State v. VitantonioState v. Vitantonio
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant, John George Vitantonio, appeals the judgment of conviction entered by the Painesville Municipal Court, after a bench trial, on one count of obstructing official business, a second-degree misdemeanor in violation of
{¶2} Appellant was charged with one count of obstructing officiаl business. The matter proceeded to a bench trial where the following was adduced through testimony.
{¶3} In the early morning hours of August 18, 2012, Karlyle Huntington, a resident at Brentwood Apartments, called the City of Painesville Police Department to file a complaint concerning a domestic disturbance from appellant‘s apartment, her neighbor. Ms. Huntington explained she heard appellant and his girlfriend having an argument and two children yelling and crying. Ms. Huntington testified that, after phoning the police, she went to appеllant‘s apartment and informed him she felt compelled to notify the authorities. According to Ms. Huntington, appellant apologized for the commotion.
{¶4} Painesville Police Sergeant Michael Slocum arrived with backup units to investigate the disturbancе call. Sergeant Slocum first interviewed Ms. Huntington, who directed the officer to the apartment door from which the noise previously emanated. It is unclear whether Ms. Huntington notified Sergeant Slocum that she spoke with appellant. Sergeant Slocum knoсked at appellant‘s door and announced his presence, hearing no noise or commotion from inside the apartment. Sergeant Slocum then went outside and observed a light inside appellant‘s apartment turn off. Returning inside the building, Sergeant Sloсum sought the aid of Diana Reed, property manager at Brentwood Apartments. Ms. Reed attempted the master key to unlock appellant‘s door;
{¶5} Upon consideration of the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charge and sentenced him to 30 days in jail, with 20 days suspended and the remaining 10 days subject to an optional community work program in lieu of jail. Appellant was also placed on community control for six months and ordered to pay a $100 fine. According to a notation on the entry, the sentence was stayed pending dispоsition of the appeal. On November 1, 2012, appellant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to
{¶6} On Dеcember 12, 2012, appellant filed his notice of appeal. We note appellant‘s appeal is timely as his motion for a new trial based upon insufficient evidence, made after the entry of conviction, tolled the time for an appeal pursuant to
{¶7} Appellant asserts two assignments of error. Appellant‘s first assignment of error states:
There is insufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court in finding Appellant guilty of the crime of obstructing official business, where the basis of the сonviction is a finding (1) that Appellant failed and/or refused to answer the door to his apartment in response to the persistent knocking of police officers who were responding to a complaint, made by Appellant‘s neighbor, of a
disturbance at Appellant‘s premises, and (2) that the knocking police officers were possessed with exigent circumstances to enter into the premises.
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, appellant claims there is insufficient evidence by which to support his conviction of obstructing official business.
{¶9} At the outset, appellant did not technically make a
{¶10} The test for determining the issue of sufficiency is “whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have fоund the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979). Thus, the claim of insufficient evidence invokes a question of due process, the resolution of which does not allow for a weighing of the evidence. State v. Lee, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-084, 2011-Ohio-4697, ¶9.
{¶11}
{¶12} “(A) No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official‘s officiаl capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official‘s lawful duties.”
{¶13} Here, the purported “act” that allegedly impeded law enforcement in the performancе of their duty to investigate the reported domestic disturbance was, in fact, a non-act: appellant‘s failure to open his apartment door. With respect to
The court is not unmindful of the situation faced by the officers. It would appear that under the facts of the instant cаse the officers
would have been justified in breaking open the door of the apartment to determine whether anyone was injured in the apartment. However, defendant‘s failure to open the door to the apartment is not made a crime undеr Columbus City Code 2315.03.
{¶14} Similarly, in Lakewood v. Simpson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80383, 2002-Ohio-4086, the Eighth Appellate District examined Lakewood Codified Ordinance 525.07 which prohibits obstructing official business in identical language as
{¶15} Similarly here, we are faced with a circumstance where appellant refused to respond to the persistent knocking of law enforcement: a failure to act, not in and of itself an affirmative act. Counsel for appellant acknowledged at oral argument that there were exigent circumstances that permitted the police to enter the premises. However, this merely means appellant was without privilege to refuse entry and the pоlice could
{¶16} Moreover, “the State must prоve not only the commission of an overt act done with an intent to obstruct the officers, ‘but it also must prove that [the defendant] succeeded in actually hampering or impeding them.‘” State v. Crowell, 189 Ohio App.3d 468, 2010-Ohio-4917 (2d Dist.), ¶12, quoting State v. McCoy, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22479, 2008-Ohio-5648, ¶16. Here, appellant‘s act of refusing entry was, at most, an inconvenience for the officers who had to seek out a key and ultimately consider breaking down the door. However, the door opened approximately 15 minutes after the officer began knocking and announcing his presence, at which time the offiсers investigated the nature of the disturbance and ensured the safety of the occupants.
{¶17} We therefore conclude that, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the elements of obstructing official business have not beеn met. This holding should not be construed to dilute law enforcement‘s ability to ardently investigate domestic disputes when there is a reasonable belief that someone is in imminent danger, has been injured, or is in need of immediate assistance. The eerie calm following a reported domestic disturbance, coupled with a light going off in the apartment and no response at the door, provided exigent circumstances to enter the apartment in this case. Appellant was without privilege to refuse entry, and the record indicates law enforcement was indeed prepared to forcibly enter the apartment;
{¶18} Appellant‘s first assignment of error has merit.
{¶19} Appellant‘s second assignment of error states:
The judgment of the trial court in finding Appellant guilty of the crime of obstructing official business is against the manifest weight of the evidence, where the basis of the conviction is a finding (1) that Appellant failed and/or refused to answer the door to his apartment in response to the persistent knocking of police officers who were responding to a complaint, made by Appellant‘s neighbor, of a disturbance at Appellant‘s premises, and (2) that the knocking police officers were possessed with exigent circumstances to enter intо the premises.
{¶20} The disposition of appellant‘s first assignment of error renders the assignment of error concerning manifest weight of the evidence moot.
{¶21} In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the Painesville Municipal Court is reversed. Appellant‘s conviction for obstructing official business is hereby vacated.
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
COLLEEN MARY O‘TOOLE, J.,
concur.