192 Iowa 818 | Iowa | 1921
IV. The appellant produced three witnesses upon the trial, who testified that appellant’s general moral character was good. One of these witnesses was named Collins. On his cross-examination by the county attorney, the following . . n trcUlfipirCCl:
Palmer, another of appellant’s character witnesses, was asked, on cross-examination:
“Did you ever hear of this defendant going with a man named Christensen to C. M. Pennell, a mail who lost some tires, and trying to settle up the case that was pending against Christensen concerning some stolen tires?”
Smith, another of said witnesses, was interrogated by the county attorney as,, follows:
“Did you ever hear that, in November, 1917, defendant wont with a man named Christensen to a man named Pennell, from whom a number of automobile tires had been stolen, and endeavored to settle with Mr. Pennell for the stolen tires?”
Timely objections were interposed to these questions, which
“Gentlemen of the jury, as against this [referring to defendant’s witnesses as to character] I did something which they say is very unfair. I did a thing that I know I had a right to do, and as prosecuting attorney of this county, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not done it. I brought in three witnesses who testified to the contrary. You will remember that, when I was cross-examining Collins, Smith, and Parmer, I said to them (in order to find out one’s reputation, you have to find out what people say about him), and I said, ‘Have you ever heard that this defendant sold three stolen tires to Mr. Spillman?’ No, they had never heard of that. ‘Had you ever heard that, about November, 1917, he was arrested with some stolen tires, at least one of which was kept in the storeroom of the Hughes-Irons Motor Company?’ and the answer was ‘No.’ I put the same question to all of them, ‘Had they ever heard that this defendant, together with Mr. Christensen after the defendant had been arrested, went to Mr. Pennell and tried to make settlement for those stolen tires?’ and to all such questions, the witnesses replied that they had never heard. Now, gentlemen of the jury, I have tried to be fair; so I called Mr. Pennell and Mr. Spillman here, and asked them as to this man’s reputation and as to his character. Mr. Pennell and Mr. Spillman were here, and testified to their dealings in a general way, and to what they knew about the character and reputation of this man, and they testified that it was not good, but that it was bad." Now, gentlemen of the jury, did you hear any cross-examination on that score? They knew what I asked their character witnesses. I could not offer any further evidence of character; and why didn’t they ask Mr. Pennell about those tires? Why didn’t they ask him? I could not ask him, but they could have asked him where he got his information as to this man’s character. They could have gone into this in detail, and found out what his statements were based upon; but they didn’t do that. They accuse me of being
This entire line of argument was duly objected to by appellant’s counsel, but no rulings appear to have been entered bj? tiie court. Further argument of a similar character, obviously intended, not as a legitimate discussion of the evidence in the ease, but for the express purpose of seeking to unduly prejudice the jury, was indulged in by the county attorney. We cannot set our seal of approval upon such methods to secure the conviction of one charged with crime. Ability, skill, alertness, and zeal in a public prosecutor are commendable, and should be encouraged. It is for the good of society, for the welfare of the State, that crime shall be punished, and that the prosecution of criminals shall be vigilant and vigorous. But, under our laws, the person charged with crime has certain well known rights which the State is bound to respect. Time and again we have declared that proof of other crimes than the one with which a defendant is charged is not admissible against him. The State cannot do, by the indirect method resorted to in the instant case, that which it would not be permitted to do directly.
State v. Kimes, 152 Iowa 240, cited by counsel for appellee, does not justify the proceedings had in the instant case. In said case, we said:
“While the rule is that, in rebutting evidence of good moral character offered by defendant, the State cannot introduce evidence as to particular transactions, it is certainly competent, on cross-examination of a witness who has testified as to defendant’s good moral character, to ask whether there have not been rumors or reports in the community as to his, bad character, with reference to particular transactions. ’ ’
We do not intend to depart from the rule thus announced; but, in the instant case, the county attorney went much further in cross-examination than could be allowed under this rule, and supplemented this by argument highly prejudicial and exceedingly improper. We are disposed to allow a wide latitude in the arguments of counsel, realizing the native ability of the average juror to make due allowance for oratorical embellish
Because of the matters herein discussed, this case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. It is so ordered.'— Reversed and remanded.