"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FORGERY CONVICTION."
"THE GUILTY VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL."
{¶ 3} In her two assignments of error, Weese contends that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence and based on insufficient evidence. This Court disagrеes.
{¶ 4} "While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met its burden of persuasion." State v. Gulley (Mar. 15, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 19600, at *1, citing State v. Thompkins (1997),
"[b]ecause sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that а conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency. Thus, a determination that [a] conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency." (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Roberts (Sept. 17, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 96CA006462, at *2.
{¶ 5} Therefore, we will address Wеese's claim that her conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence first, as it is dispositive of her claim of insufficiency.
{¶ 6} When a defendant asserts that her conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, *3
"an appellate court must review the entire rеcord, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviсtion must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Otten (1986),
, 33 Ohio App.3d 339 340 .
{¶ 7} This discretionary power should be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant. Id.
{¶ 8} Weese was convicted of forgery, in violation of R.C.
{¶ 9} Under R.C.
{¶ 10} Barberton Police Department Patrolman Terry Mullinex ("Mullinex") testified that on February 16, 2007, he was called to the Barberton Checksmart because a female had attempted to pass a fraudulent money order. After he spoke with Vansickle, Mullinex spoke with Weese. Weese showed Mullinex the envelope in which she received the money order. According to Mullinex, the envelope was a brown paper bag-type envelope that was hand addressed to Weese with no return address. The envelope's postmark indicated that it was sent on February 13, 2007 frоm south Florida. Woodbridge was located in Chicago, Illinois.
{¶ 11} We find from the testimony that the State presented sufficient evidence that the money order was forged as it is defined in R.C.
{¶ 12} We next turn to Weese's argument that she did not know that the money order was forged when she presented it. "Knowingly" is one of the culpable mental states defined in R.C.
"A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist."
{¶ 13} Weese argues that thе State did not present any witnesses or evidence that "definitively establish" that she knew the money order was forged. However, because a defendant's mental state is difficult to demonstrate with direct evidence, it may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances in the case. State v. Logan (1979),
{¶ 14} If the State relies on circumstantial evidence to prove an essential element of an offense, it is not necessary for "`such evidence to be irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.'" State v. Daniels (June 3, 1998), 9th Dist. No. 18761, at *1, quoting State v. Jenks (1991),
{¶ 15} In this case, Vansickle testified that she had learned that Weese had attempted to present the money order to another Checksmart location. According to Vansickle, an internal company computer program, kept in the regular course of business, revealed that Weese had tried to cash the money order at another Akron area Checksmart, but the transaction was not completed. See Evid. R. 803(6). Vansickle testified that Weese informed her that the money order was a portion of her income tax return. Weese explained that her tax rеturn had been directly deposited into her bank account and because she owed the bank money, the bank deducted the amount she owed and then sent her the balance via money order.
{¶ 16} Mullinex testified that Weese informed him that she had her income tax return directly deрosited into her account at FirstMerit, which was overdrawn. Therefore, FirstMerit deducted the amount Weese owed from her income tax return and sent her the money order. Mullinex stated that Weese's explanation was odd because it "was kind of odd to me that the Woodbridge Currency Exchange would be sent to her from a bank when they have their own money orders or checks." Weese also informed Mullinex that her tax return was for $2,300 and that she owed the bank $200-$300. When Mullinex asked her about the difference, Weese told him that she had received more money оrders that she had deposited into a new account at a different bank. Mullinex further testified that Weese tried to negotiate the money order in question at two other locations but "they denied her." Mullinex stated that although Weese was cooperative at first, "[s]he got very defensive, irate, swearing in the store. So we removed her from the store because it was a public place and placed her in the cruiser where she became more belligerent and loud and abusive towards me." *7
{¶ 17} Weese testified that because she did not have timе to go to her bank, she attempted to cash the money order at a Checksmart location. She testified that the money order could not be verified at that location so she went to National City Bank where she opened an account. She explained that she had been banking with FirstMerit, but FirstMerit closed her account because it was overdrawn. Weese stated that she had received a total of five money orders and that her income tax return was for $3,500. She was supposed to receive $3,200 back from FirstMerit. She testified that she deрosited four money orders for $800 each at National City. This deposit totaled $3,200. Weese then testified that she discussed with the someone at National City "about where it came from and so I didn't want to get money back because I was a little suspicious of how they came abоut but after I left the bank, I thought they were legit so I took one to cash it so I could have money because I hadn't got paid in almost three weeks." Accordingly, Weese took the fifth money order and left National City. Weese attempted to cash the money order at anоther check cashing location and "they said they couldn't verify it from the number on the [money order.]" She then went to the Checksmart branch in Barberton that Vansickle managed. Weese testified that she did not know where the money orders came from or from whom they were sent. She furthеr testified that she thought they were valid.
{¶ 18} On cross-examination Weese affirmed that she had received five money orders for $800 each, totaling $4,000. Weese explained that "I thought they may have just accidentally printed an extra one[.]" She verified that she knew that she had received too many money orders. She also explained that she chose not to cash the fifth money order at National City but instead decided to try to "cash it myself." She also testified that whenever she had received anything from her bank in the past, it had the FirstMerit emblem on it and the envelope had a return address. *8
{¶ 19} From the evidence presented, we find that the trial court's determination that Weese knew that the money order was forged, as that term is defined in R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27. *9
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this dоcument shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App. R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
*1CARR, P. J. WHITMORE, J. CONCUR