STATE of Louisiana
v.
James K. VARNELL.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
*1109 J. Stacey Freeman, M. Randal Fish, Bossier City, for defendant-relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul J. Carmouche, Dist. Atty., Anne S. Goodman, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-respondent.
DIXON, Chief Justice.
Defendant James Varnell was charged by bill of information with possession of marijuana, in violation of R.S. 40:967. After the trial judge overruled defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana seized from his vehicle, defendant pleaded guilty to the offense, reserving his right to seek review of the ruling in this court.
On April 29, 1981, Officеrs Robert Skaife and Delbert Green of the Shreveport Police Department were proceeding north on Hearne Avenue in Shrevepоrt when Officer Skaife noticed a pickup truck in the inside lane headed in the same direction. Officer Skaife pointed out to Officer Green that defendant, who was driving the truck, was wearing a "peculiar hat" and smoke was coming out from under the brim of the hat. He asked Officer Green to pull up beside the truck so that he could get a closer look. He noticed that defendant was smoking a rather large hand-rolled cigarette. "It lookеd almost like it was a cigar, it was so big," was the only other description of the cigarette. Suspecting that the cigarette was made with marijuana, the officers attempted to stop defendant, but the flashing light on their vehicle would not work. The officers sought the assistance of two other officers that were in the vicinity. While defendant was waiting for the traffic light to change to green, Officers Skaife and Green pulled their vehicle behind him and the other officers pulled in front of him. Officer Skaife got out of the vehicle and approached defendant's truck. As he opened the door to the truck, he began to identify himself as a police officer. He placed his hand on defendant's arm, and as defendant attempted to get out, thе truck began to roll forward. Defendant tried unsuccessfully to put his other foot on the brake, but the truck struck the police car that was parked in frоnt. Officer Skaife approached defendant again and informed him that he was being stopped "for the suspected marijuana cigarette." Noticing the cigarette burning on the floorboard of the truck, the officer retrieved it. He also found two baggies of marijuana near the same spot. Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana.
In ruling on defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana, the trial judge was of thе opinion that there was no way the officers could have known whether the cigarette was a roll of tobacco leaves or a rоll of marijuana; and although he doubted whether there existed probable cause to arrest defendant, he concluded that the officers' conduct could be justified as an investigatory stop, from which they found the marijuana. In so doing, the trial judge attempted to distinguish the facts of this case from State v. Davis,
The trial judge found it significant that in the present case defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and the marijuana was actually seized, whereas in Davis the defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin although *1110 the officers stopped him for suspicion of smoking marijuana but never found the marijuana cigarette.[1] In expressing his uncertainty as to the proper ruling, the trial judge stated:
"... This if (sic) obviously a very close case in the light thаt the Supreme Court of our state, in the Davis case, has already held a similiar (sic) type situation as unconstitutional. In other words, violated the right against unreasonable search and seizures. But this Court is going to give the Supreme Court, if it chooses to do so, another chance to look at that questiоn in the light of this case for the reason that the man still had the cigarette in his possession...."
Here, as in Davis, the trial court failed to focus its inquiry first on the legality of the initial stop or detention of defendant. In Davis, the legality of the initial stop of the defendant was first examined. Once we determined that the initial detention was unlawful, we concluded that all evidence seized subsequent to that detention was tainted and, therefore, inadmissible.
To lawfully stop a person for invеstigation, the officer conducting must, at least, have articulable knowledge of particular facts which, with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, are sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to suspect the person of involvement in criminal activity. State v. Bickham,
At the hearing on the motion tо suppress, Officer Skaife testified that his attention was first attracted to defendant because of the "peculiar hat" he was wearing, and that hе noticed smoke coming out from under the brim of the hat. Upon noticing that defendant was smoking a "rather large hand-rolled cigarette," he immediately suspected that the cigarette was made with marijuana. It is on this suspicion the officers stopped defendant and seized the marijuana in question. The trial judge was apparently convinced, despite his ruling on the motion, that the officers had no way of knowing whether the cigarette was a roll of marijuana or tobacco. The officers did not testify that they possessed "articulable knowledge of particular facts" from which reаsonable inferences could be drawn that defendant was actually smoking marijuana and not tobacco. Smoking a "rather large hand-rolled cigarette" is not, alone, a characteristic so restricted to marijuana smokers as to arouse reasonable suspicion of unlawful conduct. The stop and detention of defendant were unlawful, and the evidence seized as a result of that unlawful detention is inadmissible.
The state's argumеnt that the marijuana should, nevertheless, be admissible because it was in plain view when it was seized is rejected. But for defendant's unlawful detention, the offiсers would never have observed the marijuana.
For these reasons, defendant's plea of guilty is set aside, the ruling of the district judge on the motion to suрpress is reversed, the motion to suppress is granted, and the case is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
WATSON and MARCUS, JJ., dissent.
NOTES
Notes
[1] In State v. Davis,
