of simple historical fact.” Id. at 116 (quotation and citation omitted). Moreover, as the high court later explained in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., “the rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfinding function be performed in the particular case by a jury or by a trial judge.”
¶ 15. The Supreme Court subsequently refined its functional approach to standard-of-review issues in a pair of seminal criminal-procedure rulings, Thompson v. Keohane and Ornelas. In Thompson, the Court held that the question of whether a suspect is “in custody” and therefore entitled to Miranda warnings was “a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independеnt review.”
¶ 16. Instructively, the Court applied similar factors and reasoning in reaching its conclusion in both cases. First, the Court noted that “objective” factors inform both decisions. In resolving the in-custody issue, the question is “what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and “would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at
¶ 17. In addition, the Court found that independent review by appellate courts provides useful precedents to “guide future decisions” as well as to “guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.” Thompson,
¶ 18. Any number of courts have since looked to the principles articulated in Miller, Thompson, and Ornelas to determine the appropriate standard of review of other issues, including the voluntariness of a consent to search. Many have concluded that these principles militate in favor of independent review. State v. Thurman,
[T]he concept of “voluntariness” reflects a balance between the need for effective law enforcement and society’s belief that the coercive powers of law enforcement must not be unfairly exercised. Declaring whether certain police conduct is or is not unfairly coercive sets the norms that fix the limits of acceptable police behavior. There can be little question that establishing such norms involves substantive policy judgments and that such norms should have jurisdiction-wide application. These are functions classically reserved to multi-judge aрpellate panels. In short, what constitutes unfairly coercive police behavior should not vary from courtroom to courtroom within Utah. This end is best accomplished by viewing the ultimate conclusion that consent was voluntary or involuntaryas a question of law, reviewable for correctness.
Id. (citations omitted).
¶ 19. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also engaged in a thoughtful analysis of the issue in State v. Phillips,
¶ 20. As noted, other courts have reached similar conclusions, for similar reasons. See, e.g., Phuagnong v. State,
¶ 21. Still, a number of courts, for reasons not always clear, continue to apply the clearly erroneous standard to consent to search. Although rarely discussed in the case law, objections to independent review appear to focus on several points. First is the matter of judicial resources, i.e., the concern that de novo review is “redundant and wasteful” and might serve to encourage frivolous appeals. Thurman,
¶ 22. Another related concern expressed by some commentators is the need to define “effective limiting principle^] for when constitutional fact review should be applied,” so that every issue with a constitutional dimension does not necessarily acquire de novo status. Hoffman, supra,
¶23. Finally, there is the argument from authority. This generally takes two forms. Those courts that continue to apply a clearly erroneous standard do so largely on the basis of lоngstanding precedent — precedent that relies, in turn, on Schneckloth’s characterization of the question as one of fact comparable to confessions. See e.g., Navarro,
¶ 24. A few courts have gone further and determined not to depart from the clearly erroneous standard on the strength of the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of Schneckloth in Ohio v. Robinette,
¶ 25. With this background in mind, we are persuaded that the reasoning of those courts that have adopted independent review in this setting is fundamentally sound, and that any objections are without merit.
¶ 26. At the same time, as the Supreme Court stressed in Ornelas, the “multi-faceted” nature of the voluntariness inquiry underscores the need for a body of binding case-law applying the consent-standard in a variety of individual cases, thereby providing “content . . . through application” and guidance to the police and the trial courts.
¶ 27. Although our dissenting colleague objects to this holding on several grounds, none proves persuasive. The dissent expresses initial concern about “the breadth of the majority holding,” observing that “the issues underlying a motion to suppress can be very different.” Post, ¶¶ 47, 48. We quite agree, which is why our analysis is focused exclusively on consent to search, and our holding is limited to that issue. The concern for overbreadth is unfounded.
¶ 28. Equally baseless is the dissent’s suggestion that our holding represents a departure from past practice based on a misguided desire to “fix” what is not broken. Post, ¶ 51. On the contrary, as explained at the beginning of this opinion, the law in this area (our own included) is strikingly unsettled and inconsistent, and warrants the fresh review in the preceding discussion. Nor does our holding break new ground. While we acknowledge the split of authority on the question presented, we ultimately rely on the reasoning in numerous state court decisions that the voluntariness of a suspect’s consent to search must be examined independently by a reviewing court.
