STATE of Louisiana
v.
Shawn G. WALTON.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
*1205 Ralph L. Barnett, Gretna, for plaintiff-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Patricia E. Black, Asst. Dist. Atty., New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.
Before SCHOTT, KLEES and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
SCHOTT, Judge.
This сase has come before us on defendant's motion to appeal the trial court's denial of his motiоn to recuse the trial judge. Before reaching the merits of the appeal, however, we question whethеr our appellate jurisdiction extends to the trial court's denial of a motion by a defendant to recusе the trial judge.
LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 684 provides that the defendant may not appeal prior to sentencing from a ruling recusing or refusing to recuse the trial judge. This mandates a dismissal of the appeal without further comment. However, the complete record is before us and defendant's appellate brief has been filed. Furthermore, Art. 684 speсifically grants the state the right to apply for supervisory writs in the event the trial judge is recused over the state's оbjection or the state's motion to recuse the trial judge is denied. Comment (a) to this Article explains this is so beсause of the possibility of long delays with incarceration of a defendant who can not make bail betwеen the time an appeal is granted and the time the recusation issue is decided by the appellate court. Because the same reasoning supports the right of a defendant to apply for supervisory writs frоm an adverse ruling on his motion to recuse we have resolved to treat his appeal and appеllate brief as an application for supervisory writs.
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana in violation of RS 40:966 along with co-defendant Darryl Butler. The latter pled guilty pursuant to RS 40:983 and in testifying at that hearing Butler stated that the marijuana in the console of the automobile where he and Walton (the present defendant) wеre apprehended belonged to him (Butler) and Walton had nothing to do with it. Butler said Walton never smoked it, and, in fact, neither one of them has smoked it in the car. The trial judge asked Butler, "How come the police said they hаd a strong smell of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle?" To which Butler replied he had no idea.
After the testimony the trial judge (Judge Wimberly) remarked that Butler "has a lot of courage, because I don't believe him, I tell you that much." After some colloquy with defense counsel the judge stated, "I don't believe him. I can't do anything about it, but I don't believe him; a long time for a buddy, ten years."
On the basis of these statements counsel moved to recuse the trial judge because Butler would be a witness in Walton's behalf and the judge had already determined he was not credible. The motion was heard by another judge of the court and denied.
In the recusation hearing before the second judge (Judge Oser), Judge Wimberly acknowledged that he made the foregoing statements at the earlier hearing and the follоwing colloquy occurred:
EXAMINATION BY MR. BARNETT:
Q. Prior to the trial of Shawn Walton then, if it is set in your Court as a misdemeanor, which is a trial only by the Judge, you have predisposed yourself into committing on the *1206 record that you don't believe the co-defеndant who will be our witness, both for the Motion to Suppress as well as on the trial of the matter. Is that not a fair statement?
A. No, it's not a fair statement. What I said at the time was that I did not believe the co-defendant Butler's testimony at that time. I may believe it at the trial. If there is a trial of Shawn Walton I may believe it, but at that time I did not believe that pаrticular testimony, no.
Q. What you're saying then, if the testimony remains exactly the same you may believe that testimony a second time?
A. I don't know. I have no way of knowing until I observe the witness and his demeanor and what he says and how he says it. He may say something entirely different. I don't know this at this time and you don't know it either.
Q. I know, Your Honor, I heard him state this from the witness stand, and you stated, "I do not believe him." It's a simple statement.
A. Mr. Barnett, if the case goes to trial with your client, it's a different ball game. You can't make a judgment based on something that happened in the past. If you're asking mе whether that incident biased me against your client, my answer is no, it did not. My mind is completely open for anything that you care to present, if there is a trial.
Q. But you're aware that a Motion to Suppress has been filed and the сo-defendant Butler will testify?
A. Yes.
Q. You've committed yourself
A. No, I don't know he's going to testify.
Q. Assuming that he testified, you've already called him, by way of a note of evidence, a perjure
A. I haven't called anybody a perjure.
BY MR. MC ELROY:
I don't believe that the Judge has ever intimated that the witness was a perjure.
BY MR. BARNETT:
I'll withdraw that.
EXAMINATION BY MR. BARNETT:
Q. You stated that you did not beliеve him at that time. You stated on two occasions that you didn't believe his testimony.
A. That's right.
Q. And you're now
A. Because he was obviously biased. Now, his bias may not show at some future testimony. I don't know. But it showed loud and clear on that day.
Q. You're familiar with the police report?
A. I read the police report, yes, sir, but I don't have any present recollection of it. I don't carry it around in my mind.
The trial judge is presumеd to be impartial. For a defendant to be entitled to the recusation of a trial judge on the grounds of bias or prejudice such must be of a substantial nature based on more than mere conclusory allegations. State v. Edwards,
Accordingly, we refuse to exercise our supervisory jurisdiction as to the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to recuse the trial judge.
Appeal Considered as Application For Writs.
WRITS REFUSED.