State v. VargasonState v. Vargason
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These consolidated appeals require the court to determine the interplay between the Iowa law allowing the issuance of a temporary restricted license to a person whose driving privileges have been revoked and the Iowa law requiring this state to consider a driver’s out-of-state driving record in making licensing decisions.
See
We hold that Vargason’s license revocation was pursuant to Iowa Code
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A. Facts common to both cases. Richard Vargason, now an Iowa resident, has an extensive and dismal driving record. He has been convicted of operating under the influence (OWI) on eight occasions in three different states over a nineteen-year time span. Four of his convictions arose in Georgia (1979, 1981, 1993, and 1994); two occurred in Florida (1982 and 1985); the most recent convictions happened in Iowa (March 1996 and July 1996).
On February 3, 1995, the State of Florida permanently revoked Vargason’s driving privileges. The record reveals, however, that should he reside in Florida in the future, he would be eligible to apply for a hardship reinstatement. It appears that a hardship reinstatement in Florida is akin to a work permit and similar to a temporary restricted license under
Vargason moved to Iowa in 1995. He wasted little time in being arrested and charged with an OWI violation in March 1996. Because Vargason’s chemical test results were .280, the arresting officer served an immediate notice upon Vargason that his driving privileges were revoked for 180 days.
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The Fayette County Attorney charged Vargason with first-offense OWI.
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Vargason’s next entanglement with law enforcement officers occurred in July 1996 in Benton County. At that time, he was arrested and charged with second-offense OWI, as well as operating a motor vehicle while his driving privileges were revoked. See
id.
§§ 321J.2(2)(&), .21. The officer administering the chemical test issued a one-year revocation of Vargason’s operating privileges when the test results showed an alcohol concentration of .10 or more.
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Subsequent to these criminal violations, Vargason successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program and was discharged from probation in October *694 1997. He also served his sentences and paid all fines and fees. He had no additional OWI convictions.
B. The agency action — Fayette County appeal. - In February 1998, Vargason sought a driver’s license. He was apparently unaware of the six-year revocation and believed that his 180-day and one-year revocations had expired. The DOT refused to issue a license to him, citing the Florida revocation as a bar. (It appears that the DOT, like Vargason, was also unaware of the six-year Iowa revocation.) The DOT relied on the following regulation in issuing its denial:
If a person does not have a current out-of-state license to surrender or has been subject to an out-of-state suspension, revocation, disqualification, cancellation, denial, or bar within the last six years, the department may require an official letter from the out-of-state licensing agency before issuing a license. The official letter must verify that the person is eligible for licensing in that jurisdiction or would be eligible for licensing if future proof of financial responsibility were filed.
Upon Vargason’s request for a review of the denial, a hearing officer upheld the DOT’s decision. Vargason then sought formal review and a hearing was held before an administrative law judge (ALJ). It was during this hearing that the parties realized that Vargason was under a six-year revocation in Iowa as a result of the Benton County sentencing order for Var-gason’s second Iowa OWI conviction. Accordingly, in his decision, the ALJ confirmed that Vargason was subject to a six-year revocation and, therefore, was ineligible for an Iowa driver’s license.
See
The DOT’s agency appeal of the ALJ’s decision resulted in a reinstatement of the DOT’s denial of driving privileges to Var-gason. The reviewing officer noted that the DOT could issue a license only if allowed to do so by statute. The officer concluded that the DOT had no statutory authority to issue any license to Vargason due to the Florida revocation. Vargason sought judicial review in Fayette County district court, which affirmed the agency decision.
C.
Benton County district court application.
During the course of the administrative proceedings, on August 5, 1998, Vargason filed an application in the Benton County OWI case, asking the court to order the DOT to issue a temporary restricted license.
See id.
§ 312J.4(9) (allowing a person whose license has been revoked under chapter 321J to petition the court, after the expiration of the period of ineligibility, for an order requiring the DOT to issue a temporary restricted license). The district court held that
*695 II. Scope of Review.
A.
Agency action.
Judicial review of agency action is governed by Iowa’s Administrative Procedure Act, Iowa Code chapter 17A. See
Ramsey v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp.,
576 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa 1998). We may reverse if the agency’s decision is affected by an error of law or is not supported by substantial evidence.
See id.;
B.
District court ruling on application for temporary license.
The correctness of the district court’s ruling on Vargason’s application for a temporary restricted license turns on its interpretation of the relevant statutes. We review questions of statutory construction for correction of errors of law.
