State v. WashingtonState v. Washington
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- Before:
- Konenkamp
Lead Opinion
Rаphael Washington (“Washington”) appeals his conviction for aggravated assault, contending the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instruction which would *381have allowed the jury to consider if he was “guilty but mentally ill.” We affirm.
FACTS
Washington attacked and stabbed Robert Tasso several times in the head and neck with a carpet knife. He then displayed his blood covered hands to onlookers and told them hе had just gotten revenge against the man who had scarred his face on a prior occasion. Several months earlier, Washington had been attacked with a broken glass pitcher and the injuries resultеd in scars to his face. Tasso resembled the person who had attacked Washington, but he was not the assailant.
Washington was arraigned May 18, 1993, and was specifically advised of the five different pleas hе could enter as enumerated in
ISSUE
WITHOUT HAVING ENTERED A MENTAL ILLNESS OR INSANITY PLEA, WAS WASHINGTON ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ALLOWING THE JURY TO FIND HIM GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL?
Washington contends that because there was testimony he was mentally ill at thе time of the attack, he was entitled to instructions and a special verdict form allowing the jury to find him “guilty but mentally ill” of aggravated assault. The trial court rejected Washington’s proposals based on the rationale that a verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” could be submitted to the jury only if he had previously asserted the’ defense of insanity.
A verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” may be returned only in a limited set of circumstances:
If the defendant rаises the defense of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,” he may be found “guilty but mentally ill” if the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) The defendant is guilty of an offense; and
(2) The defendant was mentally ill when he committed the offensе.
Washington argues a defendant who raises only the defense of mental illness and not insanity is not required to enter an insanity plea at the arraignment in order to subsequently raise the defense of mental illness аnd obtain a “guilty but mentally ill” instruction.
If a defense of insanity or mental illness has been presented during a trial, the court shall рrovide the jury with a special verdict form of “guilty but mentally ill” for each offense. The court shall instruct the jury that a special verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” may be returned instead of a general verdict. The court shall also instruct the jury that the special verdict requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury that the defendant committed the offense but that he was mentally ill at the time he committed the offense.
*382Washingtоn concedes expert testimony would not have supported a claim of insanity at the time of the assault, and acknowledges it was for this reason he did not enter a plea of “not guilty and not guilty by reаson of insanity.”1 Essentially, he contends he was entitled to a jury instruction on the special verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” because he entered a plea of not guilty, the prosecutor was aware of his possible mental illness claim,2 and he presented evidence at trial he was mentally ill.
Nevertheless, given that “insanity” and “mental illness” are used in parity in
We conclude a defendant who wishes to plead not guilty and assert “mental illness” must enter a plea of “not guilty but mentally ill” in order to be entitled tо submit a “guilty but mentally ill” instruction to the jury, just as a formal insanity plea must be entered to entitle a defendant to that special verdict instruction.3 Although insanity and mental illness are terms with distinct legal consequences, considering the insanity defense model our legislature used to enact the “guilty but mentally ill” concept, logically the statutes should be construed similarly.
Affirmed.
MILLER, C.J., and AMUNDSON, J., concur. SABERS, J., and WUEST, Retired Justice, dissent. *383GILBERTSON, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this ease was considered, did not participate.Notes
. The terms mentally ill and insane are not synonymous.
(20) “Insanity,” the condition of a person temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the time of committing the act charged against him, he was incapable of knowing its wrongfulness, but not including an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial behavior;
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(24) “Mental illness,” a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood or behavior which affects a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impairs a person‘s judgment, but not to the extent that he is incapable of knowing the wrongfulness of his act. Mental illness dоes not include abnormalities manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct;
. Washington asserts in his brief that State had ample notice of his mental illness defense as he provided discovery information regarding his position that he was under a delusion that he was being attacked by his former assailant at the time of the present assault.
.The dissent suggests that
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
In my opinion the majority decision is legislation which is a function of the legisla*384ture rathеr than this court, therefore, I join the writing of Justice Sabers.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
The majority opinion states:
SDCL 23A-25-13 does not express any requirement that a defendant have previously entered a plea of “mental illness” to be entitled to a speciаl verdict instruction. Further, it uses mandatory language, stating the court shall provide a guilty but mentally ill verdict form if a defense of mental illness has been presented at trial.
The opinion states “insanity” and “mental illness” arе “used in parity in
“A statute must be construed according to its intent, which must be determined from the statute as a whole, as well as enactments relating to the same subject.” State v. Wolff, 438 N.W.2d 199, 200-201 (S.D.1989). However, the majority opinion fails to cite
If a defendant is found “guilty but mentally ill” or enters that plea аnd the plea is accepted by the court, the court shall impose any sentence which could‘be imposed upon a defendant pleading or found guilty of the same eharge[.]
(Emphasis added). Thе disjunctive “or” indicates that a defendant could be found “guilty but mentally ill” by a jury without first entering that plea. This directly conflicts with the majority opinion’s conclusion that a defendant is required to enter a plea of mеntal illness in order to be entitled to submit a guilty but mentally ill instruction to the jury.
By enacting South Dakota’s [guilty but mentally ill] statutes, our legislature intended to provide an alternative verdict available to a jury to reduce the number of offenders who were erroneously found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Robinson v. Solem, 432 N.W.2d 246, 248 (S.D.1988) (emphasis added). Neither the legislation nor the legislative history indicate that the defense must be pled first as a guilty plea.
The plea required for “insanity” should not be required for “mental illness.” Insanity constitutes a “not guilty” plea while mental illness is a “guilty” plea. If a defendant entered a guilty but mentally ill plea first, there would not even be a trial. Statutes are to be interрreted so that they are “harmonious and workable” with one another. Whalen v. Whalen, 490 N.W.2d 276, 280 (S.D.1992) (modified on other grounds by Sjolund v. Carlson, 511 N.W.2d 818, 822 (S.D.1994)). Here, the interpretation which makes
I agree with the majority that, for future cases, some form of “adequate foundation and formal notice” be made before trial and before the requested jury instructions are given. This defendant should be entitled to the same courtesy and notice by this cowrie especially where, as here, he claims the state was provided “ample notice” of his mental illness defense through pre-trial discovery. To require a guilty but mentally ill plea first does not comport with state law in light of
A defendant may plead:
(1) Not guilty;
(2) Not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity;
(3) Guilty;
(4) Nolo contendere; or
(5) Guilty but mentally ill[.]