State v. WatsonState v. Watson
Although the appellate court found that the defendant, Marva L. Watson a/k/a Lawrence Lackings,1 was estopped from raising the issue that evidence seized at his arrest should have been suppressed because trial counsel did not raise this issue in the trial court, it nevеrtheless agreed with the defendant‘s contention first raised on appeal that defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to move before trial to suppress the evidence. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the defendant‘s conviction and sentence for possession of heroin.
We granted the State‘s application. State v. Watson, 00-1580 (La.6/22/01), 793 So.2d 1256. After reviewing the jurisprudential backdrop applicable to this query, we reverse the appellate court decision because the present record does not adequately prоvide a basis for addressing the merits of the suppression issue—the fundamental question for assessing the adequacy of counsel‘s representation in this case. The defendant‘s proper course for litigating that question is in post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, wе reverse the appellate court and reinstate the defendant‘s conviction and sentence. His claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is relegated to post-conviction relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 5, 1998, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Officers Michael Sinеgar and Wellington Beaulieu of the New Orleans Police Department were on foot patrol in the Florida Housing Development in New Orleans when they observed the defendant, Lawrence Lackings, and another unidentified person walk into the hallway. Officer Sinegar testifiеd that as he saw the defendant walking out of the hallway, he observed the defendant‘s right hand balled into a fist. At this point, Officer Sinegar asked the defendant to open his right hand. In response, the defendant dropped his right arm to the ground, opened his right hand, and discarded a small piece of aluminum foil on the ground. Officer Beaulieu retrieved the discarded piece of aluminum foil, opened it, and observed a white powder residue inside the foil. As the officers’ attention focused on the defendant, the other individual who accompanied the defеndant ran away. When Officer Sinegar advised the defendant that he was under investigation for a narcotic violation, the defendant began walking away. At this point, Officer Sinegar advised the defendant that he was under arrest for a drug law violation. After a struggle ensued, the officers wrеstled the defendant to the ground and was forced to use pepper spray to subdue him. The State
On October 13, 1998, the defendant, accompanied by court-appointed counsel, waived the reading of the bill of information and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of possession of heroin. At a motion hearing on October 19, 1998, defense counsel withdrew his motions for preliminary examination and all discovery motions when the State provided him with a copy of the police report.
This matter went to trial before a jury on October 26, 1998. After the State and the defendant stipulated that the substance found in the aluminum foil was heroin and that it weighed one-tenth of a gram,2 the State called only one witness, Officer Sinegar, who testified about what had transpired at the time he and his partner encountered the defendant.3 The defendant took the stand in his defense. In stark contrast to the police officer‘s testimony, the defendant testified that the police officers pulled him from his bicycle as he rode through the housing development, asked him about the whereabouts of another individual, and then beat him before arresting him. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted misdemeanor convictions, including possession of a concealed weapon, and several misdemeanor theft convictions.
After deliberating for fifty minutes, a jury of twelve found the defendant guilty as charged. Subsequently, on November 3, 1998, the trial judge sentenced the defendant to serve four years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentenсe. When the trial court denied the defendant‘s motion to reconsider sentence, the defendant filed a motion for appeal.4
On appeal, the defendant contended that the arresting officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initially stop him, and furthеr argued that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to file a motion to suppress evidence and to object to the introduction of the aluminum foil packet into evidence at trial. A divided panel of the appellate cоurt vacated the defendant‘s conviction and sentence, finding that the defendant‘s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court found that the trial counsel should have filed a motion to suppress because the aluminum foil package was illegally seized. A majority of the appellate panel stated that, “The state failed to show there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and order
DISCUSSION
Generally, the preference for addressing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is a post-conviction proceeding in the trial court, not on appeal. State v. Deloch, 380 So.2d 67, 68 (La.1980). The rationale behind such procedure is that a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted to explore the issue. State v. Stowe, 93-2020 (La.4/11/94), 635 So.2d 168; Deloch, 380 So.2d at 68.