¶ 29. Turning to issues of substance, the dissent questions the relevance of the trilogy of Supreme Court decisions — Miller, Thompson, and Ornelas — that inform our analysis. If these cases are indeed inapposite then we can only conclude that the numerous courts and commentators that have relied on them for similar guidance must be equally misinformed. That is not, however, the case. While it was decided as a habeas matter, Thompson’s analysis of the respective roles of trial and appellate courts has been usefully applied beyond the habeas context, to hold, for example, that “in custody” determinations for Miranda purposes must be reviewed de novo in direct appeals. See, e.g., United States v. LeBrun,
¶ 30. The dissent’s critique of Ornelas is weaker still, resting on a claim that we have ignored or rejected that portion of the Supreme Court’s opinion reaffirming the traditional deference afforded trial court findings of historical fact. Ornelas’s significance, however, was its seminal holding — later specifically reaffirmed in United States v. Arvizu,
¶ 31. The third and arguably most compelling leg of our analysis, Miller v. Fenton, the dissent dismisses as yet another habeas case. As explained, however, the Supreme Court expressly extended its holding in Miller to direct appeals in Fulminante,
¶ 32. The dissent further claims that the “most important” distinction between this case and the Supreme Court decisiоns is that the voluntariness inquiry here implicates a “subjective” standard requiring a determination of the defendant’s state of mind, an inquiry that turns principally on issues of fact. Post, ¶¶ 61, 64. The argument is demonstrably incorrect. This and other courts have repeatedly recognized that the fundamental inquiry in the consent-to-search context is whether “a reasonable person in defendant’s circumstances would . . . have felt free to refuse.” Sprague,
¶ 33. The voluntariness inquiry may include an appraisal of such personal attributes as the suspect’s age, education, maturity, and intelligence. Fulminante,
¶ 34. Ultimately, it is not the purported distinctions from Ornelas, Thompson, and Miller that appear to drive the dissent but rather a fundamental disagreement with their holdings, a disagreement grounded on a suspicion that de novo review somehow represents a “negative assessment of the quality of fact-finding by trial courts with respect to federal constitutional questions.” Post, ¶ 76. This inference is unfounded and can not be reached by anything stated or implied in the majority opinion. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, we continue to accord substantial deference to the trial court’s findings of historical fact. Nothing in our opinion can or should be construed to undermine this fundamental principle of appellate review.
II.
¶ 35. Turning to the particular facts and circumstances presented, our independent review of the record leads us to conclude that Stone’s consent to search was voluntary. Defendants’ appeal focuses on two principal points. First, they contend the trial court disregarded a critical circumstance that allegedly rendered the environment inherently coercive, to wit, Stone’s observation from the police cruiser of defendants’ being forced to the ground at gunpoint, handcuffed, and patted
¶ 36. Viewing the officer with his gun drawn outside of the police cruiser might have seemed intimidating to Stone, sitting inside of the cruiser. Nevertheless, we are persuaded by all of the surrounding facts and circumstances that his consent to search was voluntary. Display of a weapon, shouting, and forcibly subduing or handcuffing a suspect does not per se vitiate a subsequent consent to search that the record otherwise shows to be uncoerced and freely given. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
¶ 37. Stone’s observation of the officers’ display of force may have been unsettling, but it was not specifically directed at him, and there was nothing about the encounter to suggest that Stone’s capacity to reason should have been unhinged or his ability to consent overborne. See United States v. Taylor,
¶ 38. It is true that the officer also cautioned Stone that a refusal to give consent would result in the officer’s “attempting to obtain a search warrаnt from a judge.” We have explained, however, that statements indicating an intent by the police to apply for a warrant merely “describe what will occur in the event of a refusal” and do not undermine a subsequent consent to search. State v. Pitts,
¶ 39. Second, defendants assert that Stone was indisputably in police custody — indeed that he was effectively under arrest without probable cause — thereby rendering his consent to search involuntary and “tainting” any evidence obtained therefrom. See Sprague,
¶ 41. Whatever the merits of this claim, the facts establish no causal nexus between Stone’s brief initial detention and his later consent to search. As noted, the record shows that Stone denied any illegality; that the officer then left the cruiser to speak with the remaining passengers in the vehicle about what he believed to be marijuana, where he observed the cocaine and related packaging materials; and that he then returned to the cruiser, informed Stone about the contraband, and received consent to search during the subsequent colloquy. Nothing that occurred during the initial detention, therefore, appears to have caused the officer to approach and question the other passengers, observe the cocaine, or return to question Stone. We thus discern no basis to conclude that the initial detention led to or “tainted” the later consent. To the extent that there was any connection, however, we are satisfied that it was sufficiently attenuated by the several intervening events. See Sprague,
¶42. Even assuming, however, that Stone was effectively in custody and under arrest when he actually consented to the search, the de facto arrest would only be illegal if the police at that point lacked probable cause. See State v. Guzman,
¶ 43. Probable cause to arrest or search may be based on the observation of illegal drugs by an officer with the training and experience to identify them as such. See, e.g., State v. Delaoz,
¶ 44. Viewing the circumstances presented here in their entirety and in a “practical [and] . . . common sense manner,” Guzman,
Affirmed.
