133 Iowa 489 | Iowa | 1907
The appellant assigns some twenty-five errors on which he asks a reversal of this judgment. It is manifest that the proper limits of the opinion will preclude an extended discussion of each of the errors assigned, and we shall, therefore, direct our attention principally to the ques
The appellant urges that the county attorney should not have been permitted to read the indictment to the jury, and bases his claim upon the proposition that, where the defendant is acquitted of a higher offense by conviction of a lower included offense, the graver charge is entirely eliminated from the proceedings. While it is true that a defendant, who has been tried on an indictment charging murder in the first degree and convicted of manslaughter only,'cannot be again tried for the graver offense, it is also true that the indictment upon which the second trial is had is, and must be, the same as that on which he was first tried, and that it is entirely proper and in fact it is a requirement of the statute (Code, section 5312) that the indictment upon which the defendant is tried shall be read to the jury and his plea thereto stated to the jury. The indictment charging murder in the first degree, and the former acquittal of the defendant of that crime, necessarily called for a statement on the part of the court or of the county attorney that, while the indictment charged the graver crime, the defendant could only be tried on the included offense of manslaughter} and there was no error in permitting the county
While the appellant in his original argument apparently urges the incompetency of the examination of this witness, in his reply, he shifts his ground and states that his complaint is that there was an.attempt on the part of some one to coach the witness. If any such attempt was made, it did not appear when the witness was on the stand unless it be said that she had been coached in the interests of the defendant. As we have heretofore shown, she refused absolutely to answer any material question put to her by the State, and this refusal was made on the ground, as she herself stated, that she did not want to answer, and in the face of an order of the trial court committing her for contempt in not answering. There is nothing in the appellant’s contention on this branch of the case. There is no showing in the record that the county attorney exceeded the due bounds in his attempt to draw from this witness testimony to which the State was clearly entitled in the presentation of its case.
Other errors were assigned, but they are not of sufficient importance to demand specific consideration.
We find no error in the record for which there should be a reversal of the case, and, believing as we do that the verdict has sufficient support in the evidence, the judgment must be, and it is, affirmed.