Jerry D. Vandenacre appeals from judgments of conviction for grand theft, a felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), 18 — 2407(l)(b); malicious injury to property, I.C. § 18-7001; and driving without privileges, I.C. § 18-8001; entered by the district court on October 27, 1995, following a jury trial. For reasons set forth below we affirm the judgments of conviction.
I.
BACKGROUND
Two separate criminal informations were filed charging Vandenacre with the commissiоn of various felonies and misdemeanors. All of the charges were disposed of without the necessity of trial with the exception of the charges of grand theft, malicious injury to property, driving without privileges, and aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, I.C. §§ 18-905 and -915. These remaining charges were consolidated for jury trial and guilty verdiсts were returned as to the grand theft, malicious injury to property and driving without privileges charges, but Vandenacre was found not guilty of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer., Judgments of conviction were entered accordingly.
II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues on appeal are essentially as follows:
(1) Was substantial evidence presented at Vandenacre’s trial upon which a rational juror сould have found that he exercised unauthorized control over property exceeding $300 in value?
(2) Did the district court correctly rule that Vandenacre’s offer to stipulate to some elements of the grand theft charge did not preclude an officer’s testimony relating to his fingerprint investigation?
(3) Was Vandenacre prejudiced by the рrosecution’s improper question about prior felonies so as to entitle Vandenacre to a new trial?
(4) Has Vandenacre showed the presence of cumulative errors?
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DISCUSSION
A. The Value Issue Relative to the Grand Theft Charge.
The grand theft charge was based upon the theft of a stereo from a home. Since Vandenacre did not deny that he wrongfully took, obtained or withheld thе stereo system from the owner, and indeed admitted in his testimony that he had wrongfully taken the stereo system with the intent to sell the same, the only factual issue at trial regarding the grand theft charge was whether or not, at the time of the theft, the purloined stereo system had a value in excess of $300. See I.C. §§ 18-2403,18 — 2407(l)(b)(l). 1 Vandenaere contends that he was not guilty of grand theft, but at most, the evidence would only support a finding of petit theft, a misdemean- or, I.C. § 18-2407(2).
The stаte called two witnesses to testify as to the value of the stereo system at the time of its theft, one of whom was the owner of the stereo system. Over the objection of the defense as to lack of foundation, the owner opined that at the time of the theft the stereo system had a fair market value of $850. She predicated such opinion upon her understanding of the phrase “fair market value,” her opportunities to speak with people who sell similar new and used stereo systems and to her familiarity with the sale price of such systems.
The other witness called by the state to testify, inter alia, as to the value of the stereo system was a Kootenai County deputy sheriff. On direct examination the deputy was asked several questions for the purpose of laying a foundation to elicit his opinion as to the value. When the state asked the deputy to render his opinion, Vandenacre objected upon the grounds of lack of foundation, and the trial court sustained the objection. Immediately thereafter the state asked the following question and the deputy gave the following answer:
Q: Sergeant, if the victim, the owner of these three components, were to want to sell these three components February 27th of 1995, what would you pay for them?
A: Seven, eight hundred dollars.
Vandenacre did not object to the question nor did he move to strike the deputy’s answer. Having failed to do so, such testimony was properly before the jurors for thеir consideration and to give it such weight as they deemed appropriate. Standing alone, however, such evidence may very well have been insufficient to support a verdict finding Vandenacre guilty of grand theft.
Vandenacre called only one witness, who described herself as a private investigator, to testify as to the market value of the stolen property. She opined that the market value of the stereo system was $225.
Vandenacre contends that the state failed to produce substantial, competent evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the value of the property which he had admittedly stolen had a value in excess of $300. We rejеct such contention.
We initially note that under I.R.E. 701, a trial court may allow a lay witness to state an opinion about a matter of fact within her knowledge, so long as two conditions are met: (1) the witness’s opinion must be based on her perception, and (2) the opinion must be helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or a determinatiоn of a fact in issue.
