State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Joey Michael Wayland, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20190274
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
Filed 05/07/20
2020 ND 106
Jensen, Chief Justice.
State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Joey Michael Wayland, Defendant and Appellant
Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial District, the Honorable Joshua B. Rustad, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.
Samuel A. Gereszek, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellаnt; submitted on brief.
Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State‘s Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and appellee; submitted on brief.
[¶1] Joey Wayland appeаls from a district court‘s judgment entered following a jury verdict finding him guilty of Theft of Property and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. Wayland contends his case should have been dismissed because his right to a speedy trial was violated by a continuance of his trial from March 11, 2019 to April 8, 2019. Wayland also contends the district court violated his right to remain silent by ordering him to submit to a mental health evaluation. We affirm.
I
[¶2] On November 6, 2018, Wayland was arrested and charged with Theft of Property in violation of
[¶3] On March 8, 2019, the district court continued the trial scheduled for March 11, 2019. On March 10, while represented by counsel, Wayland wrote a letter to the court with a multitude of generalized complaints including an objection to any continuаnce of his case and seeking a dismissal of the case because his right to a speedy trial had been violated. The March 11, 2019 trial was rescheduled for April 8, 2019, rescheduled again for May 6, 2019, and rescheduled again and held on July 30, 2019.
[¶4] The court does not apрear to have initially considered Wayland‘s March 10, 2019 letter, filed while he was represented by counsel, as a motion to dismiss. However, on April 23, the court granted Wayland‘s second attorney‘s request to withdraw as Wayland‘s counsel, acknowledged Wayland‘s lettеr contained a request to dismiss for violation of Wayland‘s right to a speedy trial, and requested the State respond to the letter. The request to dismiss within Wayland‘s March 11, 2019 letter was made without factual assertions or legal citations and consisted of the following:
[¶5] On appeal, Wayland asserts his convictions should be vacated and his case dismissed because his right to a sрeedy trial was violated. He also argues his right to remain silent was violated when he was ordered to submit to a mental health examination.
II
[¶6] Wayland contends the district court‘s continuance of the March 11, 2019 trial date violated his right to a speedy trial. He did not file a motion to dismiss challenging the continuance of either the April 8, 2019 trial date or the May 6, 2019 trial date.
[¶7] “A defendant in a criminal prоceeding has the right to a speedy trial under
[¶8] A district court‘s speedy trial decision is reviewed de novo, but the court‘s findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Hamre, 2019 ND 86 at 10. In Hamre we recognized that this Court has adopted a four-part balаncing test from Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), to decide speedy trial claims under the state and federal constitutions. Id. ¶ 11. The four-part test includes the following: (1) thе length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the accused‘s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice to the accused. Id. This Court has held a delay of one year or more is “presumptively prejudicial.” State v. Moran, 2006 ND 62, ¶ 9, 711 N.W.2d 915 (citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992)).
[¶9] Our review of this issue is de novo. Ordinarily the absence of oral or written findings by the court would compel a remand of the case for the purpose of requiring the district court to make findings regarding the defendant‘s request to dismiss for violation of the defendant‘s right to a speedy trial. However, our de novo review of this case сompels the conclusion the continuance of the March 11, 2019 trial did not violate Wayland‘s right to a speedy trial. Wayland filed his lеtter requesting dismissal based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial on March 10, 2019. Wayland‘s request for dismissal asserted no factual or legal support for the request, other than “the 90th day for speedy rights to trial has passed.” The letter did not include any discussion of thе four-part test this Court applies in reviewing potential speedy trial violations. He did not renew or expand on that request with rеgard to the rescheduling of the April 8, 2019 trial date or the May 6, 2019 trial date. His request to dismiss was made within a three-page letter containing numerous generalized complaints, written to the court while he was represented by counsel. On March 10, 2019, his case had been pending for a total of 124 days and at the rescheduled trial date of April 8, 2019, his case would have been pending 153 days. Wayland has failed to articulate any prejudice caused by the continuance of the
III
[¶10] For the first time on appeal, Wayland argues his constitutional right to remain silent was violated when his attorney requested he submit to a mental evaluation. “Issues not raised at trial will not be addressed on appeal unless the alleged error rises to the level of obvious error under
IV
[¶11] Waylаnd‘s right to a speedy trial was not violated by the continuance of his trial from March 11, 2019, to April 8, 2019. Because Wayland failed to raise the alleged constitutional violation of his right to remain silent in the district court, and he has not asserted the order for him to submit to a mental health evaluation was obvious error, we decline to address the issue on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
[¶12] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Gerald W. VandeWalle
Daniel J. Crothers
Jerod E. Tufte
Lisa Fair McEvers