141 Me. 403 | Me. | 1945
Section 22 of Chapter 129, R. S. 1930,
“whoever being more than 16 years of age wilfully and wantonly or maliciously vexes, irritates, harasses, or torments any person in any way, after having been forbidden so to do, by any sheriff, deputy sheriff, constable, police officer, or justice of the peace, . . . shall be punished.”
The indictment against the defendant alleged that the defendant
“on the twenty-fifth day of May in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and forty-four, being then and there a person more than sixteen years of age, did wilfully, wantonly and maliciously vex, irritate, harass and torment one Mabel E. White by then and there without the permission or consent of the said Mabel E. White entering the dwelling house and convalescent home owned and occupied by the said Mabel E. White, and others, and frightening, disturbing and bothering the said Mabel E. White after he, the said Carl Wagner, had been duly forbidden so to do by one Leo T. Spain, a duly appointed and qualified deputy sheriff,____”
At the trial, after presentation of the evidence by the State and by the defendant, the defendant moved the Court to direct the jury to return a verdict of “not guilty.” The presiding justice denied the motion, and the defendant noted his exception. To sixteen other rulings of the Court made during the progress of the trial, the defendant also noted exceptions. The jury returned a verdict of “guilty” and the defendant is before this Court upon a bill of exceptions embodying the exceptions so noted at the trial.
The charge in the indictment is based upon the defendant’s doings on that occasion. If he wilfully, wantonly and maliciously vexed, irritated, harassed or tormented Mrs. White, it was by entering the house and going to Mr. Wheaton’s room and holding a Bible study according to the.practice of the religious sect to which he belonged. ■ :
In the statute the words “wilfully and wantonly or-maliciously” modify the words “vex, irritate, harass, or torment.” The specific intent to “vex,” etc., is, therefore, an element of the offense created and must be proved with the same certainty.as any other element. 22 C. J. S., Crim. Law §32; State v. Neal, 37 Me., 468; State v. Quigley, 135 Me., 435, 437, 199 A., 269; State v. Sprague, 135 Me., 470, 475, 199 A., 705; Savitt v. United States, 59 Fed. (2d), 541; People v. Plath, 100 N. Y., 590, 3 N. E., 790, 53 Am. Rep. 236; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich., 401; Thacker v. Comm., 134 Va., 767, 114 S. E., 504. It cannot be presumed from the commission of the overt act although such overt act be committed with general wrongful intent. 22 C. J. S., Crim. Law, §32; Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, p. 271¿ Smith v. State, 87 Fla., 502, 100 So., 738; Thacker v. Comm., supra; People v. Plath, supra.
The defendant’s state of mind which constituted his intent upon the visit complained of must be ascertained from his conduct viewed in the light of attendant circumstances.
He had made visits on previous occasions to see Mr. Wheaton who was interested in the work carried on by the defendant and such visits had been unobjectionable to Mrs. White. It was his persistence, in claiming the right to see Mrs. Ketchum that had incurred her displeasure and caused her to order him not to return. On May 25 he visited Mr. Wheaton and engaged with him in Bible study as on previous occasions, and made no attempt to see any other person. His conduct on
Exceptions sustained.