State v. WatfordState v. Watford
On this appeal defendant argues, among other things, that:
Point I — Defendant‘s convictions must be reversed because his confession, which resulted from the assistant prosecutor‘s impermissible plea bargaining with an uncounselled defendant and his promise of specific sentences for defendant and his brother, was involuntary.
We conclude that, as a matter of State law, any statement given in exchange for a prosecutor‘s promise of sentence during uncounselled plea negotiations on an indictable offense is inadmissible. Hence, we reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.
The evidence at trial revealed that defendant and his brother assaulted Roland Lee, who had a romantic relationship with defendant‘s ex-girlfriend. Defendant stabbed the victim three times. In order to understand the principal issue before us, however, we must detail only the essential facts developed at the motion to suppress (more properly considered an
After defendant‘s arrest, he gave a taped confession in which he admitted stabbing Lee. Defendant stated that when he
Detective Anthony Crokus, the arresting officer, testified that at headquarters defendant was read and waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), but was initially reluctant to give any information necessary to process the arrest. However, at some point defendant asked Crokus if he could make a deal to help his brother. Crokus relayed defendant‘s inquiry to Detective Everingham, who in turn called the First Assistant Cumberland County Prosecutor.
The prosecutor arrived at headquarters and commenced plea discussions with defendant concerning the stabbing and weapons possession charges, as well as the unrelated crimes. The prosecutor promised defendant a package deal of “20 years, must do 7 years without parole” if defendant “cooperated truthfully.” He also promised defendant that his brother would receive the minimum mandatory of three years under the “Graves Act.” After the Miranda rights were readministered, defendant confessed to the crimes after the prosecutor left.
In his testimony the prosecutor acknowledged that his purpose in going to headquarters was “to go down there and cut a deal with [defendant] at that point.” The prosecutor testified:
The agreement was that if he cooperated truthfully, and I explained to him that truthfully meant that he wouldn‘t implicate anybody that wasn‘t involved in the crime, that he wouldn‘t take out or exculpate someone who was involved, and that he didn‘t, and that he would tell the actual roles of the players in the crimes, that as long as he wasn‘t involved in a murder, for every crime that he told us about truthfully, he would get 1 sentence; in other words, for the armed robbery, he would receive 20 years, must do 7 years without parole, and that for every other additional crime that he was involved in, that he would receive a concurrent sentence.
....
I also told him, I explained to him what the Graves Act was and I explained to him when you commit a crime with a gun or your accomplice is involved in using a gun, that you know about that, your sentence has to include at least a third without parole. (emphasis added).
[E]ven if you got [your brother] involved in [the aggravated assault], as long as he knew there was a gun involved, he‘d be subject to the Graves Act and would have to get at least 3 years without parole.
The prosecutor also testified:
I said that if his brother cooperated fully, the same conditions: that I would give his brother the minimum allowed by law, which was 3 years without parole, and I also told him that if the police or I suspected that he wasn‘t being fully candid, that he would agree to take a polygraph test, and I said that he would of course — this would be in return after cooperation for a guilty plea to the various crimes involved. (emphasis added).
According to defendant, the First Assistant Prosecutor was called to police headquarters when defendant would not cooperate, and advised him “not to get [his] own attorney“; said that “he would appoint [defendant] a public defender“; that “he had control over the judge and counsel“; and threatened that “he would see to it” that his brother, a teacher, “never taught in the State of New Jersey.” Defendant further testified that the prosecutor never explained or answered his questions regarding what an attorney would do for him, but said that, between defendant and his brother, “he had to get 10 years out of us“; that “I would serve 7 years and my brother would serve 3“; and that “he would see to it that we were kept together the entire time that both of us were serving time.” According to defendant, the prosecutor also made clear that, if defendant did not cooperate, “he would see to it that me and my brother each serve a minimum of 25 years each before we were eligible for parole” and that “the judge would agree because he was a prosecutor.” After speaking with the prosecutor for “a minimum of an hour,” he decided to give a statement to the detectives because “my future was in his hands ... and my brother‘s, too.”1
Defendant argues that his confession was coerced by the First Assistant Prosecutor‘s promise that defendant and his brother would receive specific sentences if defendant cooperated and confessed. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor‘s “promise” rendered his confession involuntary in violation of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In support of his argument, defendant cites Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 42 L.Ed. 568, 573 (1897), in which the United States Supreme Court endorsed the view that for a confession to be voluntary, it must not have been “`extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.‘” But as Judge Havey develops in his concurring opinion, the per se rule in Bram does not state the present federal constitutional standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1251, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 315 (1991). See also State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 257-58, 571 A.2d 914 (1990). We therefore reject defendant‘s per se argument advanced as a matter of federal constitutional law.
