STATE OF OHIO v. STEVEN P. UPCHURCH
C.A. No. 20CA0001-M
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
January 19, 2021
[Cite as State v. Upchurch, 2021-Ohio-94.]
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE WADSWORTH MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO CASE No. 19TRD03977-A
Dated: January 19, 2021
CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.
{1} Appellant, Steven Upchurch, appeals his conviction for speeding by the Wadsworth Municipal Court. This Court affirms.
I.
{2} Mr. Upchurch received a traffic ticket for driving sixty miles per hour in an area with a speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour in violation of
{3} The trial court found Mr. Upchurch guilty of speeding and fined him $130. Mr. Upchurch filed this appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
DEFECT IN THE INSTITUTION OF PROCESS : THE TRAFFIC CITATION ITSELF IS ERRORED [SIC]. I HAD TO INVESTIGATE TO FIND BOTH TIME AND PLACE CONCERNING SUMMONS FOR ARRAIGNMENT.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
FURTHER DEFECT IN INSTITUTION OF PROCESS : UPON CHALLENGING THE [TRIAL] COURT TO PROVE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION (AT ARRAIGNMENT), THE [TRIAL COURT] ASSUMES AND ASSERTS JURIS[DICTION] IN LIEU OF THE PROSECUTOR[‘]S BURDEN OF PROOF. WHICH I BELIEVE WAS NOT MET ON [THE] RECORD.
{4} In his first and second assignments of error, Mr. Upchurch appears to argue that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. Because these two assignments of error address related issues, this Court will consider them together.
{5} Personal jurisdiction consists of ““[a] court‘s power to bring a person into its adjudicative process[.]” Renacci v. Evans, 9th Dist. Medina No. 09CA0004-M, 2009-Ohio-5154, ¶ 6, quoting Black‘s Law Dictionary 870 (8th Ed.2004). In civil cases, a court with subject matter jurisdiction where venue is appropriate has personal jurisdiction over the parties when an action is commenced in accordance with
{7} Mr. Upchurch provided a copy of a ticket with his motion for a continuance. That copy does not appear to be faint, but completely blank with the exception of the ticket number and Mr. Upchurch‘s signature, which appears in a slightly different location than on the original copy. Mr. Upchurch did not argue that he was not served with the ticket or that, based on the ticket, he was unaware of the offense with which he was charged, nor did he present any evidence to that effect. Service of the traffic ticket at the scene was sufficient to vest the trial court with personal jurisdiction. See Eytcheson at 68. Compare State v. Mattingly, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 98CA0035, 1999 WL 1068454, *3 (Nov. 24, 1999).
{8} Mr. Upchurch has also argued—as he argued before his trial commenced—that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because he is a resident of Lorain County and had no contacts within Medina County apart from driving through the jurisdiction. This argument does not relate to whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Upchurch because in a
{9} Mr. Upchurch‘s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
SHOULD THE TRIAL COURT HAVE IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION[,] CONVICTION CANNOT HOLD. MANIFEST WEIGHT OF [THE] EV[I]DENCE FALLS SHORT OF PROSECUTION[‘S] BURDEN OF PROOF. NO HARD EVIDENCES WERE SHOWN... WHILE WELL ESTABLISHED REASONABLE DOUBT WAS SHOWN.
{10} Mr. Upchurch‘s third assignment of error is that his conviction for speeding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court does not agree.
{11} When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court must:
review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983).
{12}
No person shall operate a motor vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar upon a street or highway * * * [a]t a speed exceeding fifty-five miles per hour, except upon a two-lane state route as provided in division (B)(10) of this section and upon a highway, expressway, or freeway as provided in divisions (B)(12), (13), (14), and (16) of this section[.]
{13} In this case, the officer testified that on the morning of December 6, 2019, he parked his cruiser at a Lodi intersection when schoolchildren were getting on their school bus, as was his pattern. He recalled that he had just arrived at the location when he observed a flatbed truck “coming through the town at 60 miles an hour” as measured on his radar. The officer testified that he waited until he was certain that no children were crossing the street, then initiated a traffic stop. He also testified that he was trained to visually estimate the speed of motor vehicles and that he was able on this occasion to determine that Mr. Upchurch was driving in excess of the posted speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour. With respect to the radar unit, the officer testified that he had been trained to operate the radar unit and that he operated it on that occasion within the parameters of his department‘s policies. The officer also identified the model of the radar unit that he used and explained that it had been serviced and calibrated in August of the same year.
{14} The officer testified that it is his practice to check the radar device using tuning forks each morning when he arrives at the location of the stop, but he explained that he did not do so on the day of this incident because he observed Mr. Upchurch‘s vehicle as soon as he arrived at the intersection. According to the officer, he turned on the radar unit and obtained the vehicle‘s speed before he had a chance to check the unit. The officer explained that his department does not have a policy requiring daily checks of the radar device, but noted that it is his practice nonetheless. He testified that on his workdays immediately before and after the date of this incident, the radar unit was accurate.
{16} Mr. Upchurch‘s conviction for speeding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. His third assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
I‘D MOTIONED THE COURT FOR A DISCOVERY OF [EVIDENCE]. PURSUANT TO A PRETRIAL CONFERENCE... I HAVE SPECULATIVE REASON TO BELIEVE EXCULPATORY [EVIDENCE WAS] WITHHELD. I BELIEVE I MAY HAVE BEEN “SANDBAGGED” WITH [EVIDENCE] [AND] LACK THEREOF, LAST MINUTE.
{17} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Upchurch argues that his conviction must be reversed because certain evidence was not provided to him, including records of the officer‘s daily radar testing and dashboard camera video of the incident. Mr. Upchurch acknowledges that the argument in support of this assignment of error is based on speculation. At best, this Court notes that it relies on evidence outside the record that may or may not exist. As such, these arguments cannot be raised in a direct appeal. See State v. Walter, 9th Dist. Wayne Nos. 16AP0009,
{18} Mr. Upchurch‘s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
THE [TRIAL] COURT ENUMERATED NO [RIGHTS], NOT EVEN APPELLATE [RIGHTS].
{19} Mr. Upchurch has articulated a fifth assignment of error that appears to assert that the trial court did not inform him of any of his rights. His brief contains no argument in support of this assignment of error, and this Court declines to construct an argument on his behalf. See Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (May 6, 1998).
III.
{20} Mr. Upchurch‘s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Wadsworth Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wadsworth Municipal Court, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
Costs taxed to Appellant.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
STEVEN P. UPCHURCH, pro se, Appellant.
THOMAS J. MORRIS, Director of Law, for Appellee.