Notes
Although the trial court found that the record was unclear whether Stone was handcuffed at this time, defendants claimed in their opening brief that he was handcuffed. The State disagreed, and defendants ultimately conceded in their reply brief and at oral argument that he was not handcuffed until later, and then only for a brief period of three to four minutes.
Although the trial court made no findings on whether or when Stone was handcuffed, the parties agree that the videotape shows that the investigating officer placed Stone in handcuffs shortly after subduing Weisler and King, but removed them several minutes later, before the second interview with Stone in which he consented to the search.
The State does not contest defendants’ standing to assert the claim under the automatic standing rule of State v. Wright, 157 Vt. 653, 654,
Our own confession cases are similarly erratic, occasionally stating that we review for clear error, see, e.g., State v. Beckley,
Although Miller involved federal habeas review of a state decision, the Court has since applied the independent review standard to confessions on direct appeal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante,
Our conclusion is based on the persuasive principles articulated by the Supreme Court and applied by a number of state courts, as discussed above. Therefore, we note, but need not resolve, the ongoing debate among courts and commentators as to whether the principles articulated by the Supreme Court concerning the standard of review for Fourth Amendment-related issues are actually binding on the states. See generally R. Coombs, A Third Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still Growing Regulation of State Courts’ Criminal Appeals, 2005 Mich. St. L. Rev. 541, 551-52 (discussing the substantial confusion among state appellate courts as to whether they are bound to apply the Supreme Court’s de novo review decisions because the Court “has not yet expressly stated, nor otherwise eliminated substantial doubt, ... in whole or part [that] such review is constitutional doctrine and thus binding on both federal and state appellate courts”).
Stone was also handcuffed at one point during the episode, but defendants have conceded that the handcuffs were removed before the conversation with the officer in which he gave consent to search.
Defendants also summarily assert that the trial court’s statements, quoted above, indicate that the court impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the voluntariness of consent to defendants. See State v. Pitts,
See, e.g., United States v. Lasso-Barrios,
While asserting that he was effectively under arrest, Stone does not seek to suppress under Miranda v. Arizona,
Concurrence Opinion
¶ 45. concurring and dissenting. The majority correctly acknowledges that the standard-of-review issue in this case conceals “layers of complexity” previously unexamined by this Court. Ante, ¶ 8. I am pleased that we are finally
¶ 46. My disagreement takes two forms. I think our change of direction was wrong in any Fourth Amendment case for reasons I state below.
¶ 47. My second disagreement is with the breadth of the majority holding and our earlier decisions. We have assumed that all motions to suppress should be decided on de novo review, without distinguishing between the underlying issues, see State v. Pitts,
¶ 48. As this case demonstrates, the issues underlying a motion to suppress can be very different, and the differences are significant for the question before us. As I argue below, even if some issues raised in motions to suppress should involve a de novo standard of review when they reach this Court, the issue of whether consent to search is voluntary should not be subject to de novo review. The decisions from other jurisdictions are overwhelmingly against de novo review in this instance, and I do not believe that the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt it even for the federal courts.
¶ 49. No act is more difficult for an appellate judge than to affirm a lower
¶ 50. We are, however, not omnipotent, and we have to accept that other judicial officers may have a better and more informed perspective on a case than we do. We develop limitations on our review responsibility with that point in mind. The central thesis of standards of review is that we should not allocate decisional responsibility based on power and stature, but instead on systems that best produce accurate and fair decisions of high quality. Those systems are not infallible either, and they occasionally produce results that appear to us to be wrong. As difficult as it may be to accept the apparently wrong decisions, overall the quality of decision-making is enhanced by the system.
