{¶ 2} On September 20, 2006, at 5:43 p.m., Dayton Police
Officers Michael Fuller and Daniel Reynolds stopped a Buick Park *2 Avenue with dark tinted windows near the intersection of Glenbrook and Carnegie in Dayton. The windows were so dark that Officer Fuller could not see inside the vehicle, and Offiсer Fuller knew from his experience that the condition constituted a window tint violation.
{¶ 3} Defendant, Ashanta Watts, was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. When Officer Fuller asked Defendant for his driver's license, Defendant's hands shook so badly that he had difficulty removing his license from his wallet. Fuller testified that Defendant was very nervous, more so than most people who are stopped for traffic violations.
{¶ 4} Officer Fuller ran Defendant's licensе, which turned out to be valid. That took less than one minute. Officer Fuller then returned to Defendant's vehicle and asked Defendant for permission to search his vehicle. The request was based on Defendant's extraordinary nervousness. Defendant told Officer Fuller that the vehicle did not belong to him but that Officer Fuller сould search it. Defendant did not hesitate in consenting to the search. Neither did he limit the search of the vehicle officers might perform. At Officer Fuller's rеquest Defendant agreed to a pat-down frisk, which revealed nothing, and further agreed to sit in the rear of Fuller's police cruiser during the search of his vеhicle. *3
{¶ 5} While Officer Fuller was searching Defendant's vehicle, Officer Reynolds tested the window tint level with a meter, which revealed that the tinting allowed only twenty-nine percent of the light to pass through, instead of the minimum fifty percent required by law. Officer Reynolds then began filling out the paperwork for the window tint citаtion while Officer Fuller continued to search. That was approximately ten to fifteen minutes into the traffic stop.
{¶ 6} Officer Fuller first searched the passenger compartment and found nothing. He then moved to the trunk, where he found a water bottle with a concealed middle compartment that cоntained a baggie of crack cocaine. Officer Fuller immediately recognized the crack cocaine based upon his experience, which included hundreds of encounters with crack cocaine.
{¶ 7} Officer Fuller arrested Defendant for possession of crack cocаine. An inventory search of the vehicle prior to towing produced a set of digital scales. A subsequent search of Defendant's person disclosеd more cocaine. After Defendant's vehicle was towed away and while transporting Defendant to jail, Officer Fuller detoured to the tow yard wherе Officer Reynolds checked the window tint with a meter a second time because he had forgotten the exact reading he initially obtained at the scene of the stop. *4
{¶ 8} Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of crack cocaine, over ten but less than twenty-five grams, in violаtion of R.C.
{¶ 9} Following a hearing, the trial court granted Defendant's motion. The trial court accepted as true Offiсer Fuller's testimony and found it more credible than Defendant's. The court also found that the initial stop of Defendant's vehicle for the window tint violation was vаlid. However, relying upon State v. Robinette,
{¶ 10} The Statе timely appealed to this court from the trial court's decision suppressing the evidence. *5
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 11} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING WATTS' MOTION TO SUPPRESS. A POLICE OFFICER MAY ASK A PERSON IN CUSTODY FOR CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS CAR EVEN THOUGH THE OFFICER LACKS PROBABLE CAUSE OR EVEN AN OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BASIS TO ASSOCIATE THE PERSON WITH A CRIME. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER THE PERSON WHO IS IN CUSTODY AND WHO CONSENTS DID SO VOLUNTARILY, WHICH MUST BE DETERMINED BY CONSIDERING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES." {¶ 12} A police officer's request for consent to sеarch a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation is valid if it is made, and voluntary consent is obtained, during the period of time reasonably neсessary to process the traffic citation; in other words, while the driver is lawfully detained for the traffic violation. State v. Loffer, Montgomery App. No. 19594,
{¶ 13} It is undisputed that the stop of Defendant's vehicle for window tint violation was lawful. Dayton v. Erickson,
{¶ 14} Officer Fuller searched Defendant's vehicle while his partner, Officer Reynоlds, used a meter to measure the tint on Defendant's windows and filled out the paperwork for a window tint violation. Because Defendant's consent to search his vehicle was obtained within the period of time required to process the window tint violation, and the search likewise took place while the violation was being processed, no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity other than the traffic infraction was required to suppоrt the search. Loffer.
{¶ 15} Furthermore, the totality of the facts and circumstances supports a finding that Defendant's consent to search his vehicle was given freely and voluntarily. Ohio v. *7 Robinette (1996),
{¶ 16} Defendant was seated in his own vehicle, on a public street, in broad daylight. Officer Fuller did not threaten or coerce Defendant in any manner, and Defendant was completely cooperative with Officer Fuller, agreeing to a pat down frisk and to sit in Officer Fuller's cruiser with Officer Reynolds while Fuller searched Defendant's vehicle. Defendant gave his consent immediately, without hesitation or reluctance, and he did not in any way limit the search.
{¶ 17} The mere fact that Defendant was detained by police pending issuance of a traffic citation, standing alone, does not render Defendant incapable of voluntarily giving consent for the search.State v. Riggins, Hamilton App. No. C-030626,
{¶ 18} Because Defendant's consent to search his vehicle was *8 obtained during his lawful detention fоr a traffic violation, and Defendant had voluntarily consented to that search, his Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Therefore, the trial court errеd in suppressing the evidence discovered in the course of that search.
{¶ 19} The State's assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence will be reversed and the case will be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
*1FAIN, J. And DONOVAN, J., concur.