Appellant John Wallingford was charged with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of § 195.211. On February 7, 2000, Walhngford was found guilty on all three counts. He was later sentenced as a prior and persistent offender to 14 years on each count. The sentences were directed to run concurrently. All of the sales were made to a confidential informant wearing a body microphone and transmitter. Wallingford raises one point on appeal, contesting the admission of testimony by a police officer as to the content of the conversations between the informant and Wallingford. We affirm the convictions.
On November 18, 1997, Buchanan County Strike Force confidential informant Gerald Ashford arranged to obtain crack cocaine from Wallingford. Before meeting with Wallingford, Ashford met with Strike Force member Frank Till, Ashford was given $100 to purchase the cocaine as well as an audio recorder (also known as a body microphone) and a transmitter. Ashford, followed by Till, drove to Beth Walling-ford’s residence. Till parked two blocks away, but could still hear what was going on through the transmitter. At trial, Till testified that he heard Ashford greet Wall-ingford by saying, “Hi John.”
*854 On November 24, 1997, Ashford again made arrangements to purchase crack cocaine from Wallingford. Another confidential informant, Kimberly Merritt, accompanied Ashford on this buy. This time, Merritt was given the audio transmitter and recording device and the $100 buy money. Merritt and Ashford met Wallingford in a bar. An unidentified woman accompanied Wallingford. Wall-ingford and the woman got into Ashford’s car and, again, drove to Beth Wallingford’s house. Till followed. Merritt and Ashford told Wallingford they wanted to purchase a $100 rock of crack cocaine. Wallingford told them “the guy” was on his way. Soon after, a car pulled up and the unidentified woman approached the driver’s side window. Merritt gave Wallingford the money, who then handed it to the unidentified woman in exchange for the drugs.
On January 23, 1998, Ashford again arranged to buy crack from Wallingford. This time he was accompanied by Strike Force member Brian Lupe. As before, Ashford was given an audio transmitter, body microphone and $100 as buy money. Lupe and Ashford drove to Vivian Cooper’s house, where Wallingford was staying, with Till following them. At trial, Till was permitted to testify, over objection, to the conversations he heard between Ash-ford and Wallingford on the first and third transactions.
In his sole point on appeal, Wallingford contends that the trial court erred in allowing Till to testify to what he heard during the November 18, 1997 and January 23, 1998 drug buys. 1 At trial, each time Till was asked to iterate what he heard over the transmitter, Wallingford objected. Each time Wallingford’s objections were overruled and Till was permitted to testify as to the conversation that took place between Ashford and Walling-ford. Wallingford argues that Till’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay.
The state counters by claiming: (1) the statements were not hearsay, (2) the dangers of admitting hearsay were nonexistent in this case because Ashford testified at trial and was subject to cross examination, and (3) Till’s testimony was cumulative to evidence already before the court and, therefore, Wallingford was not prejudiced by the hearsay.
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the mattered asserted that depends on the veracity of the statement for its value.
State v. Sutherland,
Courts generally exclude hearsay because of the inherent lack of trustworthiness that accompanies such testimony.
State v. Link,
As to the first drug transaction, Till testified, over objection, that the informant identified the other man as “John.” Till *855 also testified over objection as to the informant’s request to buy a hundred dollar piece of crack cocaine and “John’s” response, which ultimately led to the purchase. 2 As to the third sale, Till testified that he heard the informant ask again for a “hundred.” The suspect responded that he only had a “thirty.” 3 At trial, Ashford identified Wallingford as the seller and testified to essentially the same conversations related by Till. Ashford testified before Till.
We find that Till’s testimony regarding the conversations he heard over the transmitter as to the first and third drug transactions were not hearsay and, thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
Wallingford spends much of his argument concentrating on the greeting by Ashford, identifying the suspect in the first sale as “John.” The state first argues that the statement “hi John” is not hearsay at all. Alternatively, it argues that Walling-ford’s response, or lack thereof, to this greeting was a tacit admission and even if the testimony was hearsay, it would be admissible as an admission by a party opponent. Wallingford does not clearly articulate the basis for his contention that the use of the name was hearsay. It is unclear whether he objects because it is Ashford’s out-of-court statement being related by Till or because Ashford could have only known the name based on hearsay. Evidence of a person’s name, or a name by which he is known, is generally not within the rule excluding hearsay evidence.
State v. Cannon,
The suspect in the first drug buy made no denial or correction of the salutation, “Hi John.” By not correcting Ashford, or denying that his name was John, Wallingford’s omission serves as a tacit admission of the correctness of the greeting used by Ashford. It was thus admissible as an admission by a party opponent and is, in fact, outside the hearsay doctrine.
State v. Brown,
As indicated previously, it is difficult to discern whether appellant also complains that Till’s testimony about the remaining parts of the conversations is also hearsay. Although he made a blanket objection to all such testimony at trial, he makes only passing reference to any other portions of the conversations beyond the use by Ash-ford of the name “John.” He does not contend that there is an insufficient foundation to show that the statements attributed to him were in fact made by him. The statements attributed to Wallingford are admissible as declarations against interest.
State v. Moiser,
Hypothetically speaking, even if Till’s testimony constituted incorrectly admitted hearsay, in order for wrongly admitted hearsay to constitute a reversal, an appellant must show that he suffered prejudice as a result of the error.
State v. Haddock,
Notes
. We note that in the conclusion portion of his brief, Wallingford asks for relief on all three charges. However, in his point on appeal, he does not challenge testimony given regarding the November 24, 1997, "buy.” There was no hearsay objection to the testimony about what was overheard during this drug buy.
. In this sale the informant and the seller were in visual surveillance but not closely enough that Till could identify the seller.
. This sale occurred inside a residence and neither the informant nor the suspect was under visual surveillance.
. In Moiser, similar testimony was submitted even though the informant did not testify.