¶ 51. We have a clear system of allocating decisional responsibility between the trial courts and the Supreme Court, and it has been develoрed and refined over hundreds of years. It best achieves accuracy and fairness in judicial decisions, and it best allocates limited resources. There is no evidence that it is in any sense broken or deficient, even when constitutional decisions are involved. We made a mistake in trying to “fix” it — a mistake we should correct today.
¶ 52. I will start with the narrower point, that the question of whether consent to search is voluntary should not be subject to de novo review in this Court. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said explicitly, see Ohio v. Robinette,
¶ 53. In this case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing in which one officer — but none of the occupants of the vehicle — testified. It found, based on that testimony and a police-vehicle videotape of some of the events, that the consent to search was voluntary. Under our traditional
¶ 54. Our lоng-standing standard of review was based fundamentally on a policy choice of who should make this type of decision. See Miller v. Fenton,
¶ 55. The majority concludes, however, that there are reasons to eliminate any deferential standard of review for certain constitutional facts, particularly whether consent to search is voluntary. In making its analysis, the majority emphasizes the reasons for eliminating any deference, but largely ignores any contrary reasons. We are free to develop our own jurisprudence in this area, and if we consider all of the relevant reasons, we should stay with our traditional standard of review, which has served us well.
¶ 56. Before I explain the reasons for my position, I want to explain the state of the law. Although not quite saying so, the majority specifically points to two U.S. Supreme Court decisions as requiring de novo review in this case: Thompson v. Keohane,
¶ 57. Ornelas is arguably closer because it involves Fourth Amendment issues and the proper standard of review. It held that the question of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is present is reviewed under a modified de novo standard. Ornelas observed that “[articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible,” and that these are “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.” Ornelas,
¶ 58. We decided Sprague seven years after the Supreme Court decided Ornelas and, nevertheless, observed that “federal appellate courts uniformly apply a clearly erroneous standard to the voluntary-consent issue.” Sprague,
¶ 59. The majority takes me to task for not acknowledging that there are contrary decisions. I readily acknowledge that fact but emphasize that the majority has adopted a rule supported by only a relatively small minority of courts around the country, a point the majority does not concede.
We decline Tompkins’ invitation to employ Ornelas’ two-tier standard when we review a district court’s determination whether consent to search was given voluntarily. The Supreme Court reiterated its deferential standard of review for Fourth Amendment voluntariness determinations in Ohio v. Robinette, a post-Ornelas decision. The Robinette Court noted that voluntariness of consent to search is a question of fact; as such, it does not trigger the de novo review mandated by the Supreme Court in Ornelas for mixed questions of law and fact. The Supreme Court’s refusal to depart from its established precedent, coupled "with the virtually monolithic position of the circuits in affording deferential review to voluntariness inquiries raised by consensual searches, persuades us that Tompkins’ reliance on Ornelas to mandate a change in our clear error standard of review is misplaced.
Id. at 120-21.
¶ 61. Second, and most important, the issue of whether consent to search is voluntary involves a determination of the defendant’s state of mind, which is a question of fact, as the Supreme Court has held over and over. It is no less a question of fact where the “fact” is not directly observable. Thus, it is the kind of question for which appellate courts routinely give deference to the trial courts. See Logan v. State,
¶ 62. Not only is the question one of fact, it is a question of historical fact. The court must determine whether the consent to search was voluntary at the time it was given. This awareness is important because, in my judgment, the majority has created an artificial and unworkable distinction under which questions of historical fact are reviewed deferentially under a clearly erroneous standard, except when they are not, as in this case.
¶ 63. There are important differences between the question before this Court and those before the Supreme Court in Ornelas and Thompson. In Thompson, the issue was whether the defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes when he was interrogated.
¶ 64. The issue in this case — whether defendant’s consent to search was voluntary — is almost entirely subjective, based on all the relevant circumstances. See Schneckloth,
¶ 65. The trial judge’s perspective in seeing and hearing the witnesses is very important in determining the actual state of mind of the defendant. Factual findings made from that perspective deserve deference
¶ 66. A related difference involves the nature of the standards being applied. The standards in Thompson and Ornelas involve legal terminology that can be understood only in the context of the many court decisions defining it and the origin and purposes of the standards. The Court observed in Ornelas that “[articulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible,” and that these were “fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed.”
