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State v. Underwood
615 P.2d 153
Kan.
1980
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*1 51,401 No. No. 51,420 Underwood, Kansas, Appellee, v. Curtis Leon Appellant.

(615 153) P.2d Opinion July 1980. filed Shultz, Shultz, Shultz, Wichita, Fisher, argued & the cause Russell Monnat appellant. and was on the brief attorney, cause, Beverly Dempsey, argued the assistant district and Robert T. Miller, attorney attorney, Stephan, general, and Vem district were with her on appellee. for the brief opinion court was delivered jury appeals Leon Underwood con- Curtis Fromme, J.: *2 (K.S.A. 21-3401). underlying The felony murder

viction of classify the homicide as being to which is used 21- of a firearm defined in K.S.A. 4204(l)(b). 51,401 in appeal This the for No. this forms basis court. attempt underlying In an to erase the or collateral motions in a 1974 case in he had defendant filed two which He filed motion annul this convicted theft. one to conviction and a second motion withdraw his nolo per- overruled. then contendere. Both motions were Defendant appeal denying from the order these motions. This fected 51,420 appeal in this forms the basis for No. court. are appeals two were consolidated and now before this

The appeal court for We will consider case decision. appellant was August eigh- On when Underwood first. Hankins, years old, stealing bicycle teen he assisted Gus Jr. University campus. Appellant testified from the Wichita security he was with Hankins and observed Hankins cut gave him cutters chain with bolt cutters. Hankins the bolt bicycle. Appellant put in his off on the bolt cutters rode pocket. eyewitness, appellant An who later identified both Hankins, police. appellant The and Hankins were notified theft. Hankins was arrested in charged arrested bicycle. Appellant had the bolt cutters his appellant plea of pocket when was arrested. The entered a nolo he charge theft and sentenced for contendere to the years. placed probation period to ten He was on of from one fully served year period. His was terminated when two September, 1976. appellant’s leading events The 28,1978. Appellant and October some occurred on Street, attending party at 2718 East 10th were a card

friends watching game, Wichita, appellant one of While Kansas. Brewer, bag stealing a of mari- players, accused him of Earl eventually began fight- juana. They exchanged angry words and marijuana yard. During bag altercation ing A stopped. friend of Brewer fight The dropped ground. to the shotgun and handed it to Brewer. carrying came from the house appellant shotgun. Brewer The his friends brandished appellant car entered their cars to leave. From the announced he would return. appellant appellant’s

The friends went his home where appellant changed changed he his The clothes. from dress clothes platform jeans Appellant shoes and tennis shoes. also pistol pistol. recently pur- The obtained .32 caliber had friend, appellant girl chased with funds from his live-in ostensibly, protection. Appellant gave gun for her Marzett, half-brother, safekeeping Phil returning before to the fight. scene of the and his friends returned to the 10th Street

address and Brewer was summoned to come outside the house. fight was resumed. Friends of both men became embroiled fighting. One man emerged was stabbed. friend of Brewer from the house with shotgun. Brewer and had been *3 fighting ground. up on Brewer stood and ran toward his friend shotgun. appellant pistol with the retrieved the from Marzett by appellant. shot at Brewer. Four shots were fired One bullet Appellant struck and killed Brewer. testified he fired the shots because he saw reaching shotgun; Brewer for the he feared for the safety of his friends and himself.

Shortly appellant telephoned after the shooting police arranged Appellant to turn himself in. charged was with the of a firearm and with murder. The firearm charge which underlying formed the for the was based on the fact had been bicycle convicted theft and had of a firearm.

Appellant filed a seeking motion the trial court annulment of bicycle the 1974 theft argued attorney, conviction. He that his prosecutor, judge had assured him that the 1974 convic- tion would be cleared and annulled as soon serving as he finished year probationary period. Appellant his two further contended he plea entered his and testified Hankins because of this assurance. conducting evidentiary motion,

After hearing on the the trial court refused to annul the 1974 conviction. The court found that although may have possibility been aware of the annulment, the sentencing court did not discuss annulment when apparently explained that the plea accepted and no one was court, The trial after procedure was not automatic. annulment annulment and for ex- examining providing statutes permit the an- statutes would not pungement, held appellant’s any expungement firearm violation in nulment or event. to withdraw his nolo conten-