State v. Missamore,
Aso, it is settled in Idaho that, in civil actions, the owner of proрerty is competent to testify as to its market value without qualifying the owner as an expert witness.
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Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v. Akzo Coatings, Inc.,
The applicable standard of review we apply in determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict finding Vandenaere guilty of grand theft is not disputed. Where there is substantial, competent evidenсe to support a jury verdict, it will not be disturbed on appeal.
State v. Clayton,
Furthermore, when a defendant stands convicted, the evidence will be viewed on appeal in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
State v. Fenley,
Having reviewed all of the evidence placed before the jury by both the state and Vandenaere, we hold that there was substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found that the fair market value of the stereo system exceeded $300 at the time of Vandenacre’s admitted theft thereof.
B. Vandenacre’s Offer to Stipulate as to the Theft Vis-a-vis the State’s Evidence Regarding It’s Search for Fingerprints.
Later in the trial, Edward Anderson, a patrol deputy employed by the Kootenai County Sheriffs Department, wаs called as a witness for the prosecution. The prosecutor was beginning to inquire of Deputy Anderson as to the fingerprint investigation of the victim’s home when the defense objected:
MR. LONG: Judge, I’m going to object to this line of questioning. I think it’s irrelevant in light of the stipulation that we have offered to enter into. With all respect to the officer, I’m sure he did a fine investigation, but it seems irrelevant since we’re willing to stipulate that my client took the stereo out of that trailer.
THE COURT: Mr. Baughman?
MR. BAUGHMAN: Your Honor, the State is attempting to show the intent to deprive.
THE COURT: Well, just because you’re stipulating to the facts doesn’t mean the State isn’t entitled to go ahead and prove their case, even though you’re willing to stipulate tо the issues. So, the objection will be overruled.
Deputy Anderson then testified that he conducted a fingerprint search of the doorway area and the area where the stereo had been located but was not able to locate any fingerprints.
*511 Vandenacre argues that in allowing the deputy sheriff to testify over Vandenacre’s оbjection as to the results of the fingerprint search, “The trial court’s error here is plain.” He asserts that by allowing the state to go forward with “irrelevant and prejudicial matters,” the trial court “wasted the jury’s time” and inflamed the fact finders. Vandenacre contends that under the “plead out” concept he may offer to stipulate as to a fact or facts which the state would otherwise be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. He argues that if he does offer to so stipulate, the state should be precluded from introducing evidence of facts as to which the defendant has offered to stipulate. Since he did offer to admit that he “took the stereo out of the trailer,” Vandenacre argues that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in permitting the state, over his objection, to introduce, through a deputy sheriff, the results of the deputy’s “fingerprint search” of the premises from which the stereo system had been stolen. Vandenacre directs our attention to Professor Edward J. Imwinkelreid’s article entitled The Right to “Plead Out” Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a Denial of Equal Protection, 40 Emory L.J. 341 (1991). This is the only authority he presents in support of his argument that his offered stipulation that he “took” the stereo system should have precluded admission of the state’s evidence of the fingerprinting investigation.
We are persuaded that if there was any error by the trial court in overruling Vandenacre’s objection to the fingerprint testimony, such error was harmless. To hold an eiTor harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that thе evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.
State v. Sharp,
C. The Prosecution’s Improper Question
Vandenаcre also seeks reversal of the judgments of conviction on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. He predicates his argument upon the following dialogue between the trial judge, the defense attorney and the prosecutor conducted during cross-examination of Vandenacre and in the presence of the jurors:
Q [by thе prosecutor]: Mr. Vandenacre, have you ever been convicted of a felony?
[Defense attorney]: Your Honor, I’m going to object, and request that this be taken up outside the presence of the jury.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I remind you not to discuss this matter among yourselves, not to form or express any opinions on this matter. If you’d like to rеtire to the jury room, we’ll take this up. We’ll probably take a brief recess after we take this up.