¶ 67. For related reasons, I do not believe that this case is controlled by Miller v. Fenton,
¶ 68. Miller contains important analysis that is inconsistent with the majority’s position. First, the Court noted that while the state court conclusion on voluntariness is not presumed to be correct under § 2254(d), the federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding should “give great weight to the considered conclusions of a coequal state judiciary.” Id. at 112. Thus, Miller should not be cited for the proposition that the Supreme Court favored giving no weight to the state court determination of voluntariness in a de novo review. Indeed, like Ornelas, the decision actually supports giving some deference to state court decisions.
¶ 69. Second, the Court made a number of observations that support deferential review in this case. It noted, “that an issue involves an inquiry into state of mind is not at all inconsistent with treating it as a question of fact.” Id. at 113. It added that “an issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional question.” Id. The Court noted that the factfiaw distinction “at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.” Id. at 114. All of these observations cut against de novo review in this case.
¶ 70. Finally, the Court noted the uniqueness of determining whether a confession is voluntary, noting that it has two components: (1) “whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means”; and (2) “whether the defendant’s will was in fact overborne.” Id. at 116. The presence of the first component distinguishes the confession
¶ 71. The third reason that the controlling precedents are against de novo review is that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in requiring de novo review, аpplying it to some mixed questions of fact and law and not to others, even though the others involve constitutional questions. See B. Adamson, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) as an Ideological Weapon?, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1025, 1064 (2007) (“Put bluntly, it is difficult to discern a principled reason why this inconsistency exists.”). The majority’s holding that all motions to suppress are reviewed de novo finds no support in the Supreme Court decisions. Even after Ornelas, and even if we were employing an objective standard, and even if we called the determination of voluntariness a mixed question of fact and law rather than a question of fact, it is unpredictable whether the Supreme Court would apply de novo review to the voluntariness of consent. Under these circumstances, it should not be unexpected that the federal courts of appeal have not changed the nature of their appellate review in determining whether consent to search is voluntary.
¶ 72. The situation is the same for the state appellate courts and for the same reason. A majority of states with supreme court decisions on this issue continue to maintain that great deference must be given to a trial court’s determination of whether consent was voluntary.
¶ 73. I agree with the substantial majority of state and federal courts that apply deferential review to a determination of whether consent to search is voluntary. For the reasons given, I do not believe that the U.S. Supreme Court would rule that review of such voluntariness rulings should be de novo. For the additional reasons discussed in the next section of this dissent, I would not follow a contrary U.S. Supreme Court decision if it occurred.
¶ 74. Having stated my position on the narrow question before us, I turn to the broader question of whether we should ever use a de novo standard of review for motions to suppress based on constitutional claims, my response to the broad holding of the majority. In my view, we should not adopt a de novo review standard for multiple reasons.
¶ 75. First, there are no persuasive reasons why we should abandon deferential review of fact questions that determine constitutional rights while maintaining such review for other comparable questions. As discussed above, whether consent to search is voluntary is a question of fact involving a determination of the state of mind of the person who gave consent. Constitutional rights are important, but thе consequence of the decision to the litigants may be no less great in other contexts where we defer to the trial judge’s expertise and superior position in evaluating the evidence. Because our deference policy is based on the superior position of the trial judge to evaluate the evidence, a de novo standard necessarily lessens the quality of the decision making. There is no evidence that fact-finding by this Court will result in better or more accurate decisions than those by trial judges. The whole point of our standard-of-review jurisprudence is that it will not. Thus, we are in the internally inconsistent position of reducing the quality of fact-finding because the facts involved are particularly important.
¶ 76. It is hard to see the majority decision as anything other than a negative assessment of the quality of fact-finding by trial courts with respect to federal constitutional questions.
¶ 77. It is also important to recognize that the alternative to de novo review is not ineffective review. We operated under a deferential standard of review for many, many years and were able to ensure that the full requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were implemented. Giving deference to a trial court’s factual determination does not mean that we will uphold it if it is not supported by the evidence or that we will affirm conclusions that are inconsistent with applicable legal standards. A good example of this point is our decision in State v. Roberts,
¶ 78. Under the majority standard, the one actor whose analysis of the evidence is irrelevant is the trial judge. The result is that no one will evaluate the demeanor of the witnesses and the inferences that can be made from their presentation. That loss is very significant in a case like this because defendant’s claims are that the statements and actions of the officer were coercive, and that officer’s testimony is the record before us. Because only their ultimate conclusion matters, trial judges have no incentive to provide a detailed analysis of the evidence where there is de novo review, and they are less likely to do so. As I discussed above, not even the U.S. Supreme Court has gone that far in reducing the role of the trial court. Ornelas held that appellate courts should “give due weight to inferences drawn from [historical] facts by resident judges.”
