67 Wis. 624 | Wis. | 1887
Are the facts stated such as to make the service upon Bombach good as against the defendant ? In our judgment they are. The defendant is a foreign accident insurance corporation. It never procured a license to do business in this state, as required by the statutes. Secs.
The several things thus enumerated are connected by dis-junctives, so that the doing of any of them by Bombach would have made him the agent of the defendant, within the definition. State v. Farmer, 9 Wis. 459. The facts stated show that he did every one of them himself, unless it was to make the contracts of insurance mentioned; and the facts stated show that he aided and assisted in making each
As to the commencement of actions or service of process upon foreign insurance corporations, this is in no respect changed by ch. 240, Laws of 1880, notwithstanding sec. 5 of that act is nearly in the same language as sec. 1977, R. S. It simply makes it a misdemeanor to act as such agent otherwise than as prescribed. This was fully considered and determined in State v. Northwestern Endowment & Legacy Ass’n of Minn. 62 Wis. 176, 177. But here Bombach received a commission on each of the policies mentioned as issued by the defendant, and hence the question of his acting “ gratuitously,” there considered, is not here involved. By receiving and retaining such applications and premiums, and then issuing to the respective beneficiaries policies thereon, and then sending the same to Bombachfor delivery, the defendant thereby ratified his agency.
If the argument of counsel, to the effect that sec. 1977 only relates to agents of such foreign insurance companies as are duly licensed to do business _ within this state, is sound, then there would be,.no possible way of commencing an action against an unlicensed foreign insurance company doing business in this state in violation of law. In other words, such construction would reward such foreign insurance companies as refused to pay the requisite license, by enabling them to retain the license money and then shielding them from the enforcement of all liability, whether on their contracts or otherwise, in the courts of Wisconsin. Such construction would defeat the whole purpose and scope of the statute. Besides, such construction would restrict the application of the section wholly to home insurance companies and' such foreign insurance corporations as procure the requisite license; whereas the language of the section is, “ any insurance corporation,” “ any contract of insurance,” “any premium for insurance,” “any business
The courts of other states have taken a similar view of similar statutes. Gibbs v. Queen Ins. Co. 63 N. Y. 114; Pope v. Terre Haute, C. & M. Co. 87 N. Y. 137; Osborne v. Shawmut Ins. Co. 51 Vt. 278; McNichol v. U. S. Mercantile R. A. 74 Mo. 457; Swift v. State, 25 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 594; Lhoneux v. Hong Kong & S. B. Corp. L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 446.
Foreign insurance companies are not compelled to do business in this state. If they voluntarily choose to do so, however, they must submit to such conditions and restrictions as the legislature may see fit to impose. Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; State ex rel. Drake v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 176.
In Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, a person, having acted as an agent of an insurance company doing business in that state without a license under a similar act, was convicted and fined under the statute; and it was held that there had been no violation of sec. 2, art. IY, Const, of U. S., providing that “ the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states;” nor of sec. 8, art. I, giving to Congress the power “to regulate
From these decisions it appears that by voluntarily doing business in the state the defendant voluntarily submitted itself to the laws of the state. Prom them it further appears that the question of interstate commerce is in no way involved in such a case; and hence it is distinguishable from Cooper Manuf'g Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, and other similar cases.
The defendant’s right to impeach the sheriff’s return by other evidence includes the plaintiff’s right to support such return by similar evidence. We conclude that the court got jurisdiction of the defendant by the service upon Bom-bach.
The question, however, is not before us as to just what subject-matter such jurisdiction may extend to. It is enough to know that there may be cases to which such jurisdiction
By the Gourt.— The order of the circuit court is affirmed.