State v. WagnerState v. Wagner
The facts essential to this appeal are not in dispute. In a joint trial befоre a jury both defendants were found guilty of receiving stolen property (
The irregularities in the jury selection process commenced when the jury panel first entered the courtroom. The first 14 jurors to enter the courtroom from the holding room were directed to take seats in the jury box. As jurors were challenged and excused following questioning, the judge replaced them by calling upon other jurors seated in various rows in the courtroom by starting at one point in the courtroom “and going right down the row.” Defendants did not voice any objection to the jury selection process until sentencing day, when they moved for a new trial on this basis. The judge denied the motion, noting that although there was a technical noncompliance with the provisions of
Defendants contend that the trial judge committed error in denying their motion for a new trial which was based on irregularities in the jury selection process.
The name of each person summoned and returned by a sheriff or other proper officer as a petit juror shall be written or printed on separate pieces of paper of as nearly as possible uniform size, color and shape. The sheriff or other proper officer or the clerk of the court, or a person designated by the sheriff, officer or clerk for thаt purpose, shall roll up each piece of paper separately and deposit it in a box. When a jury is required for the triаl of a cause, either civil or criminal, the box in which the names have been placed shall be shaken so as to intermix thoroughly the рieces of paper therein, and the sheriff, clerk or other person shall, by direction of the court, publicly and in open cоurt, draw from the box, one at a time, the pieces of paper therein, until 12 persons ... whose names are found written thereon, shall аppear. If any of the 12 persons so appearing are successfully challenged or excused from serving on that jury, the drawing shall be continued until 12 persons ... not so challenged or excused appear, and they, being severally sworn, shall constitute the jury for the trial оf such cause. [Emphasis supplied]
It is vital that juries be selected in a manner wholly free from taint and suspicion. To that end the pertinent рractice safeguards in the statute must be carefully observed. There are times, even in the absence of prejudice to a dеfendant, when it is essential to insure future observance of a prescribed practice safeguard or the vindication of a fundamental principle that courts should not hesitate to reverse. In Meszaros v. Gransamer, 23 N.J. 179 (1957), our Supreme Court observed:
In this day there should be ready recognition of the absence of justification for such new trial except in the unusual instance where it is really essential to insure future observance of a prescribed practice safeguard or the vindication of a fundamental principle. [At 189]
While it is true defense counsel did not object to the jury seleсtion procedure, it must be emphasized that the chief responsibility for conducting jury selection rests with the trial judge. State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259 (1969). It is also true that defendants have been unable to demonstrate prejudice stemming from the jury selection procedure. When the integrity of the process is аt stake, prejudice is not a precondition to successfully asserting impairment of the fundamental right of proper jury selection. See State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 404 (1980). Jury selection is an integral part of the process to which every criminal defendant is entitled. State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 62 (1979); State v. McCombs, 81 N.J. 373, 375 (1979). Thus, we
Defendant Richard Wagner contends that the trial judge committed error by amending the indictment to include him in the charge of receiving stolen property, even though defense counsel orally waived defendant‘s right to a new indictment. We agree.
Finally, defendants argue that the trial judge erred in his application of the attorney-client privilege to exclude the testimony of the attorney of a co-indictee. We have carefully
The judgments of conviction for both defendants are reversed. The matter is remanded for a new trial as to Margaret Wagner. We do not retain jurisdiction.