State v. WalkerState v. Walker
This аppeal principally involves judicial review of a criminal sentence to determine whether it is excessive under LSA-Const. Art. 1, Sec. 20.
Defendant, Freddie Walker, brought this appeal following his conviction for the aggravated burglary of an inhabited dwelling, in violation of
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 7, 1986, Glenn Cliff returned to his home at a rooming house on North Rampart Street. Arriving at the door to his room, he observed that one of the door panels appeared to have been kicked in and that two twelve-packs of Milwaukee Best beer, the type and quantity that he had left in his refrigerator, was sitting оn the floor outside his door. When Cliff went to unlock the door, his key would not go into the lock and it appeared as if someone had tampered with the lock.
Cliff then went to a telephone located outside the rooming house and called the police to report a trespasser. Following the phone call, Cliff rеturned to the door of his room and peered through the opening in the door, where the removed panel had once been. While looking through the opening, someone inside the room threw Cliffs money box at him, striking Cliff in the chest. Cliff then made a second telephone call to the police.
Returning to the door of his room, Cliff saw thе defendant crawling through the opening in the door. The defendant then attacked Cliff with what Cliff initially believed was a knife, but was actually a screwdriver, grazing Cliffs forehead. Cliff then grabbed defendant’s right hand, the hand holding the screwdriver, and grabbed defendant by the throat. Defendant attempted to jab Cliff with the screwdriver, but Cliff managed to stab defendant with the scrеwdriver instead.
As Cliff believed he had rendered defendant unconscious, Cliff got up off the floor, leaving defendant lying in the hall of the rooming house. However, defendant was conscious and he once again attacked Cliff with the screwdriver. The two wrestled and Cliff shouted for help.
Two residents of the rooming house, Dennis Pong/Palm and Howard Streеt, heard Cliffs calls and came to his aide. Together, they managed to subdue defendant until Officer Sleeco of the New Orleans Police Department arrived. Sleeco found two of the men holding down the defendant, one with a whelp on his face. He also found that defendant was severely injured, so that an ambulance had to be called. Defendant was taken to Charity Hospital where he remained for five and one-half (5½) days.
The State filed a bill of information against defendant on August 14, 1986. Thereafter, defendant was arraigned on August 18, 1986, at which time he pled not guilty. Subsequently, on October 3, 1986, defendant’s motion to suppress identification and motion to suppress confеssion were both found moot. And, following the preliminary hearing held on the same day, the court found probable cause and denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The bench trial commenced on October 18, 1986.
In addition to the foregoing facts, Cliff also testified that he had seen defendant hanging around the rooming house on August 6, 1986, the day before the incident. At that time, defendant had attempted to invite himself into the building, without success. Defendant took the stand and testified that he had been sitting on the front steps of the rooming house when one of its residents, “Little Blackie” or “Lil Blackie”
As defendant turned to go back outside, he saw some change on the floor outside the front door of Cliff’s room. When defendant bent down to pick up the change, the door to Cliff’s room opеned and Cliff attacked him. Then, another person grabbed him around his throat and began to choke him. He blacked out; his next conscious thought was waking up in Charity Hospital.
After reviewing these offenses the court concluded:
Due to the faсt that Mr. Walker was armed where serious [injury] and death could have insued. [sic] There was serious injury inflicted upon Mr. Walker himself. Due to the fact that this was a residence and an apartment where an individual was living and other individuals were in the Rooming House and because of Mr. Walker’s prior record this Court feels that any lesser sentence would derogate from the seriousness of the matter and considering Mr. Walker’s past record that any lesser sentence would involve further harm to individuals on the street or in the community. As a result it is the sentence of this Court that Mr. Walker serve twenty-five years Department of Corrections at hard la-bor_(transcript, pp 4-5).
Thereafter, defendant’s, counsel made an oral motion for appeal. The written motion for appeal was filed August 6, 1987 and was granted.
ERROR PATENT REVIEW
Defendant’s record was reviewed for errors patent. None were found.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Through counsel, defendant alleges that his sentence of twenty-five (25) years is unconstitutionally excessive because it is grossly out of prоportion with the severity of the crime, so that it is nothing more than a needless imposition of pain and suffering. We disagree.
