State v. VerebState v. Vereb
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Klaphake
OPINION
Aftеr the district court denied his pretrial suppression motion, appellant entered
On appeal, appellant challenges the legality of the initial stop of the vehicle in which he was riding and his warrantless arrest. Because there was a reasonable articulable basis for the stop and probable cause to arrest appellant, we affirm.
FACTS
On Octоber 18, 2000, Little Falls Police Chief Michael Pender received a telephone call from a Wal-Mart employee. The employee reported that two individuals, whom police later identified as Shane Allen Saarela and appellant Michael Tibor Ver-eb, had just purchased a large quantity of cold tablets. The employee also reported that the two men had made several trips into the store to purchase the cold tablets. Chief Pender knew from his training and experience that cold medicine usually contains ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, which are common precursor ingredients used to manufacture methamphetаmine.
When Chief Pender arrived at the store, an employee met him and stated that the men had just left in a vehicle. Because the employee knew which way the vehicle was traveling, he accompanied Chief Pen-der to search for the vehicle. The employee sighted the vehicle and Chief Pender attempted to follоw it, but its speed soon exceeded 75 miles per hour and it began to pull away. Chief Pender requested backup from the state patrol, and State Trooper Eugene Okerlund responded and stopped the vehicle.
Saarela, the driver, did not have a driver’s license with him and was unable to produce other identification, but claimеd that his name was “Thomas Oscar Strand-lien.” Appellant also failed to produce identification and, according to Chief Pen-der, was initially “reluctant” to give his name. Neither party could produce any insurance information on the vehicle.
According to Chief Pender’s report, appellant appeared confused and evasive during questioning. Appellant initially offered no explanation as to why he had purchased a large quantity of cold tablets or why he and Saarela had attempted to evade the officers. Appellant explained that the vehicle belonged to his girlfriend, and he consented to its search. In the trunk, Chief Pender found a number of plastic bags containing more than 30 boxes of cold tablets and several packages of “AA” lithium batteries, which are also known to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Appellant told Chief Pender that he had a head cold and that
Appellant and Saarela were taken to police headquarters for farther questioning by drug task force agents, and the vehicle was towed. Both men were given Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Saarela waived his right to an attorney and agreed to questioning; appellant stated that he understood his rights but did not wish to speak with agents. Approximately two hours and 15 minutes after the initial stop, appellant was formally placed under arrest for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
During booking, appellant was asked to change clothes. While picking up appellant’s clothes, police found two plastic baggies and a black pouch, each of which contained a white powdery substance. The substаnce was later tested and proved to contain approximately 20 grams of methamphetamine.
ISSUES
1. Was there reasonable articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle in which appellant was riding?
2. Was there probable cause to support appellant’s warrantless arrest for conspiracy to manufaсture methamphetamine?
ANALYSIS
“When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine, as a matter of law, whether the district court erred in suppressing- — or not suppressing — the evidence.”
State v. Harris,
I.
Appellant first challenges the legality of the stop of the vehicle in which he was riding. He argues that police lacked probable cause to stop it because the mere report that he had purchased cold tablets was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion that appellant had сommitted a crime or was about to commit a crime.
An investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, not probable cause.
State v. Pike,
An officer need not personally observe facts to establish reasonable artic-ulable suspicion and may rely on facts provided by a third person.
Marben v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety,
Here, we conclude that police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to support the stop of the vehicle, based on the following facts: (1) Chief Pender received a report from a Wal-Mart emрloyee who observed two men purchasing a large number of cold tablets; (2) Chief Pender knew that cold tablets are precursor materials commonly used in the production of methamphetamine; (3) when Chief Pender arrived at the store, an employee met him and told him that the men had just left in a vehicle; (4) the employee observed the direction the vehicle had traveled and rode along with Chief Pender to search for the vehicle; and (5) Chief Pender observed the vehicle attempting to evade his pursuit by traveling at excessive speeds.
The speeding violation and evasive driving conduct alone justified the stop.
See State v. Fiebke,
II.
Appellant next challenges the basis for his warrantless arrest for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. He argues that his legitimate possession of cold tablets and batteries does nоt establish probable cause to arrest him merely because those items are precursor materials used to manufacture methamphetamine.
An investigative detention following a lawful stop may last only “as long as reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”
State v. Blacksten,
Probable cause exists when police have facts and circumstanсes that would warrant a prudent person in the officer’s position to reasonably conclude that the person committed a crime.
G.M.,
To determine if probable cause exists to make a warrantless arrest, a court must look to the “information that police took into consideration when making the arrest, not what they uncovered thereafter.”
2
State v. Walker,
Appellant argues there was insufficient evidence to arrest him for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine because there was no evidence of any agreement between him and Saarela to commit the crime. Conspiracy requires an agreement with another to commit a crime and an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.
Here, the overt act requirement was satisfied by the purchase of a large quantity of cold tablets and batteries by appellant and Saarela. In addition, police had other circumstantial evidence from which they could infer, for purposes of probable cause, that appellant and Saarela had entered into some type of agreement to participate in a crime, as follows: (1) police knew at the time of appellant’s arrest that he and Saarela had entered the Wal-Mart store several times to purchase a large quantity of cold tablets and lithium batteries, which are precursor matеrials used to manufacture methamphetamine; (2) police observed evasive driving conduct on Saare-la’s part; (3) appellant appeared confused and evasive when questioned; (4) neither appellant nor Saarela could produce identification; and (5) appellant produced $570 in cash from his pockets, which he claimed was for “supplies.”
While these facts alone might not justify a conviction, they are sufficient to “lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person under consideration is guilty of a crime.”
State v. Carlson,
Finally, we recognize that the supreme court recently affirmed this court’s revеrsal of a conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.
Hatfield,
In addition, the issue regarding sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction was not raised below or addressed by the district court, nor has appellant specifically raised or briefed this issue on appeal. We decline to sua sponte determine whеther the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.
Cf. State v. Pinkerton,
DECISION
The district court did not err in determining that police had reasonable articula-ble suspicion of criminal activity to justify a stop of the vehicle in which appellant was riding. The district court also did not err in concluding that, after further investigation, police had probable cause to arrеst appellant for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. The evidence was sufficient to show, for purposes of establishing probable cause, that appellant and Saarela had an agreement to commit a crime and acted in furtherance of that agreement. We therefore affirm the distriсt court’s decision denying appellant’s suppression motion.
Affirmed.
Notes
. At the plea and sentencing hearing, the parties agreed to correct the statutory citation in Count I of the complaint, which charged appellant with conspiracy to commit a first-degree controlled substance crime, from
. Following appellant’s de facto arrest, police uncоvered other evidence from the vehicle, including two more cash register receipts from Wal-Mart, dated October 17, 2000, the previous day. Police also discovered that Saarela had given them a false name when he was initially stopped, because they found his driver’s license in the vehicle. Further, in response to questioning at hеadquarters, Saarela admitted that appellant had handed him $20 to purchase two boxes of cold tablets, but claimed that he did not know what methamphetamine was and had no knowledge that cold tablets and lithium batteries were items used to manufacture methamphetamine. Saarela later admitted that "it was possible that [he] hаd purchased three boxes instead of two.” When Chief Pender spoke again with the employee at Wal-Mart, however, he learned that Saarela purchased six boxes of cold tablets and that appellant purchased six packages of batteries and nine boxes of assorted cold tablets. This evidence may support appellant’s eventual conviction, but we do not consider it in determining whether probable cause existed to support appellant's arrest.