See State v. Wagner,
596 N.W.2d 83, 85 (Iowa 1999);
III. Interplay Between Chapter 321J and Chapter 321C.
The resolution of this case rests on a determination of whether the DOT or the district court has the authority to grant a temporary restricted license to an individual who is also subject to an out-of-state revocation. 2 We will begin our discussion with an analysis of chapter 321J and the provisions made in our OWI laws for the issuance of a temporary restricted license. We will then determine whether anything in chapter 821C modifies the authority granted in chapter 321J with respect to the issuance of a temporary license.
A.
Temporary restricted licenses under chapter 321J.
Vargason relies upon
A person whose driver’s license has . . . been revoked under this chapter . . . may petition the court upon the expiration of the minimum period of ineligibility for a temporary restricted license . . . for an order to the department to require the department to issue a temporary restricted license.
(Emphasis added.) This statutory provision plainly and unambiguously gives the district court the authority to decide whether an individual subject to a chapter 321J revocation should be granted a temporary restricted license. A review of chapter 321J reveals a separate, specific provision also granting the DOT similar authority,
see
In summary, a person who is subject to a six-year revocation under
As applied to the facts of the case before us, only the district court has authority under chapter 321J to issue a temporary restricted license to Vargason because his license revocation was pursuant to
B. Interstate compact — chapter 321C. The Iowa legislature enacted the Interstate Drivers License Compact in 1965. See 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 295. This Act allows the director of transportation to enter into compacts with other states that conform to the provisions of chapter 321C. One purpose of such a compact is to
[m]ake the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws, ordinances and administrative rules and regulations as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of any license by reason of which the licensee is authorized or permitted to operate a motor vehicle in any of the party states.
Iowa Code ch. 321C, art. I(& )(2). To facilitate the consideration of out-of-state compliance with motor vehicle laws, the party states report each conviction related to the use or operation of a motor vehicle occurring in their state to the home state of the licensee. See id. art. III. For purposes of suspension or revocation of a driver’s license, the licensee’s home state may give the same effect to out-of-state OWI convictions that such convictions would have if they had occurred in the licensee’s home state. See id. art. IV(a)(2); accord State v. Peterson, 347 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Iowa 1984).
Of particular importance to the present case is the following provision governing the application for a license to drive:
Upon application for a license to drive, the licensing authority in a party state shall ascertain whether the applicant has ever held, or is the holder of a license to drive issued by any other party state. The licensing authority in the state where application is made shall not issue a license to drive to the applicant if:
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2. The applicant has held such a license, but the same has been revoked by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation and if such revocation has not terminated, except that after the expiration of one year from the date the license was revoked, such person may make application for a new license if permitted by law. The licensing authority may refuse to issue a license to any such applicant if, after investigation, the licensing authority determines that it will not be safe to grant to such person the privilege of driving a motor vehicle on the public highways.
Iowa Code ch. 321C, art. V(2) (emphasis added). Finally, the compact provides that
[efccept as expressly required by provisions of this compact, nothing contained herein shall be construed to affect the right of any party state to apply any of its other laws relating to licenses to drive to any person or circumstance
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Id. art. VI.
From these provisions, we conclude that chapter 321C prevents Iowa licensing authorities from issuing a driver’s license to an applicant who held an out-of-state license that was revoked, subject to one exception. That exception is triggered after one year from the date of the out-of-state revocation. See Russell v. Director of Revenue, 861 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Mo.Ct.App.1993) (holding that Missouri applicant, whose Kansas license had been revoked for an OWI conviction, was not eligible for a Missouri license because one year had not passed since the Kansas revocation, as required by the Interstate Drivers License Compact). Upon the expiration of one year, the applicant may apply for a new license in Iowa “if permitted by law.”
In apparent contradiction to these provisions, the State argues that the compact’s statement of policy “seems to require that Iowa honor Florida’s permanent *697 revocation.” The State quotes the policy as to “[mjake the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor . . . as a condition precedent to . . . issuance of any license . . . in any of the party states.” Iowa Code ch. 821C, art. I(& )(2). But the State misrepresents the policy of the compact in its cryptic quotation of the statute. The compact merely strives to “[mjake the reciprocal recognition of licenses to drive and eligibility therefor more just and equitable by considering the overall compliance with motor vehicle laws . . . as a condition precedent to the continuance or issuance of a license.” Id. In other words, the policy promoted by the statute is not to give effect to out-of-state revocations in, the party state, but to allow the licensing state to consider out-of-state driving records in making its own licensing decisions. Therefore, we reject the State’s argument that the intent of the compact is to require that Iowa licensing authorities honor out-of-state revocations for the entire period of the out-of-state revocation. Cf. Kiebort v. Commonwealth, 719 A.2d 1139, 1142 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) (holding that when home state’s length of suspension is different from party state where conduct and conviction occurred, home state is not required to give the same length of suspension as party state but rather treats the reported conduct as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state).
