State v. WaterburyState v. Waterbury
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Ladd
The accused was charged in the indictment with knowingly uttering a check of $10.80, purporting to have been signed by C. L. Besler, with indorsements thereon — “ F. Miller ” and “ Jos. Campaigne.” It appeared from the evidence that some one purchased a dozen bananas of a person bearing the name last mentioned, and delivered this check in payment, receiving the difference in money, and that thereafter the name of Campaigne was indorsed thereon in presenting it to the bank for payment. Does the fact that the name was not on the check when uttered, as alleged, constitute a fatal variance in the proof ? The check was a complete instrument without the indorsements. These formed no part of it, but were distinct contracts. For this reason it is unnecessary in charging forgery, unless predicated upon the indorsements, that these, when made by the accused or other persons, be alleged or proven. Bader v. State, Tex. Cr. App. (69 S. W. 506) ; Perkins v. Com., 7 Grat. (Va.) 651 (56 Am. Dec. 123) ; Miller v. People, 52 N. Y. 304 (11 Am. Rep. 706) ; Commonwealth v. Adams, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 50; State v. Yerger, 86 Mo. 33; 19 Cyc. 1402.
The possession of the fruits of crime have with equal propriety and as good reason given rise to the like presumption in prosecutions for forgery. The principle was clearly stated in the early case of State v. Collins, 14 N. C. 122, where it was said that “ being in possession of the forged order drawn in his own favor were facts constituting complete proof that either by himself or by false conspiracy with others he forged or assented to the forgery of the instrument — that he either did the act or caused it to be done — until he showed the actual perpetrator, and that he himself was not privy. It is very different from’ having a counterfeit bank note. That is an instrument current in its -nature and use, and will come innocently to one’s hands. But it is next to impossible that the defendant could get possession of such *139an instrument as this, purporting to be for his own benefit -without having, fabricated or aided in the fabrication of it. If the instrument be a forgery, he who holds it under such circumstances is taken to be the forger, unless he shows the contrary.” To the same effect, see Hobbs v. State, 75 Ala. 1; State v. Williams, 152 Mo. 115 (53 S. W. 424, 75 Am. St. rep. 441) ; State v. Peterson, 128 N. C. 556 (40 S. E. 9, 85 Am. St. Rep. 756); State v. Allen, 116 Mo. 548 (22 S. W. 792); U. S. v. Britton, 2 Mason, 465, Fed. Cas. No. 14,650; State v. Yerger, 86 Mo. 33; State v. Morgan, 35 La. Ann. 293 ; 4 Elliott, Ev. section, 2484. Bishop, in referring to the current of American authorities, says: “ They seem to indicate that generally the possession of forged paper, or, at all events, the uttering, if in the county where the indictment is found, is cogent evidence to be addressed to the jury that the forgery of the paper was committed by the defendant in the sarnie county.” 2 Bishop, Criminal Proc. section 433. Touching the same point, ‘Wharton says: “ In larceny this presumption [of innocence] is overcome by proof that the possession is so recent that it becomes difficult to conceive how the defendant could have gotten the property without being in some way concerned in the stealing. So it is with uttering. The uttering may be so closely connected in or with the forging the utterer may be proven to have such capacity for forging or such close connection with the forgers that it becomes, when so shown, probable proof of complicity in the forgery.”
In Commonwealth v. Talbot, 2 Allen (Mass.) 161, the defendant was accused of uttering and also of forging a receipt in full, and an instruction that the possession of it by a person claiming under it or seeking to derive a benefit from it was strong evidence tending to show that he made the false signature or caused it to be made was approved. But this inference ought not to be drawn from the naked.fact ‘of uttering a false negotiable instrument as true when the payee named therein does not purport to be the person *140charged with uttering and it appears to have been indorsed by such payee in blank. Title to such an instrument passes by delivery, and one not familiar with the signatures might acquire possession without any benefit resulting and consistently with entire innocence. Should a person receiving such a check or draft or note, subsequently discovered to be forged, be presumed guilty of a heinous crime ? Something more is essential to such a result, as proof of statements of the accused in passing the instrument, or of his connection with other forgeries, or that he pretended to be the payee when he was not, or that he passed the instrument under an assumed name. Here the person passing the check asserted nothing save by the act of paying for the bananas purchased with it, and calling attention to the name of purported maker, neither of which acts is so inconsistent with innocence that guilty knowledge of the falsity of the instrument should be inferred therefrom. In Miller v. State, 51 Ind. 405, the defendant was charged with forging the name of one Mullen upon the back of the draft, and also with having uttered the instrument with such forged indorsement, and an instruction saying that upon the utterance of the draft with the forged indorsement thereon the presumption arose that the defendant forged the same, unless his possession was explained, was held erroneous on the ground ASDthat being indorsed by the payee in blank the draft would pass upon delivery so as to vest title in each successive holder without further indorsement. Scienter is a necessary element of this crime, and the mere fact that the defendant had in his possession a check, purporting to be indorsed by a payee other than himself, and the title to which would pass upon delivery, was not alone sufficient to justify his conviction.