94 Conn. App. 297 | Conn. App. Ct. | 2006
Opinion
The defendant, Andre Walters, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit kidnapping in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-92 (a) (2) (C), attempt to commit kidnapping in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-94, and threatening in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62 (a) (1). The defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress an incriminating statement that he made while he was in police custody. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are relevant to the defendant’s claim on appeal. On June 26, 2003, Lisa Campbell, the victim, stopped at a gasoline station near 140 Weston Street in Hartford on her way home from work. As the victim stood outside her vehicle pumping gasoline, she was approached by the defendant, who asked her for directions to Tower Avenue. The victim offered to allow the defendant to follow her to Tower Avenue in his automobile, and he accepted. As the victim turned to
Once inside the convenience store, the victim encountered Detective Nathaniel Ortiz of the Hartford police department. The victim informed Ortiz of what had just occurred and pointed to the defendant, who by then was walking across the street. Ortiz called for backup and began to follow the defendant. When Officer Michael Francis arrived at the scene, the officers detained the defendant, handcuffed him and placed him in the backseat of Francis’ police cruiser. Ortiz asked the victim if she would go over to the cruiser where the defendant was being detained. When she arrived, Francis asked the victim if she could identify the person in the cruiser. Standing eight feet away and looking into the open window of the cruiser, the victim answered, “That’s the guy.” Francis then asked the victim to move closer to the vehicle so that she could be certain about her identification. The victim approached the cruiser so that she was standing inches away from the door, looked into the backseat and stated, “That’s the guy.” The victim turned and walked away from the cruiser. As she walked away, the defendant stated: “I didn’t do anything, I only asked her for directions and she freaked out.”
The defendant was charged, and the matter was tried to the jury. The defendant filed a motion to suppress the incriminating statement that he made during the
On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly denied his motion to suppress the statement that he made while detained in the backseat of the police cruiser when he was subjected to a show-up identification.
“Two threshold conditions must be satisfied in order to invoke the warnings constitutionally required by Miranda: (1) the defendant must have been in custody; and (2) the defendant must have been subjected to
“The term interrogation under Miranda refers both to express questioning and [its functional equivalent, meaning] any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. State v. Vitale, 197 Conn. 396, 411, 497 A.2d 956 (1985), quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, [301], 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). A statement which is not elicited as a result of interrogation, but is given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence, is admissible in evidence. State v. Copeland, [205 Conn. 201, 207, 530 A.2d 603 (1987)]. It is the defendant’s burden to show that he was interrogated. State v. Doehrer, [200 Conn. 642, 647, 513 A.2d 58 (1986)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wright, 58 Conn. App. 136, 141-42, 752 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 907, 755 A.2d 884 (2000).
“The trial court’s essentially factual determination of whether the police officer’s conduct constituted interrogation is reversed only if it is clearly erroneous. State v. Evans, [203 Conn. 212, 227, 523 A.2d 1306 (1987)].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 109, 751 A.2d 298 (2000) (McDonald, C. J., dissenting).
The defendant asserts that the act of bringing the victim close to the police cruiser to identify him was the functional equivalent of interrogation under the standard set forth in Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 291.
More importantly, however, under the facts of this case, the defendant has not shown that Francis should have predicted that his conduct would cause the defendant to incriminate himself. Although, undisputedly, being in police custody and subject to a show-up identification is a stressful experience, “[i]nterrogation, as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In the present case, the court found that the defendant possessed no personal characteristics, such as a mental deficiency, intoxication or youthfulness, that could have made him more susceptible to coercion. See Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. 309. Furthermore, there is no evidence indicating that the defendant behaved in any way during the identification procedure that should have alerted Francis to the likelihood that the defendant would make an incriminating statement. See id. As the court noted, when the victim first identified the defendant when she was eight feet away from the cruiser, he did not respond. Given that the defendant did not appear to be provoked by that first identification, we cannot say that Francis should have foreseen that the second identification would yield a different result.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the court’s determination that the defendant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation requiring the use of Miranda warnings was not clearly erroneous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The defendant previously had filed a motion to suppress the identification on the ground that the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive, which the court denied. The defendant does not challenge the denial of that motion.
“A show-up is the presentation of a single suspect to an eyewitness for possible identification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ledbetter, 275 Conn. 534, 549 n.12, 881 A.2d 290 (2005).
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court set forth the rule that a suspect who is in custody must be advised, prior to police interrogation, of certain rights, including that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him. See Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 467-69.
Precedent dictates our conclusion that we must defer to the court’s finding with respect to the “interrogation” component of custodial interrogation. We point out, however, that our case law now makes clear that a
At the outset, we reject the defendant’s initial claim that Miranda warnings should be required before every show-up identification procedure conducted by police on the ground that mere use of the procedure constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation. Whether police conduct is reasonably