{¶ 2} On April 4, 2007, a sevеn-year-old girl told her mother that a relative who for two years had been her babysitter had repeatedly sexually abused her. The mother *2 contacted authorities who interviewed the child. Appellant, Kevin Ware, was eventually arrested and his computer searched. The computer search revealed massive numbers of pictures of child pornography, including some of the original complainant.
{¶ 3} Appellant was eventually named in two separate indictments: the first charging three counts of rape of a minor in violation of R.C.
{¶ 4} Appellant pled not guilty to all counts and moved to suppress statements he made to police following his arrest. He also requested that the court determine the compеtence of the eight-year-old principal witness against him. The court held a hearing on the suppression motion and found it not well-taken. The court also conducted an in camera inquiry into thе competence of the eight-year-old principal witness and found her able to testify.
{¶ 5} Following this, appellant negotiated a plea agreement wherein he would enter a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (1970),
{¶ 6} From this judgment of conviction, appellant now brings this appeal, setting forth the following four assignments of error:
{¶ 7} "1. There were multiple abuses of discretion by the Trial Court
{¶ 8} "2. Ineffective assistance of council [sic]
{¶ 9} "3. Post State v. Foster violation of the Separation of Powers
{¶ 10} "4. Application of Senate Bill 10 violates Appellаnt's rights"
{¶ 11} An Alford plea is one in which a defendant pleads guilty to an offense, with a qualification of innocence. The purpose of enteringan Alford plea "is to avoid the risk of a longer sentence by agreeing to pleаd guilty to a lesser offense or for fear of the consequences of a jury trial, or both." State v. Bailey, 1st Dist. No. C-030916,
{¶ 12} "[A]n Alford plea is simply a species of a guilty plea, which, in effect, waives a defendant's right to raise most issues on aрpeal."State v. Bryant, 6th Dist. No. L-03-1359,
{¶ 14} The second subset of this assignment of error challenges the propriety of the trial court's determination that appellant's Alfordplea was knowingly and intelligently entered. Appellant's principal complaint in this regard is that the state's recitation of the evidence, especially physical evidence, with respect to proof of the allegations against him was insufficient to determine whether the plea was properly entered.
{¶ 15} We have carefully reviewed the record of the plea procеeding and conclude that the trial court conducted a proper Crim. R. 11 colloquy. There was nothing in the exchange to suggest that the plea was the result of coercion, intimidation or deception. Appellant's counsel was present and appellant indicated on the record that he was satisfied with counsel's performance. Given appellant's own inculpatоry statements to *5 police and the proffered testimony from the eight-year-old victim, the case against him appears strong.
{¶ 16} The colloquy revealed that appellant was well awаre of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of his plea, including mandatory life sentences for the counts to which he pled. While accepting a life sentenсe may seem as unfortunate a circumstance as there can be, nevertheless, by the dismissal of the other four counts against him, appellant becomes eligible for parole at аn earlier date than he would have if convicted of all counts. Moreover, appellant's counsel suggested during the hearing that appellant was also motivated to minimize publicity of his acts. Given this, we must concur with the trial court's determination that appellant's Alford plea was knowingly and intelligently entered.
{¶ 17} In the third subset of his first assignment of error, appellant complains that during sentencing the trial court called him a "monster" and apologized for losing emotional control. While it is generally preferable for a court to refrain from value laden statements during sentencing, appellant has failed to suggest how thesе statements operated to his prejudice. The sentences imposed were statutorily mandated. The only discretion afforded the court was whether such terms were to be served conсurrently or consecutively. The court imposed consecutive sentences because, "* * * I feel like I have to make sure there is a situation where you have no contact for as long a period I can control with anybody in this community." Such a sentiment is supported by the facts of *6 the offenses to which appellant admitted in his plea. Accordingly, appellant's first assignment of еrror is not well-taken.
{¶ 19} A properly entered guilty plea waives most antecedent errors. "In ineffective-assistance claims in guilty-plea cases, `the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v. Ketterer,
{¶ 20} Concerning the Blakely question, as the state properly notes, any rights which might have accrued as the result of that case applied only to those sentenced prior to State v. Foster,
{¶ 22} App. R. 16(A) requires that assignments of error be separately argued, with each argument containing the "* * * contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies." Arguments which do not identify the error upon which the assignment of error is based or fail to argue the assignment separately, as required by App. R. 16(A), may be disregarded. Aрp. R. 12(A)(2). Appellant's third assignment of error fails to satisfy the rules; consequently it is found not well-taken.
{¶ 24} In his final assignment of еrror, appellant insists that S.B. 10 is a retroactive/ex post facto law, violates the doctrine of separation of powers, constitutes *8 cruel and unusual punishment, is offensive to due process of law and constitutes double jeopardy.
{¶ 25} We have considered and rejected all of these arguments with respect to S.B. 10. Montgomery v. Leffler, 6th Dist. No. H-08-011,
{¶ 26} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App. R. 24. Judgment for the сlerk's expense incurred in preparation of the record, fees allowed by law, and the fee for filing the appeal is awarded to Lucas County.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App. R. 27. See, also, 6th Dist. Loc. App. R. 4.
*1Arlene Singer, J., William J. Skow, J., Thomas J. Osowik, J., CONCUR.