It is also well settled that the constitutional validity of a seizure is ordinarily a mattеr for the trial court to determine in the context of a pre-trial motion to suppress, if counsel elects to file one.
In the present case, the question of the constitutional validity of the seizure of the aluminum foil-wrapped heroin was not at issue in the trial court. Thus, when the State tried this matter, its witnesses were not required to elaborate on why they stopped the defendant. Accordingly, neither the State nor the defendant had any need to scrutinize the detailed circumstances surrounding the seizure of the aluminum foil packet and explore the evidence attendant to that police action. Therefore, the trial testimony of Officer Sinegar focused only on the State‘s burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed heroin.
In light of the very limited testimony entered into evidence, see n3, supra, and thе procedural posture of this case, we find that the court of appeal erred when it addressed the defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A hearing in the trial court on a properly filed petition for post-conviction relief can illuminate the record and allow the court to hear evidence relating to defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeal and reinstate defendant‘s cоnviction and sentence. The defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is referred to post-conviction proceedings.
JUDGMENT REVERSED, CONVICTION AND SENTENCE REINSTATED.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
JOHNSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, Chief Justice, concurs and assigns the following reasons:
I agree with the majority‘s disposition reversing the court of appеal and affirming the conviction because the present record does not adequately provide a basis for assessing the adequacy of the representation provided by defendant‘s counsel. A review of the defendant‘s claim of ineffective assistancе of counsel is better reserved for post-conviction relief. I concur, however, to point out that the police report is at variance with the testimony of the officer who said that the defendant simply dropped the aluminum foil containing heroin.
JOHNSON, J., dissenting.
Under the principles set forth in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1551, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) and State v. Tucker, 626 So.2d 707 (La. 1993), in my mind, it is clear that the officers did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. The sole bаsis articulated for the stop was that defendant was observed to have his right fist clenched in a hallway where, according to Officer Sinegar‘s testimony, it was common for people to “do drugs.” There was no testimony that the officers had knowledge that defendant had participated, or was about to participate, in any criminal activity. Merely observing an individual in a public housing development with a clenched fist falls far short of establishing reasonable suspicion.
It is well settled that property abandoned pursuant to an illegal stoр cannot be seized by police officers. State v. Belton, 441 So.2d 1195, 1199 (La.1983), cert. denied, Belton v. Louisiana, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2158, 80 L.Ed.2d 543 (1984). In my mind, the court of appeal‘s reliance on State v. Ratliff, 98-0094 (La.App. 4th Cir.5/19/99), 737 So.2d 252, writ denied, 99-1523 (La.10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1160, was not misplaced. In that case, the defendant and others were observed by law enforcement in a “high crime area.” Ratliff had his arms crossed and his fist clenched. The officers ordered the men to approaсh and put their hands on the police car. As the defendant did so, he dropped an object from his clenched fist. The officers retrieved the object which was determined to be crack cocaine. At trial, the officer admitted that Mr. Ratliff was not free to walk awаy at the time the evidence was discarded. Ratliff, 737 So.2d at 254.
In the instant case, soon after defendant was arrested, Officer Michael Sinegar, completed an arrest report, documenting the following:
Officer Sinegar observed arrested subject right hand was closed fist. Officer Sinegar аttempted to open the arrested subject hand and the arrested subject discarded from his right hand a foil package onto the ground. Officer [Wellington] Beaulieu retrieved the package and it contained a white powder substance. The arrested subject was аdvised of his rights and was transported to CLU.
Conversely, Officer Sinegar testified at the trial as follows:
A. He had his right fist. He had his right hand with his right fist in a balled up manner. As I asked Mr. Lackings to open up his right hand, he dropped—he dropped his right arm to the ground and opened his right hand, and he dropped a small рiece of aluminum foil.
I believe that the police report, completed fifteen minutes after the arrest, is more reliable that the officer‘s testimony twenty-one days later. According to the officer‘s own report, defendant did not voluntarily open his hand and droр the foil package. Rather, the officer admittedly “attempted to open [defendant‘s] hand....” Thus, I can only conclude that the officer approached defendant and grabbed his hand, and it is highly improbable that