*1 JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, STATE OF NEW v. DENNY VALENTIN, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT. Argued September 22, January 198 6 Decided 1987. *2 General, argued Menkin, Deputy Attorney L. Jeffrey (W. Edwards, Attorney General of Cary appellant for cause attorney). Jersey, Defender, Anekstein, Deputy Public L. Assistant Morton Slocum, (Alfred Public respondent A. argued the cause for Defender, attorney). by delivered opinion of the Court was
The GARIBALDI, Justice. “vol- interpretation of the word appeal
This concerns decide 2C:29-3b(4). Specifically, we must in unteers” N.J.S.A. a response law-enforcement a who whether defendant thereby violates N.J.S.A. gives a false name officer’s 2C:29-3b(4), “volunteer[ing] false proscribes officer.” to law enforcement
I stop. On vehicle context of motor case arises This defendant, by stopped a car driven 9,1985, trooper April a state car The Valentin, motor vehicle violation. for a routine Denny company The of Florida. registered to Dollar-Rent-A-Car was lessee, he Valentin, the after car reported had stolen seeking to company The was the vehicle. failed to return prosecute the defendant. trooper asked stopped, the state
When Valentin was trooper then issued name, replied “Ramon Velez.” and he a motor Shortly vehicle summons and released Valentin. there- trooper stopped after same Valentin for another motor gave vehicle infraction. This time Valentin his own name. The trooper given however remembered that Valentin had a differ- prior on ent name prosecuted occasion. Hence he was on receiving two property counts: stolen violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-7; and hindering apprehension by his own “volunteer- ing” the name of Velez on the first occasion violation of
Defendant filed motion in the trial court to dismiss count two of the indictment. The motion asserted that because merely responded defendant to the questions, he did not “volunteer” false meaning information within the of N.J. 2C:29-3b(4). Specifically, argues S.A. defendant that the stat *3 question prohibits taking ute the providing initiative in false officials, to merely responding information law-enforcement an inquiry. interpretation to The State asserts that this is too narrow and that the practically word “volunteer” any includes deliberate technically advance information not required by law, response whether or not made in to a law-enforcement inquiry.1
The trial questioned by court found that iswho “[o]ne officer, armed law enforcement has not ‘taken the initiative’ affirmatively merely volunteered information but has re- sponded police questioning.” to Accordingly, granted he de- affirmed, Appellate fendant’s motion dismiss. The Division similarly concluding guilty that “to be under N.J.S.A. 2C:29- 3b(4), the actor must in providing take the initiative the false information. culpable falsely He cannot if responds be he to a question by Valentin, a law enforcement officer.” State v. 208 (1986). N.J.Super. 540 distinguish 1 TheState does case the where the defendant simply responds with an denial of in the police questions crime. In exculpatory implication such cases the State admits that the statute is not See State v. applicable. (1979). (App.Div.),
Daniels, 165 denied, certif. 81 N.J. N.J.Super. expressly Appellate of the Division overruled majority 1984), Alexander, (Law N.J.Super. 594 Div. certif. v. den., (1985), which had held that one “volunteers” N.J. 303 inquiries. In- police-initiated responding when D’Addario, stead, majority 196 N.J.Su- the followed State (Law 1984), culpable held that to be per. Div. false information or giving must take initiative actor give it solicitation. must offer without Judge agree did not with concurring opinion, his Shebell limited legislature had intended such a majority that the Nevertheless, he concurred scope for N.J.S.A. legislators that the he concluded judgment because “ha[d] clarity to allow intention with sufficient enacted their any persons than those ‘who statute to other application ” track.’ throwing off the initiative take the 2:2-2(b) 2:5-6(a), and Rule N.J.Super. at Pursuant to Rule 541. appeal judgment motion leave to granted the State’s (1986), Division, affirm. and now Appellate of the II 2C:29-3b(4)provides: to hinder own if, apprehen- A commits an offense purpose b. he: or conviction sion, punishment, prosecution, [********]
(4) law enforcement officer. information to a Volunteers *4 guide in is the doctrine rudimentary this case most
Our Suspen In re strictly must be construed. penal that statutes Carbone, (1980); DeMarco, v. 83 N.J. State sion of (1986) Gantt, (1962); 19, 24 v. N.J. Sutherland, Construction Statutory (Handler, J., concurring); Sands 1974). ¶ (4th ed. at 6-7 59.03 has strictly construed are to be penal “The statutes rule that shall be process. No one requirement of due its heart the at punished for a crime both punishment unless that crime and its clearly in positive are set forth Suspension laws.” In re DeMarco, supra, 83 N.J. 36. Penal at statutes must be suffi ciently so ordinary people definite that can understand what prohibited. conduct is Kimmelman, Town Tobacconist v. 85, 118 (1983). N.J. Supreme As the United States Court stated Grayned City 104, 108-09, Rockford, 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, (1972): 33 L.Ed. 2d 227-28 Vague laws offend several First, values. we important because assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful we insist conduct, laws give intelligence person ordinary reasonable to know what opportunity Vague accordingly. is so that he act prohibited may laws the innocent may trap providing warning. fair if by Second, enforce- arbitrary discriminatory
ment to be is laws must standards prevented, provide those who explicit them. apply