LSA-Const. Art. 1, Sec. 20 provides that “no law shall subject any person ... to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment.” State v. Sepulvado,
A punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it 1) makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pаin and suffering; or 2) is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime. State v. Telsee,
The trial judge must also articulate for the record both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that were considered and must state the factual basis underlying its sentence. Cf. State v. Michaels,
Applying these principles to the present case, the sentencing judge’s comments indicate that he was aware of and considered the guidelines of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1, which fulfills its statutory requirements. State v. Tzuanos,
Nor is the sentence excessive in light of the nature of the crime and the propensities of the offender. State v. Telsee,
Consequently, we are in accord with the trial court, a more lenient sentence than the twenty-five (25) year term, would derogate from the seriousness of the offense and pose an undue risk to the community that defendant would commit another crime. Defendant’s sentence is not a purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering nor grossly out of proportion to the severity of his crime. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
Although defendant’s pro se brief does not contain formal assignments of error, his principal argument is that there is insufficient evidence to convict him of violating
Aggravated burglary consists of the following elements: 1) the unauthorized entering of an inhabited dwelling; 2) with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein; 3) if the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon, or after entering arms himself with a dangerous weapon or commits a battery upon any person while in the dwelling. LSA-14:60; State v. Wilson,
When reviewing the evidence for its sufficiency to convict, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found these essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
At trial, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered an inhabited dwelling without authority, as the resident, Cliff, was not at home when defendant gained entry of the room by removing the door panel, and/or by tampering with the door lock. The State also proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered Cliff’s room with the intent to commit a theft therein, as Cliff’s two (2) twelve-packs of Milwaukee’s Best beer were placed immediately outside Cliff’s door and Cliff’s television had been moved to a spot near the inside of Cliff’s door. Moreover, from these circumstances it can be inferred that defendant had the specific intent to commit a felony or theft within Cliff’s dwelling.
Finally, the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon while in Clift’s dwelling and he committed a battery while
Based upon the foregoing, any rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved all the еssential elements of aggravated burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
Defendant’s final pro se contention is that the bill of information filed against him is defective. However, defendant fails to specify the manner in which the document is defective. Consequently, as the bill of information was reviewed for errors patent and none were found, this assigned error lacks merit.
Accordingly, defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed. Appeal costs are waived.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. In his pro se appellate brief, defendant also alleges that he was denied compulsory process, and that he was arrested without a wаrrant and not given Miranda warnings. However, because defendant failed to brief these specifications of error, they are deemed abandoned. La. Uniform Rules — Court of Appeal, R. 2-12.4.
. Cliff, Pong/Palm and Street all testified that no one named "Little Blackie” lived in the rooming house where they resided.
. Art. 894.1 Sentence guidelines; generally
A. When a defendant has been convictеd of a felony or misdemeanor, the court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or probation the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) The defendant, is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant’s crime.
B. The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in its determination of suspension of sentence or probation:
(1) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm.
(2) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would cause or threaten serious harm.
(3) The defendant acted under strong provocation.
(4) There was substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant’s criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense.
(5) The victim of the defendant’s criminal conduct induced or facilitated its commissiоn.
(6) The defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained.
(7) The defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the instant crime.
(8) The defendant’s criminal cоnduct was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(9) The character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is unlikely to commit another crime.
(10) The defendant is particularly likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment.
(11) The imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to himself or his deрendents.
(12) The defendant’s voluntary participation in a pre-trial drug testing program.
C.The court shall state for the record the considerations taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.
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(Added by Acts 1977, No. 635 § 1. Amended by Acts 1986, No. 704, § 1; Acts 1987, No. 500, § 1.)
. The maximum sentence for aggravated burglary under
. Defendant attacked Cliff twice with the screwdriver. It is immaterial that it was defendant, instead of Cliff, who sustained the serious injuries as a result of their struggles.