In fact, it appears that this issue is directly addressed in article V, which merely requires that an out-of-state revocation be honored for one year from the date of the revocation. See Iowa Code ch. 321C, art. V(2). At that point, the licensing state may make its own licensing decisions as permitted by the law of the licensing state. This provision would be superfluous if Iowa were required to give the Florida revocation binding effect in Iowa during the entire period of the Florida revocation.
Having determined that an individual subject to an out-of-state revocation may apply for a license in Iowa “if permitted by law,” we consider the State’s contention that two Iowa statutes prevent the issuance of a license to Vargason. Iowa Code
We first point out that statutes must be read in pari materia.
See Peterson,
347 N.W.2d at 401 (“Statutes relating to the same subject matter, or to closely allied subjects, may properly be construed, considered and examined in the light of their common purposes and intent.”). Although
Nor can rule 761 — 601.1(3) be sustained on the basis of the interstate compact. As we have already decided, that statute does not preclude the issuance of an Iowa driver’s license, if permitted by Iowa law, after a one-year period following the out-of-state revocation. In fact, the rule directly conflicts with chapter 321C by deferring Iowa licensing decisions to the out-of-state licensing authority in contravention to the compact, which merely requires that Iowa consider the out-of-state convictions as if they had occurred in Iowa in making its own licensing decisions. Because rule 761 — 601.1(3) is inconsistent with the statutes it purports to effectuate, it is invalid and unenforceable. See Lenning v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 368 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 1985) (holding that “[a]n administrative rule which does not comport with the intent of the enabling legislation may be abrogated as an act in excess of the agency’s authority”).
In summary, chapter 321C allows Iowa licensing authorities to issue a license to a person subject to an out-of-state revocation, provided that one year has passed since the imposition of the revocation, if permitted by Iowa law. We have already determined that
IV. Vargason’s Eligibility Under Section 3211.1(9).
[a] person whose motor vehicle license has either been revoked under this chapter, or revoked or suspended under chapter 321 solely for violations of this chapter, or who has been determined to be a habitual offender under chapter 321 based solely on violations of this chapter.
(Emphasis added.) The Benton County district court ruled that Vargason’s license was revoked under chapter 321C, taking his application out of the “narrow window” of
We have reviewed chapter 321C and find no provisions in it for the revocation of a driver’s license. As we discussed earlier, the compact merely requires (1) that Iowa consider out-of-state OWI convictions the same as it would consider them had the convictions occurred in Iowa, and (2) that Iowa honor out-of-state revocations for one year. Thus, licenses are not revoked pursuant to chapter 321C; rather the information that is obtained from another state as a result of the compact is used by Iowa to pursue suspension or revocation under other applicable Iowa statutes. Accordingly, the fact that the Benton County district court in the criminal case considered an out-of-state OWI conviction in deciding to issue a six-year revocation does not transform the revocation into one under chapter 321C, as authority for the revocation is found in chapter 321J, not chapter 321C.
The State also argues that Vargason does not meet the requirement expressed in
In conclusion, we hold that Vargason’s license was revoked “under this chapter,” chapter 321J, as that phrase is used in
V. Summary and Disposition.
Vargason was subject to a six-year revocation of his Iowa driving privileges pursuant to chapter 321J, and to a lifetime revocation of his Florida driving privileges. Because one year had expired since his Iowa revocation, he was eligible under
The Benton County district court erred in ruling that Vargason’s driving privileges had been revoked pursuant to chapter 321C and that, as a consequence, he was not eligible for a temporary restricted license. Therefore, we reverse that decision and remand the Benton County case for further proceedings consistent’ with this opinion.
In the agency action, the DOT incorrectly ruled that Vargason’s Florida revocation prevented the DOT from issuing any license to him. It was correct, however, insofar as it concluded that the DOT could not issue a license to Vargason. The DOT had no authority to issue Vargason a regular driver’s license due to his Iowa revocation. It also had no authority on its own to issue a temporary restricted permit to Vargason because that authority rested with the district court imposing the Iowa revocation. Accordingly, we affirm the Fayette County district court’s decision on judicial review of the DOT’s ruling. See Iowa Tel. Ass’n v. City of Hawarden, 589 N.W.2d 245, 252 (Iowa 1999) (court may affirm on any basis appearing in the record and urged by the prevailing party).
JUDGMENT OF BENTON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED; JUDGMENT OF FAY-ETTE COUNTY DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except LARSON, J., who takes no part.
Notes
. In 1997, the legislature added a new subsection to
. In light of Vargason’s six-year Iowa revocation, he no longer seeks a regular driver‘s license.
See
. The State contends that Vargason‘s revocation was pursuant to chapter 321C, not chapter 32 D. We reject this contention later in our opinion.