Penal by laws cannot be implication extended or in tendment. interpretation Where more than one may reasonable made, be or language ambiguous where the the ambi —and guity by is not manufactured the defendant —the construction must against Carbone, be drawn the state. supra, State v. 23-24; Sutherland, ¶ at supra, N.J. at 59.03 6-7. mind,
With principles these our focus this case on the meaning ordinary citizen would ascribe Certainly “volunteer” N.J.S.A. one “vol- unteers” information he when “blurts or it out” otherwise However, it prompting. advances without people most do not believe that one responses “volunteers” to a law-enforcement inquiry. See, e.g., Dictionary The Random House (9th English 1983) Language (defining ed. volunteer: “to offer undertaking or one’s for some or [oneself services] bestow, purpose[;] give, perform ... or being without asked ”). case, ... In this the State reasons that because has right inquiries constitutional refuse answer law-en- officials, any responses forcement inquiries to such are consen- and, therefore, sual disagree. “volunteered.” We
19 constitutionally or statutori not Although defendant was trooper, ordinary an ly compelled to answer the state does not think he is a motor vehicle violation stopped for in officer’s “volunteering” answers to a law-enforcement they think that quiries. persons under such circumstances contrary, most to answer. On the believe can refuse involvement with the respond only will lead further failure Seizure, LaFave, ¶ 9.2, at 52-55 Search & officer. W. Mendenhall, (1978). v. United States U.S. generally See 497, 1870, 1871-73, 2d 544-57, 509-11 L.Ed. S.Ct. (1980) governmental (recognizing the assertion substantial stops an authority when a law-enforcement officer involved a citizen would feel con and the likelihood that automobile respond questions). to the officer’s strained to signaled by trooper pull a state defendant In this case was signal cannot be stop. compliance with that His over subsequent voluntary Nor can his as a choice. characterized The fact that inquiry of name. response to the officer’s name either a true or false supply had choice to defendant respond that was practical negate imperative does ordinary citizen would inquiry. An created response to be “volun- essentially mandated consider such anticipate that 2C:29- simply could not tary,” and thus Lee, v. 3b(4) apply in such case. would See DeMarco, at supra, 183 (1984); re N.J. Suspension context, therefore, “volunteer” is too In this 36. justify a ambiguous to conviction.
Ill case, subject to more When, statutory term is in this as plain language to beyond its interpretation look than one Butler, N.J. legislature intent. State determine the legisla- (1982). the historical context Our into 2C:29-3b(4)firmly supports our narrow history N.J.S.A. tive *6 construction of the word “volunteer” in that statute. See State 'Addario, (Law Div.1984). v. D N.J.Super. 196 392 Legislature In 1981 the by amended N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3 enact- ing prohibits subsection hindering apprehen- b which one’s own sion, prosecution alia, by, or conviction “volunteering] inter false information law enforcement officer.” N.J.S.A. provision exactly This language traces the of 2C:29-3a(7),2 prohibits hindering apprehen- N.J.S.A. the sion, prosecution or conviction of “volunteering] another a law enforcement officer.” Pantasote, Inc., (1984), Perez general phrase articulated “the rule that a word or should have meaning throughout the same the statute the absence of a contrary.” clear indication to comparative Just as “a analysis language contemporaneous may, statute contrasting because of language applicable subject to similar matter, be purpose part indicative an intent or on the of the Legislature provide treatment,” Fender, different Malone v. (1979), citing N.J. Township of Hazlet, Smith v. (1973), N.J. so is the language use of the same indicative Legislature’s provide of the intent to the same treat Therefore, Legislature’s ment. phrase use of the identical —“volunteers false information to a law enforcement officer”— 2C:29-3a(7) 3b(4) strong proof N.J.S.A. that those provisions proscribe were meant to types the same of conduct. legislative history
The scant of the 1981 amendment also 2C:29-3a(7) b(4) indicates that N.J.S.A. should be construed similarly. See Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for S. 2C:29-3a(7)
2 N.J.S.A. provides a. A if, commits an offense to hinder purpose appre- hension, conviction or an of another offense prosecution, punishment he: (7) Volunteers false information to a law enforcement officer. [********] (Jan. 2, 1981) merely that the (explaining at 7 amendment hindering apprehen- prohibition against another’s
broadened conviction, prosecution similarly hindering sion, prohibit or prosecution). or Both sec- apprehension, conviction one’s own prohibition against Code’s act- from former tions derived fact,” (repealed “accessory 2A:85-2 ing after the as 1, 1979). II The Sept. Commentary: Report Final N.J. See (hereinafter Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission (1971); source note.3 Commentary) N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3 accomplice theory, which broke from the traditional new Code 2A:85-2, the basis and followed had formed of N.J.S.A. *7 Code, liability hindering prosecu- Model Penal which bases theory. Jersey justice tion an obstruction of New Commen- on 283; The com- supra, at 2C:29-3 source note. tary, N.J.S.A. the Penal Code parallel provision to the of Model mentary “volunteering does not that false information” explicitly states inquiries by the to initiated “giving include ... false answers (1985). commentary at 235 police.” Model Penal 242.3 Code § provision This police
proscribes only to the the of volunteered misinformation borderline case provision who is to reach those covered This intended which is not elsewhere. throwing police in off the track. take the initiative the [Id.] of Commentary explains that the exclusion Model Code