¶ 79. Second, a de novo standard of review wastes limited judicial resources and increases the number of appeals. The standard of review is a significant factor in determining whether to appeal a trial court decision. G. Somerville, Standards of Appellate Review, 15 Litig. 23, 24-25 (1989). A very limited standard of review makes reversal of the trial court decision unlikely; de novo review means that there is no presumption of affirmance. The decision on a suppression motion to exclude evidence obtained in a search and seizure is often determinative of when the State can obtain a conviction. The overwhelming majority of our criminal cases involve publicly funded lawyers who are less concerned with the cost of an appeal than the potential results. With no presumption that the trial court decision is correct, they have every incentive to appeal in virtually all cases. A de novo appeal rule will increase the number of appeals and increase the waste from duplicative adjudications. I do not see this as a positive effect.
¶ 80. The third reason responds directly to the asserted reason for de novo review in Fourth Amendment cases. The Supreme Court in Ornelas reasoned that de novo review is “necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles.”
¶ 81. The Supreme Court’s analysis minimizes the effectiveness of deferential review to ensure the fair application of legal principles and the full consideration of all relevant factors. Deferential review does not mean no review, as I discussed above using our decision in State v. Roberts as the example. We give no deference in determining the applicable law and in being sure it is applied. We give no deference if the trial court’s conclusion is not supported by its findings or if the findings are inadequate. Even where we give deference to the trial court’s conclusion, we may reverse that conclusion if we conclude that the trial court went beyond its discretion. In my opinion, our traditional standard of review results in a defined set of rules for guidance of trial courts and law enforcement officials. The whole point of deferential review is for the appellate court “to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles.” Ornelas,
¶ 82. In my opinion, the improved results of de novo review are wishful thinking even if we ignore the loss of the perspective of the judicial officer who heard and saw the evidence. The Court argued that different results from different trial judges on the samе facts “would be inconsistent with the idea of a unitary system of law.” Id. The same criticism can be made of different appellate judges who, put in the role of fact-finder, will reach a different result from small variations in facts; and, of course, the makeup of appellate courts will change. Since we adopted de novo review of decisions on motions to suppress, many of our decisions have been divided, a not unexpected result where the Justices are acting as trial judges. As examples of the three-to-two decisions, see State v. Muntean,
¶ 83. The Supreme Court admitted as much in Ornelas, noting that under multi-faceted substantive standards, “one determination will seldom be a useful ‘precedent’ for another,” quoting Illinois v. Gates,
¶ 84. To summarize, I would hold that we made a mistake in changing our standard
¶ 85. I agree with the majority’s result in this case, but would reach that result based primarily on the conclusion that the trial court’s determination that the consent to search was voluntary was not clearly erroneous. I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis, except in one critical respect. Relying upon an inapplicable holding from Sprague,
Since this is a case decided under the Fourth Amendment, I have limited my discussion to federal constitutional questions. We have also apparently chosen to adopt a de novo standard of review for criminal procedure cases decided under the Vеrmont Constitution. Again, I believe this change of standard of review is unwise and, in any event, overbroad. I will leave explanation of this position to a future case.
As I discuss infra, the majority holds that we decided to the contrary in Sprague. Ante, ¶¶ 25, 32. That characterization of Sprague is wrong. One of the subsidiary questions in Sprague was whether the defendant was seized, and we explained the federal objective seizure standard — “ ‘whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” Sprague,
In addition, numerous state appellate courts grant significant deference to the trial court on the issue of voluntary consent. See, e.g., Kennedy v. State,
I am amazed that the majority resists this assessment. If the de novo standard of review is not based on an evaluation of the trial court’s fact-finding on constitutional issues, why did we abandon hundreds of years of precedent to abruptly say that we will give no deference to a trial judge’s fact-finding for certain factual issues? If that is not the motivation for the majority’s ruling, why do we refuse to give even the deference called for in Ornelas? In the end, the only real rationale for the holding is that we trust ourselves to do constitutional fact-finding, but do not trust trial judges enough to give any deference to their findings.
