State v. . WalkerState v. . Walker
After resting a little time at Wall‘s gate, Walker started with the negro. It was early in February and the day very cold, and the sum about one and a half hours high in the evening. Wall was doubtful whether the negro was sick or deceitful; but did not hear Walker give any opinion, further than saying to the negro, “He had come on very well, until he had gotten to Mr. Wall‘s lane; that he had there fallen down, and if he did not go on better, he should be under the necessity of compelling him.” At the distance of 600 yards or thereabouts from Wall‘s house Walker and the negro passed Webster and his son. Walker had two untrimmed switches in his hand. He was asked by Webster, “Whom he had there.” He answered, “A runaway; a damned sullen fellow, who would not go along; and he would kill him, if he was his own, but he did not like to be hanged for killing a negro.” The negro was walking slow and, Webster thought, appeared weak. Having passed Webster a little distance, Walker gave to the negro two stripes with a brushy switch which he had in his hand, and having gone to the distance of 100 yards or thereabouts, Webster looked back and saw the negro down in the road, (664) and Walker whipping him — he supposes with the switches which he had in his hand when he passed him. Webster thought Walker gave the negro an hundred stripes, but he could not speak with any certainty as to the number. The negro had on a great coat and those stripes were given whilst he lay on the ground.
The negro and Walker were then distant about 300 yards from Foy‘s shop. Foy heard a noise down the road, and he told Williams to go and see what was the matter. Williams went and found the negro standing in the road, and Walker a few yards from him. After some conversation with Walker about the negro, and Walker saying he was a sullen fellow and had fallen down and would not go along, the negro started and walked about 50 yards, when he fell down on his face. As soon as he fell, he turned his head, so as to take his face from the ground; and Walker, having an untrimmed gum-switch in his hand, came up and, applying both hands to the switch, struck him with it twice, violently,
Williams thought it was about twenty minutes from the time he came up until the negro was untied. That the negro was very weak, and that keeping him tied was unnecessary. He thought a child of 7 years old could have managed him.
Walker is a healthy man, aged about 60 years. The negro was a stout fellow aged about 21 years.
After placing the negro on a plank in the shop, Walker observed that he believed he was dead, and immediately went on to his owner, Mr. Guy. He told Guy that his negro was at Foy‘s shop, but did not mention to him that the negro was dead. Guy took irons to put on the negro, and on the way to the shop Guy observed that he feared the negro would be gone before he reached the shop. Walker then said he expected he would not,
The negro died on Monday evening, and on Wednesday an inquest was holden. Several of the jurors of the inquest were of opinion that the negro‘s neck was dislocated, and that one of his eyes was destroyed. There was a dent in one of his temples, but whether the skull was (666) fractured or not was not known. One of the jurors thought that it was. There was a wound across the forehead, and some of the witnesses thought it was produced by the stroke of a hickory; others that it was occasioned by his fall on the ground. The upper lip was swelled, and some blood oozed from the gums. He was stripped and examined, but there was no appearance of any injury on any other part of his body.
His Honor, the judge, charged the jury that the prisoner was guilty of murder, or guilty of no offense at all; that he did not think it was a manslaughter case. The jury found the prisoner guilty of murder, and a new trial was moved for on behalf of the prisoner on the ground that it ought to have been left to the jury to say whether the prisoner was guilty of manslaughter or murder. This motion was disallowed, and an appeal was prayed for to the Supreme Court, which was granted, and the following reasons were filed for the said appeal by the counsel for the prisoner:
“That it ought to have been left to the jury to say whether the prisoner was guilty of manslaughter or murder; for —
“(1.) That in capital cases the jury are to judge of the law and of the facts. (2.) That the court is not to pronounce an opinion whether the prisoner is guilty of manslaughter or murder. (3.) That if the jury believed the prisoner thought the negro was deceitful only, and that was the cause of his falling down, the prisoner had cause of provocation, and if in this provocation he treated the negro with cruelty which occasioned his death, it ought to have been left to the jury to say whether death was the probable consequence of his cruelty. (4.) That the prisoner had the right to inflict upon the negro such correction as was necessary to make him proceed on the road home; that the law disregards the mode of correction, and looks only to degree of it; and it ought to have been left to the jury to say whether the correction given by the prisoner was such that death was or was not its probable consequence.” It is the province of the Court to pronounce whether the judge who tried the cause drew the correct legal
I do not doubt the right of the jury, affirmed in the first reason, to judge of the law and of the facts; but they would often be much at a loss to exercise this right if they were not told by the court (668) how the law is; and, according to the sentiments of Mr. Justice Foster, they will, “if they are well advised, always find a general verdict conformably to such directions.” I take it for granted, as the contrary is not insisted on in the case, that the judge proceeded as is usual in other cases; that he stated to the jury what the witnesses had testified, and then told them that if they believed the witnesses, the offense established against the prisoner was murder in point of law, and not manslaughter, or any inferior species of homicide. In this I perfectly concur, and think justice has been done, as far as a court has any lawful agency in administering the law.
SEAWELL, J. We are all of opinion that the directions of the judge below were in accordance with the law arising from the evidence, and that in the manner of delivering them he neither transcended the act of Assembly nor invaded the province of the jury; that, in short, he confined his charge to the legitimate functions of a judge, explaining what was the law if the facts in evidence were true, leaving it to the jury to determine upon their truth or falsehood.
It has been insisted on for the prisoner that the court should have stated to the jury so much of the case from the evidence as would have made it manslaughter, and then informed them, if they disbelieved the other part of the evidence, that then the case would be manslaughter, and not murder. It is true, the judge might have done so, but in not doing it, surely there was nothing denied the prisoner; for such a charge would be giving to the State two chances for conviction, whereas, according to the course pursued, the jury were directed to acquit unless they believed all the testimony; and if it was true, no one will doubt the propriety of the verdict. Of this it was the peculiar province of the jury to judge. They did believe it, and have found accordingly; and had the case come up on their finding, we see no possible ground for being dissatisfied with their verdict.
(669) The rule for a new trial must, therefore, be discharged.
LOWRIE, J., DANIEL, J., and RUFFIN, J., concurred in this opinion.
[The prisoner was pardoned by Governor Miller.]
Cited: S. v. Hildreth, 31 N.C. 434; S. v. Matthews, 78 N.C. 532; S. v. Vines, 93 N.C. 498.