Appellant then filed the motion 22-3210(7) plea injustice.” manifest dere under K.S.A. “to correct eighteen Appellant plea was entered when he was asserted old, plea years guilty charges, that he was not and that unqualified inadvertently the advice of counsel. made prosecutor Appellant nor the court com- alleged that neither the completion plied agreements with their to dismiss the case on probation completed September, probation, that but expunged. the case was neither dismissed nor trial held: court period probation and has been released “The defendant has served his executed, completed, judgment and the defendant has the order court. The Therefore, carry jurisdiction has no out the released the court. the court 22-3210(7), provisions requested by the defendant.” under K.S.A. question annulment. The statute We will first consider the 21-4616 and appellant’s conviction was K.S.A. effect at the time of provided: (21) twenty-one years age “Every at the attained the defendant who had not convicted, and who has the crime for which he was time of the commission of imposed has fulfilled the conditions of served the sentence or who thereof, period suspension have or who shall of sentence for the entire thereof, may period probation prior discharged the termination of the plea permitted to withdraw his thereafter be the court time plea guilty, guilty; of not if has been convicted after of not he enter case, guilty; shall in either the court set aside the verdict *4 against complaint, thereupon such de- information or indictment dismiss the penalties fendant, all and disabilities released from who shall thereafter be convicted, he shall in all resulting has and the crime of which he been convicted, except upon respects having conviction be treated as not prior may any subsequent as a conviction be considered crime such conviction imposed. of this determining shall be informed The defendant the sentence to be suspended placed probation privilege sentence. or when he privilege, right employment, or any application civil or license or other “In for witness, person has been any appearance conviction of crime a whose as may convicted of such that he has never been this statute state annulled under crime.” “permitted” to states that a defendant This statute 298 complaint The annul- have the dismissed.

withdraw his “privilege.” as a Our former decisions process ment is referred to indicated annulment never have construing statute Miller, 214 In Kan. 520 process is automatic. “mandatory” (1974), California distinguished we Federal Youth provision the “automatic” Correc- annulment provisions annulment. We described K.S.A. 21-4616 tions Act for annulment, “permissive” providing stating: for granting “Like the annulment conviction part of probation judicial sentencing judgment sentencing is a function process. sentencing granting denial of under 21-4603 is part process or probation (State Carlisle, 249.) & v. Owens Kan. P.2d court. vested in the trial granting of an for annulment conviction application Likewise the denial judicial judicial Such and the exercise of contemplates inquiry function. power judicial that a exercises discretion same its discretion way deciding granting or not should probation and in whether probation, granting of a revoked. The or denial of for annulment convic- application sound Kan. at 545. tion rests within district court’s discretion.” Boone, (1976), In we person’s state is annulled under K.S.A. 21-4616 “[a] conviction only judicial inquiry ruling.” after

We continue that annulment under K.S.A. 21-4616 now to hold successfully Appellant’s is not was automatic. served statute, September, terminated 1976. The annulment 21-4616, July 1, Appellant repealed K.S.A. 1978. failed to apply January By until 1979. the statute annulment then replaced statute, expungement had with K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 21-4619, pronounced which has certain limitations affect- request Supp. ing appellant’s annulment. K.S.A. 1979 21- prohibits expressly relief 4619(g) in a situation like the one in provides: which himself. now finds That statute expungement “[B]ut of a conviction does not relieve an individual complying relating law state or federal use or any firearms convicted of a felony." by persons 21-4619(d)(1) Supp. In language addition of K.S.A. prohibits expungement as follows: has “That not been convicted of a two years petitioner past proceeding involving pending being no such crime is instituted presently the petitioner;” pending against when he filed his motion to have the annulled. *5 appellant makes an he had a vested Although assertion that annulment, provides legal support for state- right he no law and the statutes indicate otherwise. The ment. The above case application expunge- of an for annulment or granting or denial judicial power ment of a is a function. Such contem- judicial plates inquiry judicial and the exercise of discretion way granting same discretion in the of court exercises probation, setting probation, of of and in de- conditions however, probation revoked, subject, ciding should be to whether imposed expungement limitations the annulment those pro- expungement nor statute. Neither annulment are automatic cedures. question to refusal trial

We turn now to the raised as appellant plea to his nolo allow to withdraw contendere entry bicycle relating theft case. K.S.A. 22-3210 acceptance pleas pertinent provides: part contendere, “(7) good or nolo A cause shown and within the plea adjudged. withdrawn at time sentence is court, discretion be before may injustice judgment the court sentence set aside the To correct manifest after may defendant withdraw of conviction his permit plea.” Appellant argues hearing that at the on the motion to withdraw appellant plea testimony of both the mother his supported position imposed his that no to be sentence was years successfully probation the case serving that after two appellant appellant that against was to be dismissed. testified preliminary exchange agreed it was that he was waive testify jury, plea, his hearing, trial his waive enter paper in the file of the codefendant on behalf of State. to recommend county attorney agreed also State had indicated the suspension imposition of sentence ex- appellant’s cooperation. In the change absence evidence was made to the we must assume this recommendation otherwise rejected. court and his

