263 Mo. 677 | Mo. | 1915
An information was filed by the prosecuting attorney in the criminal court of Jackson county charging defendant with murder in the first degree in having killed one Joseph Johnson in Kansas City on the night of October 8, 1913. Upon a trial the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and his punishment assessed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of twenty years. Prom this sentence defendant has perfected this appeal.
On the night of October 8, 1913, the deceased, a farmer from the State of Kansas, went, in company with two or three others, at about 12:30 o’clock a. m., in defendant’s automobile, the latter being a chauffeur operating a machine for hire, to a house of prostitution. As they came in one of the girls heard the defendant say to the keeper of the house that he had brought “a bunch that had plenty of ‘jack,’ ” meaning money. They remained' at the house probably half
About seven o’clock that morning, two police officers in the vicinity of Sixth and Bluff streets, looking down from the Interstate Viaduct, saw the body of a man lying at the foot of the retaining wall about fifteen feet from the edge of the viaduct. The body was lying eight or ten feet from the foot of a retaining
The defendant and Rats Miller were the principal witnesses for the defense. The defendant testified that he took deceased and three or four others to Daisy Long’s house on the night of October 8, 1913. After spending a half an hour or more there he took them to a saloon at Thirteenth and Main streets, Kansas City. Leaving them there he returned with the deceased to Daisy Long’s. The deceased proposed that defendant take him and some of the girls to St. Joseph, but the plan was abandoned and defendant asked the deceased for a dollar car fare he claimed the latter owed him. Johnson claimed he did not owe the bill and reached back towards his pocket, when defendant struck him with his revolver, felling him to the floor. In this and other respects defendant’s testimony differs materially from that of the State’s witnesses, viz.: that he struck the deceased at Daisy Long’s because he apprehended from the motions of the latter that he was about to draw a weapon; that the deceased was not carried or assisted out of the house and into the automobile, but walked out and entered the machine of Ms own accord; that deceased was boisterous and abusive, and that neither he nor Miller touched him or offered him any violence, but, presuming that he wanted to go to St. Joseph, stopped near the Wabash Railway freight station, when the deceased got out of the automobile and walked away;
Defendant is in the main corroborated as to matters occurring while they were together by Rats Miller. The jury did not believe their testimony.
I. Sufficiency of Evidence. The jury found the evidence ample to sustain the verdict. We have reviewed it, and find no such lack of substantial proof of guilt as to authorize us in reversing the judgment. Under this state of facts the reiterated rule may be properly invoked that there must either be a total failure of evidence or it must be so weak as to justify the conclusion that the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, or it will not be disturbed. [State v. Concelia, 250 Mo. 411; State v. Rumfelt, 228 Mo. 443; State v. Sassaman, 214 Mo. 695; State v. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23.]
' II. Instructions Given. The court gave eleven instructions, covering murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the fourth degree, defining the intent with which a criminal act is done, stating’ how motive or want of motive is to be considered, defining the presumption .of innocence and reasonable doubt, how circumstantial evidence should be considered, what constitutes self-defense, that the jury are the judges of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witness and how the testimony is to be considered. These instructions were full, fair and clearly expressed the law applicable to the case under the evidence. They conform to precedents which have received the approval of this court in a large number of cases. They were, in short, all that defendant could have demanded to properly instruct
III. Instructions Refused. The court ruled properly in refusing the instructions asked by defendant. The first, because not authorized by the evidence; and the second, because instructions given by the court properly declared the law as to circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt. We have reviewed with care every point properly preserved which has been urged by industrious counsel for defendant to sustain a reversal. None urged are sufficient. The guilt of defendant having been established to the satisfaction of the triers of the facts, and no prejudicial error having occurred during the trial, the judgment should be affirmed, and it is so ordered.