We need not decide if there was sufficient credible evidence to sustain the trial judge‘s legal conclusion that the confession was not involuntary under federal constitutional principles, see
Here, incident to the discussion the prosecutor told defendant the sentence he “would receive” and the sentence the prosecutor “would give” his brother. However, our Rules of Court expressly detail prosecutorial authority with respect to plea bargaining,
In a recent decision our Supreme Court, after noting “that the Sixth Amendment is more demanding than the Fifth Amendment,” held that our State Constitution,
This is not the occasion to examine the scope of the “harmless error” doctrine when a confession is admitted in violation of a State “bright line” rule. See, e.g., and compare, Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at ___-___, ___-___, 111 S.Ct. at 1253-1254, 1257-1259, 113 L.Ed.2d at 317-322, 329-333; United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 273 A.2d 1 (1971). We so conclude because here the defendant‘s confession provided the direct proof on the handgun counts, and we cannot hold it had no impact on the judge‘s other findings. The State argues that because the proofs corroborated defendant‘s confession in other respects, there was sufficient evidence to uphold the handgun convictions. The State does not suggest, however, that there was sufficient evidence to sustain those convictions if defendant‘s confession is inadmissible. We therefore vacate the convictions for the handgun offenses under
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
HAVEY, J.A.D., concurring.
I concur with the majority that defendant‘s statement must be suppressed. However, I hesitate to join in adopting the majority‘s holding that “any statement given in exchange for a
Defendant asserts that the first assistant prosecutor‘s “promise” rendered defendant‘s confession involuntary in violation of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In support of his argument, defendant cites Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43, 18 S.Ct. 183, 186-87, 42 L.Ed. 568, 573 (1897), where the United States Supreme Court endorsed the view that for a confession to be voluntary, it must not have been “extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight.”
Under current federal precedent, the unqualified rule in Bram does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1251, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 315 (1991). Rather, to determine voluntariness, a court must consider the effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2050, 36 L.Ed.2d at 866; State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 257, 571 A.2d 914 (1990). The question is whether the confession is:
the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker[.] If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.
[Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26, 93 S.Ct. at 2046-47, 36 L.Ed.2d at 862 (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1879, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1057-58 (1961)).]
Relevant factors comprising the totality of the circumstances test include “the defendant‘s age, education, intelligence, advice
Thus, despite the apparent per se rule suggested by Bram, the federal courts have recently treated promises as part of the totality of the circumstances in assessing the voluntariness of confessions. Fenton, 796 F.2d at 608. For example, in Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 945, 109 S.Ct. 374, 102 L.Ed.2d 363 (1988), the Second Circuit observed that “the presence of a direct or implied promise of help or leniency alone has not barred the admission of a confession where the totality of the circumstances indicates it was the product of a free and independent decision.” See also Fenton, 796 F.2d at 608 (Bram “has not been interpreted as a per se proscription against promises made during interrogation“).
Similarly, in Green, a detective‘s promise of psychiatric help which held out the prospect of more lenient treatment was not, in the totality of the circumstances, sufficient to support suppression of the defendant‘s confession because nothing the detective said “could be construed as holding out the hope of leniency in the courts or a shorter sentence.” 850 F.2d at 903. See also United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 403 (4th Cir.1985) (alleged promise of leniency was not supported by the record); Rachlin v. United States, 723 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (8th Cir.1983) (agent‘s statement to defendant that it was in his best interest to cooperate was not a “promise“); United States v. Glasgow, 451 F.2d 557, 558 (9th Cir.1971) (officer‘s representation to defendant that he would inform trial court and prosecutor of defendant‘s cooperation does not render confession involuntary). Thus, the common thread in most of the federal cases is that “[g]eneral encouragement to cooperate is far different from specific promises of leniency.” United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 1741, 100 L.Ed.2d 204 (1988). In contrast, the District Court in United States v. Shears, 614 F. Supp. 1096, 1100 (D.Md. 1985), after remand by the Circuit Court (762 F.2d 397), suppressed a confession given after federal agents promised defendant he would be released on bail and could plead to reduced charges. It reasoned:
These promises constituted the principal and determinative factor motivating the defendant to give the statements now challenged. These assurances of lenient treatment, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, were improperly coercive and rendered the resulting statements involuntary.
Thus, the federal cases apparently focus, at least in part, on the clarity and certainty of the promise in determining whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the promise had the capacity to overbear the will of the defendant.