Although have entered annulled, automatically believing conviction would attorney apparently given him this information sentencing entry time of prior plea. record judge such prosecution or the ever made not indicate that the does automatically promise stated the conviction would probation. does The record successful termination annulled on period indicate was sentenced for a of from one to ten *6 years. Sentencing suspended objection was not in 1974. No by appellant registered attorney. appel- then either or his When 1976, completed period lant he did not inquire concerning charge thereafter dismissal of the theft annulment of his conviction. considering

The trial court after conflicts the evidence plea found that the motion to withdraw the should be overruled. finding Inherent negative finding refusing accept such is a testimony appellant as true the and his mother. plea or nolo contendere be withdrawn after provided 22-3210(7) sentence as in K.S.A. good cause shown only when in the necessary discretion of the trial court becomes injustice. every to correct manifest Not deviation from the re- quirements entry pleas of the statute governing require will State, Trotter v. plea. 266, 269, withdrawal aof 218 Kan. 543 P.2d State, (1975). Hicks v. 279, 283, 1023 220 Kan. In 552 P.2d 889 (1976), we held sentencing the failure of the court to advise the parole defendant eligibility as to his require did not withdrawal plea guilty. of defendant’s Withdrawal aof is discretion- ary with the Considering lapse trial court. of time and the facts of this case we cannot find the trial court abused its discre- permit in refusing tion plea. to withdraw his by The final issue raised is not new to the case law of this state. This again court question confronted with the v. Moffitt, State 514, 6, decided in Syl. 199 Kan. 431 P.2d 879 ¶ Goodseal, (1967), v. 487, Syl. 220 Kan. 553 ¶¶ (1976). question P.2d 279 in those cases was whether felony possession collateral of unlawful of a firearm an ex- felon under K.S.A. 21-4204 was an support so as application rule under K.S.A. 21-3401. This court held in and Goodseal that this Moffitt possession support would murder. and Goodseal were decided Since this rule has been Moffitt Guebara, v. 520, followed in 220 (1976); Kan. 553 P.2d 296 Birch, State v. 122, 558 (1976). Other cases appear murder which followed rely do not on Moffitt of a firearm ex-felon.

For the set majority reasons forth below a of this court has

301 prejudicial concluded that it was error trial court jury theory instruct we Accordingly murder. judgment. reverse the Moffitt, State v. arriving

This court at its decision Ford, 514, People cases, v. relied on three California 60 Cal. 2d (1964); People Williams, 772, Rptr. 620, v. 36 Cal. 452, 7, People v. Rptr. (1965);

63 Cal. 2d 47 Cal. 647 406 P.2d Robillard, 88, 167, Rptr. 295, Cal. 2d 10 Cal. P.2d State (1960). A.L.R.2d 1086 In 220 Kan. at acknowledged Supreme the California Court had re position ceded its former foregoing deciding cases in People Satchell, Rptr. later case of Cal. 3d Cal. 489 P.2d 50 A.L.R.3d 383 The California court ruled Satchell the unlawful of a firearm a con felon, abstract, victed when viewed in the in is not *7 herently dangerous purposes felony to human life of the support felony murder and will charge. rule not a murder How ever, this Goodseal in in a court 4-3 decision refused to its reverse previous in Moffitt, position rely taken and continued to Supreme the cases and overruled the California Court. Moffitt Satchell and in Goodseal The difference in result in the reached adopted by respective help comes the from rules these courts to particular felony determine whether a collateral could be consid- inherently ered dangerous support to human life as to a so felony Goodseal of murder. In the in court consider- ing the felony only felony nature of the collateral not in views the the but abstract also considers the circumstances its commis- sion. So in Goodseal it was not the the firearm but felony its use the ex-felon which the court find the enabled to inherently to human life. In Satchell dangerous was the Califor- inherently nia court decided that whether a collateral dangerous by viewing should be determined elements the the in considering crime the abstract without circumstances passive commission. It held the was and in- not herently dangerous gun human was to life. Use not con- sidered. provides:

The Kansas murder statute being degree killing is the a human “Murder in first committed mali- per- willfully, ciously, deliberately premeditation and in or committed petration attempt sup- perpetrate any felonyK.S.A. Emphasis 21-3401. plied. any felony wording is sufficient of this statute Under the literal if exists. felony murder a causal relation support 492, quoting from v. 220 Kan. at State in This court case, purpose acknowledges that ostensible Delaware engaged is to those felonies deter murder doctrine accidentally, doctrine should that killing negligently which was de- beyond its rational function not extended be rule there must serve. To invoke the signed to an perpetration of or proof homicide committed felony was attempt perpetrate and that inherently life. declared dangerous human This has one rules are applicable rules to such cases. Some of these certain Smith, 796, 799-800, v. 225 Kan. 594 P.2d State summarized (1979), as follows: 21-3401, under K.S.A. there must “In order to murder rule invoke attempt proof perpetration of or was committed in the homicide felony. perpetrate causal connection between This means there must be direct 534, Moffitt, the commission of the the homicide. State 2d, 73, p. 367; C.J.S., (1967); also 40 Am. Homicide § 431 P.2d 879 see Jur. (b). Moreover, underlying felony must be one Homicide § Thus, Moffitt, must 199 Kan. at 534. the State to human life. felony inherently dangerous life to human establish defendant committed felony. during killing place v. Branch and the took the commission of (1978) Bussey, cases cited therein.” history interesting An discussion countries, including England where it rule of various states abrogated application the varied of the rule country 201.2, appears in the Penal Model Code Comment § Felony (Tent. 9, 1959.) critique Draft No. constructive entitled (1977). We Murder Kansas in 26 Kan. L. Rev. 145 be found *8 to both articles the interested scholar. recommend Theoretically malice, pre- deliberation the elements required are degree are for murder in the first meditation which by supplied if deemed to be felonious conduct alone a homicide necessary prove prosecutor It is for the to these results. not They jury to elements or for the find such elements crime. Wilson, felony. by proof of collateral are established Therefore, (1976). support Syl. 552 P.2d 931 220 Kan. ¶ required felony prove a all that is is that murder committed, inherently felony was being a which life, that which followed dangerous to human homicide Bey, State v. felony. that a of the commission direct result (1975). 535 P.2d 881 theory logic rule has based on the premeditated intent of The malicious transferred intent. inherently felony is trans- committing dangerous collateral supply malice the elements ferred to the homicide premeditation proof. with this think- without further Consistent inherently require ing, most courts applicable. rule Whar- dangerous for the 1979). p. (14th Law ed. ton’s Criminal § ‘fact’, felony-murder, express typical malice in “In the case of there is no implied by implied; the ‘law’. What is involved is an intended the malice is plays part which in the commission of and an unintended homicide. The malice fictional is the law to the homicide. As resúlt of the transferred malice; transfer, deemed committed with homicide the homicide is (14th p. Criminal Law ed. § malice is common law murder.” Wharton’s 1979). dealing are with in the case is The collateral we defined in K.S.A. 21-4204 as follows: “(1) a firearm is: Unlawful addict; “(a) any firearm an habitual drunkard or narcotics Possession of (12) “(b) long by than twelve inches a firearm with a barrel less Possession of who, (5)

person years preceding such violation has been convicted of within five jurisdiction or has released laws Kansas or other under the imprisonment felony.” drunkards, crime in that it is limited to

