State v. WaltersState v. Walters
Appellant Mark Walters appeals the decision of the Court of Common Pleas, Coshocton County, which denied his motion to withdraw a prior plea of guilty.
Appellant was indicted by the Coshocton County Grand Jury on one count оf aggravated arson on June 7, 1993. On August 19, 1993, following pretrial proceedings and negotiations, appellant pled guilty to the reduced charge of arson. In exchange for this plea, the state moved to dismiss one count of domestic violence. The court accepted the plea, granted the state’s motion, and sentenced appellant to five to fifteen years in prison. Appellant did not file a timely direct appeal therefrom.
On February 2, 1994, appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied this motion on March 24, 1994, on the grounds that apрellant had failed to demonstrate any need to correct a manifest injustice. Between October 1993 and Dеcember 1997, appellant unsuccessfully sought super shock probation. Appellant again filed a motion tо withdraw his guilty plea on March 16,1999. The trial court denied appellant’s motion on April 21, 1999, without conducting an evidentiary hеaring. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and herein raises the following assignment of error for our consideration.
“I. The trial court erred in denying Mr. Walters’ motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which guilty plea was given without thе benefit of effective assistance of *717 counsel, and erred in failing to conduct a hearing upon the motiоn to withdraw the guilty plea.”
I
Appellant contends in his assignment of error that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting an evidentiary' hearing. Appellant specifically states in his brief that he based his motion on the argument that his counsel’s ineffectiveness rendered his plea involuntary, thus violating his Sixth Amendment right to due process undеr the U.S. Constitution.
Under
In this casе, appellant’s motion meets the criteria for a postconviction petition. He filed his motion after thе time for his direct appeal had expired and specifically seeks vacation of his sentence on the constitutional basis that his plea was involuntary “due to a violation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.” Appellant also presents evidence of counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness that is outsidе the record. Hence, we conclude that appellant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea must be considered а postconviction petition for relief. Although appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the substance and timing of his motion make it a petition for postconviction relief as defined by
Appellant was convictеd of arson on August 19, 1993. Thus, we interpret appellant’s motion, filed on April 12, 1999, as an untimely petition for postconviction relief. A petitioner seeking postconviction relief must file a timely petition under the statutory requirements of
“A рetitioner under division (A)(1) of this section shall be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial trаnscript is filed in the *718 court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication or, if the direct appeal involves a sentence of death, the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the supreme court. If no appeal is taken, the petition shall be filed no later than one hundred eighty dаys after the expiration of the time for filing the appeal.”
Further, appellant failed to assert that he shоuld have been allowed to file a delayed postconviction petition under
Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider thе merits of appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his plea. See
State v. Chupp
(July 3, 2000), Holmes App. No. 99-CA-12, unreported,
Because the motion to withdraw plea was untimely, we affirm the dismissal of said motion, even though the trial court relied on other grounds to deny relief. Appellant’s Assignment of Error is overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Coshocton County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.