Whether a statement by the interrogating officer amounts to a promise must be viewed from the defendant‘s, not the prosecutor‘s perspective, applying a reasonableness standard. Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir.1968); see also Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873, 876 (4th Cir.1977). Also, when considering what impact a promise had in overbearing the will of a suspect, courts must give qualitative, rather than quantitative weight to the promise. The court does not simply weigh each factor under Schneckloth against one another on a balance scale. Green, 850 F.2d at 902. Even a single factor “may inevitably lead to a conclusion that under the totality of circumstances a suspect‘s will was overborne and the confession was not therefore a free and voluntary act.” Ibid. Thus, when a defendant is in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel,
even a mild promise of leniency [might be] deemed sufficient to bar the confession, not because the promise was an illegal act as such, but because defendants at such times are too sensitive to inducement and the possible impact on them too great to ignore and too difficult to assess.
[Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 754, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 759 (1970).]
The trial court here relied on State v. Starling, 188 N.J. Super. 127, 133-34, 456 A.2d 125 (Law Div. 1983), aff‘d o.b., 207 N.J. Super. 79, 504 A.2d 18 (App.Div. 1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 481, 511 A.2d 658 (1986), a Law Division case upholding a confession induced by an assistant prosecutor‘s promise. After waiving his Miranda rights, Starling asked to see an assistant prosecutor to discuss his knowledge regarding a series of crimes. He had already given two inculpatory statements
Examining the record here in the context of the totality of the circumstances, I would conclude that defendant‘s confession should have been suppressed. This case does not involve an idle comment by a detective causing a defendant to conclude, without an objectively reasonable basis, that the State was offering leniency in return for his cooperation. Rather, a first assistant prosecutor undertook wholesale plea negotiations with an uncounselled defendant immediately after his arrest.
According to defendant, Detective Everingham told him he had just called the “big man,” after which the first assistant prosecutor arrived at police headquarters. The prosecutor acknowledged that his purpose in coming to headquarters was “to go down there and cut a deal with” defendant. After explaining the potential aggregate sentence defendant faced for all the crimes, as well as Graves Act implications, the prosecutor told defendant in no uncertain terms that defendant “would get” a maximum of twenty years with a seven-year mandatory minimum term if he cooperated.
Moreover, unlike the federal cases, here the prosecutor did not simply imply that defendant‘s cooperation would benefit defendant and Kelvin in the ultimate prosecution of the crimes. The deal struck by the prosecutor, objectively viewed, was absolute, and intended to induce defendant into cooperating and giving a confession. Further, there is little question that the prosecutor‘s promises and explanation of the potential exposure defendant and Kelvin faced were the principal and singular factors that induced defendant to confess. This is particularly true with respect to the promise concerning Kelvin‘s sentence, in view of defendant‘s paramount concern about the potential penal consequences to Kelvin.
There is another factor implicated here which, in my view, is part of the totality of the circumstances analysis. A first assistant prosecutor, not a police detective, conducted this plea negotiation. I believe that a clear capacity to overbear the will of a suspect exists when the second most powerful figure in the prosecutor‘s office packages a deal during negotiations with a
There is an obvious imbalance when a prosecutor, trained in the law, conducts unrestrained plea negotiations with an uncounselled suspect. Plea bargaining, of course, “has become firmly institutionalized in this State as a legitimate, respectable and pragmatic tool in the efficient and fair administration of criminal justice.” State v. Taylor, 80 N.J. 353, 360-61, 403 A.2d 889 (1979); see also State v. Barboza, 115 N.J. 415, 420, 558 A.2d 1303 (1989). However, the system “presuppose[s] fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432 (1971). “`If plea bargaining is to fulfill its intended purpose, it must be conducted fairly on both sides and the results must not disappoint the reasonable expectations of either.‘” State v. Warren, 115 N.J. 433, 443, 558 A.2d 1312 (1989) (quoting State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 321, 294 A.2d 57 (1972)). Accordingly, the “prosecutor and defense counsel may engage in discussions relating to pleas and sentences....”
Although this case concerns a motion to suppress a confession, rather than the withdrawal of a guilty plea, the obvious imbalance in the plea negotiation process between a legally-trained prosecutor and a newly-arrested defendant sheds all indicia of fairness. The uncounselled defendant may not know what defenses are available, the strength of the State‘s case or the possible consequences of a plea, when negotiating a sentence or plea with a prosecutor who has conveyed his certain authority to reach a binding agreement. In such a circumstance, the prosecutor holds all the cards. The result is a “species of plea bargaining shorn of any of the essential safeguards mandated for true plea bargaining.” Grades, 398 F.2d at 413.
This regrettable imbalance was significant here. For example, the prosecutor advised defendant that he was faced with a Graves Act sentence when in fact there was a serious question as to whether a firearm had been involved in any of the crimes. Defendant was also told that his brother faced a Graves Act sentence, despite the absence of any convincing evidence that Kelvin was an accomplice who had the purpose to commit the crimes with the use of a firearm. See State v. White, 98 N.J. 122, 130, 484 A.2d 691 (1984). Indeed, Kelvin was never even charged with the Graves Act offense.1 The prosecutor also did not advise defendant that his confession and plea to the Graves