Thereupon the jury exited the courtroom and argument was heard. After it was pointed out that the prosecutor had not complied with the Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 requirement that the relevancy of a prior felony conviction be detеrmined in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor withdrew the question. Prior to returning the jury to the courtroom the following colloquy transpired between the court and Vandenacre’s trial counsel:
THE COURT: Is the withdrawal of the question sufficient in your mind or—
[VANDENACRE’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I think the jury should be admonished to disregard the question as well.
THE COURT: Okay. Anything else we need to take up before we bring the jury in?
[VANDENACRE’S COUNSEL]: I don’t believe so.
THE COURT: Go ahead and bring the jury in.
After the jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial judge admonished the jury in the following words: “The objection will be sustained. The jury is admonished to disregard the last question by the prosecuting *512 attorney, as all questions are not evidence but that particular question should be disregarded.” Thereupon, the prosecuting attorney briefly resumed his cross examination of Vandenacre. At no time did Vandenacre move for a mistrial.
Vandenacre argues on appeal that the state’s question propounded to him as to whether he “had ever been convicted of a felony” constituted “such egregious disregard of the rules of evidence” as would warrant a rеversal of the conviction. He cites
State v. Reynolds,
We are guided by the Idaho Supreme Court’s holding in
State v. Owens,
The trial court is in the best position to judge the prejudicial effect caused by an improper but unanswered question. Our prior cases have held that it must be presumed that a jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions to disregard an improper question and to avoid speculation as to what the witness might have answered if permitted to do so. See State v. Rolfe,92 Idaho 467 ,444 P.2d 428 (1968); State v. Urie,92 Idaho 71 ,437 P.2d 24 (1968). A motion for mistrial is directed to the trial court’s sound discretion and the court’s ruling thereon will not be disturbed unless it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion and that, as a result, the defendant’s rights were prejudiced. Where the witness was not allowed to answer the question and where the trial court, expressing its belief that an instruction would be sufficient to correct any prejudicial inferences which may have resulted from the question, instructed the jury to disregard the question, we do not find that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial constituted an abuse of its discretion.
Id. (citations omitted).
Unlike the defendant in Owens, Vandenacre did not at any time move for a mistrial. It appears that defense counsel was satisfied with the admonition given the jurors by the court; indeed, Vandenacre requested that such instruction be given. Thе question before us is whether the posing of such unanswered questions by the state constituted prosecutorial misconduct and therefore prejudiced Vandenaere’s right to a fair trial.
Vandenacre’s appellate briefs have accurately characterized the standard of review applicable in eases involving the еrroneous
admission
of evidence such as in
State v. LePage,
However, LePage and Hoisington do not deal with situations in which, as here, an improper question was asked a witness and no answer was supplied by the witness. In other words no tainted or other inadmissible evidence was presented to the jury as the result of the state’s admittedly improper question.
We believe the fundamental rationale of the Idaho Supreme Court articulated in
Owens
applies here. We adhere to the long standing principle “that it must be presumed that a jury obeyed the trial court’s instructions to disregard an improper question and to avoid speculation as to what the witness
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might have answered if permitted to do so.”
Owens,
D. The Cumulative Error Issue
Vandenacre seeks reversal of the grand theft conviction under the “cumulative error” doctrine. The doctrine is predicated upon the proposition that “an accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.”
State v. Campbell,
In addressing Vandenacre’s issues on appeal we have assumed error in the admission of the fingerprint investigation evidence and recognized that the prosecutor’s question regarding Vandenacre’s prior felony convictions was improper. We have concluded that neither of these errors was prejudicial to Vandenacre. Even taking these irregularities in the aggregаte, we are convinced that Vandenacre’s right to a fair trial was not infringed. We conclude that Vandenacre has shown no basis for the reversal of his judgment of conviction.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The judgments convicting Vandenacre of grand theft, malicious injury to property and driving without privileges are affirmed.
Notes
. In order to find a defendant guilty of grand theft, the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that, inter alia, the property wrongfully taken had a value in excess of three hundred dollars ($300). I.C. 18-2407(1)(b)(l).