The scope of the to law officials from false answers enforcement represented this section part policy judgment, premised reach for on the fear that a wider a delicate charges by police against persons inter- would abusive
this subsection invite investigating course of crime. [7d.] in the viewed predecessor to N.J.S.A. argues the statute that without citation 3 The 1, 1979), Sept. prohibited the (repealed N.J.S.A.2A:148-22.1 2C.29-3 was any enforcement “knowing giving law willful of false information to officer____with respect 2A:148- of [an offense].” to commission the however, Reports 22.1, prohibition to on "False was the basis for the current note. N.J.S.A. 2C:28-4 source Authorities." See Law Enforcement The commentators noted other that sections of the Model Code implement “penal policy were better suited to respect with to police.” unsworn false the statements to Id. of Jersey similarly drafters recog- New Penal Code danger might
nized the that arise from a broad construction of “volunteer” in N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3: regard investigations, With to with non-cooperation it should be borne in police compelling mind that the law means of under provides oath, and that testimony with to false penal unsworn statements been policy respect has laid danger down in to the other Sections of the with advertence abusive Code charges brought being against interviewed in course by police persons investigating crime. The borderline case ‘volunteered’ misinformation 2C:29-3a(7)] dealt police, would not be [N.J.S.A. covered else- throwing where and is intended reach those who take the initiative in the tract. police off (1971) (emphasis added).] [New at Jersey Commentary explicit Even if it is less commentary than the to the Model Code, the Jersey Commentary similarly unequivocal displacement its of “unsworn false statements” made re sponse to investigations law enforcement from scope N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3. Both commentaries make it clear Legislature intended that sections other than N.J.A. 2C:29-3 C. prohibit responses questioning by law enforcement officers.
IV do any response We not hold that to a law-enforcement cannot be a violation this under act or that an only suspect offense if speaks occurs part, first. wheth- er an depends degree offense occurs on the nature and misinformation. Just as a mere exculpatory “no” not the is type prohibited statute, of information under the is the neither mere misstatement of However, defendant’s if name. after misinforming police suspect name proceeded, for example, police to advise the that perpetrator he observed the Florida, he knew that he had returned to and that N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4) certainly operable. would be
Moreover, 2C:29-3b(4) that we do hold N.J.S.A. vague only sufficiently hold that it is or unconstitutional. We ambiguous preclude application its to this defendant in this acknowledge clarifying amendment. We this context without (although may police make work more difficult we decision are expressed by some of the fears the State believe that unfounded).4 Nevertheless, of the exact Legislature’s use in of the same statute and the language same two sections prose danger of unwarranted stated awareness of the drafters’ giving unsworn state people for cution compel conclusion that during police investigation our ments legislature did not intend the word “volunteer” N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b(4) meaning greater scope than a different to have 2C:29-3a(7). Moreover, in the word “volunteer” meaning of the assumptions about the light of the common “volunteer,” convinced that the statute did we are warning potential applicability this give defendant fair of its Thus, did not “vol conclude that this defendant case. 2C:29-3b(4), gave name he unteer,” the false under N.J.S.A. inquiry. therefore affirm trooper’s We response to the state Appellate Division. judgment of the CLIFFORD, Justice, dissenting. way to talk the judges just would learn lawyers
If Like, do, many problems. good avoid a regular folks we would instance, this case. criminal to "effectively decision allow a 4 The State warns that our may lying that he waits for the own provided hinder his prosecution by police, exchange." a criminal on It seems their verbal unlikely officer to initiate exchange More he would try likely the run would wait for an police. himself it, would not contact, correctly identify such and if forced into avoid are even less regardless We of N.J.S.A. of the applicability statute will allow our of the the State’s fear that construction impressed by giving their names instead innocent parties by criminal falsely implicate his own. *9 name, When asked his defendant was confronted with three (I agree choices: he could remain silent that maybe he did not that, put maybe, high priority know and that for those a who on irritating people, law-enforcement silence is such good a approach trooper name; anyway); he could tell the or he up could make or “borrow” a name. Defendant took last gave Nobody course: he false information. asked him do Nobody that. phony Nobody extracted the name. coerced proffering defendant bogus into identification—he vol- up unteered it. He made his answer. He lied. His intention was to avoid detection send the off goose on wild chase. lawyer
One need not be a or wordsmith or semanticist understand proscribing volunteering statute of false ato law-enforcement officer is violated when Den- Valentin, ny wanted on a charge, stolen vehicle tells a state trooper that his name Ramon I Velez. do not think the crowd down at the corner nearly newsstand would have simple, trouble with eminently this sensible statute that this Court has.
I would reverse and remand to trial court with an order to reinstate count two of the indictment.
For Justice WILENTZ and Justices affirmance —Chief HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—6.
For reversal remandment —Justice CLIFFORD—1.