This crime is a status prohibitum. posses- malum It is drug addicts and ex-felons. posses- a firearm in the prohibited because sion of the firearm drunkard, a narcotics addict or an ex-felon is sion of habitual legisla- public policy of the State as declared viewed in the abstract possession of the firearm when ture. The life. This is true because dangerous to human not possession, which has defined as unlikely mere seems use, object, and its could be not and control over dominion prohibited posses- that the a manner undertaken in so mean- degree. first The above in murder sion would result contemplated in this firearm statute ing Neal, 737, 738-39, taken from in this impossible find an intent appears quite It malice, premed- deliberation felony encompassing collateral and relieve to the homicide these elements itation so as to transfer *9 are prosecution the If these proof of same. elements the from present they firearm are not use the the of proven They be as ele- possession should then of the firearm. premeditated degree first reason ments of gun. and deliberate use malicious begins, separate a crime We of the firearm note that once the use committed; deadly weapon the assuming with a e.g., assault required present. part Aggravated integral assault is an of intent is State v. the murder cannot be based thereon. homicide Clark, Syl. It follows ¶ firearm, abstract, viewed in possession a when the of premeditation for the transferred does not harbor the malice a as make a murder. intent so homicide Prager Mr. in the dissent in State Justice examples sets the beginning page forth three of illogical results which can flow when a homicide unintentional not in the abstract in deter- viewed These mining whether it is to human life. examples are as follows: defendant, having previously example, a convicted “For let us assume that check, purchases protect writing fund firearm to for insufficient family accidentally of his home. He himself and his criminal invaders drops discharged, gun, causing killing guest the floor and in his the to strike be felony, killing during possession the home. Since the occurred commission of unlawfully, precluded gun interposing the defense of defendant would majority adopted guilty the accident. Under the rule defendant would be subjected degree possibly imprisonment murder in the first to a term of life penitentiary. the state example Vietnam war and his “Another farm lad served at the time of —a discharge obtained an rifle which he took to his farm He wanted automatic home. gun only protection family himself his not but also for use provisions killing predators might attack livestock. Under the of K.S.A. any person possess capable 21-4201(l)(g) it is class E firearm automatically single trigger. discharging An than once function more upon points gun farm. defendant at the intruder comes defendant’s The intruder, place. directing gun accidentally discharges get him to off his adopted by majority require kills in this case the intruder. rule would jury degree first since convict the defendant of murder at the time of killing committing the defendant was another of an automatic — weapon place. killing the time took —at example having previously con- “One more suffice. defendant should person. accidentally victed another At the time was in of a shoots defendant felony- long. Applying of a firearm with a barrel eleven-inches upon murder and rule defendant would *10 imposed. If the firearm involved the case had a barrel a life sentence would any long would not criminal

twelve-inches the defendant offense category shooting the since the was accidental and would fall into of an excusable impute It seem malice to the defendant homicide. does not reasonable situation; yet so this result first situation and not to do in the second absurd would majority adopted by under rule of the court case.” 220 Kan. follow 506-507. may injustice felony Further murder occur cases because the strip charge felony may an murder accused of the normal case, possible in a In the defenses murder case. instance, appellant had possessing no intent violate law previous bicycle the firearm. He his theft believed successfully completed automatically when he dismissed possessed probation. was in and he a firearm so He error under accident, charge murder the defenses such as lack of passion open posses- malice and heat of were not to him for the disputed. establishing underlying felony could sion not be proof underlying strong no When is instructions on required. degrees v. & lesser of murder are State Sullivan Sulli- van, 110, 124, (1978); Reed, State v. 214 578 (1974). Kan. P.2d addition, filing

In under rule in most, all, any possibility establishing if not cases removes 21-3211, person jus- K.S.A. is defense self-defense. Under against aggressor when and to the tified the use of force believes, him, reasonably appears it and he that such extent necessary against is himself or another conduct to defend force. If two men are aggressor’s imminent use of case, grabs shotgun he is then fighting, in this and one gun, if himself use of a he aggressor and the other defend However, K.S.A. 21-3214 an instruc- can find one in time. under permitted by 21-3211 K.S.A. is not available tion on self-defense felony. Purdy, person committing a forcible who is Supp. Under K.S.A. 1979 615 P.2d Kan. forcible includes trea- 21-3110(8) the definition rape, robbery, burglary, son, murder, voluntary manslaughter, sodomy arson, battery, aggravated aggravated kidnapping, physical threat any felony which involves use or other force of a firearm person. Unlawful or violence nor does fit felonies enumerated is not included forcible phrase at the end of the definition. the catch-all within person is confronted Now, who does that leave where possession of a holding and Goodseal the rule in Moffitt inherently pistol of a after conviction the de- Goodseal it follows Logically under human life? entitled to an not charged with fendant when the use of If the court considers on self-defense. instruction dan- firearm to establish that life, establishes that the collateral the use also gerous to human away from the accused the felony. This takes is a forcible defense of self-defense. logic, are convinced that majority of this court now in the dissent Prager Mr.

reasoning urged and rule Justice adopted for Kansas. 220 Kan. at should be particular determining whether a Accordingly, we hold that *11 life inherently dangerous to human so as to collateral 21-3401, felony murder under K.S.A. justify abstract, in the should be viewed elements of the collateral should not circumstances of the commission and the Moffitt, v. making in the determination. State be considered 514, 6, 7, contrary Syl. holding all cases to the are Kan. ¶¶ disapproved. proscribed of a firearm K.S.A.

The unlawful 21-4204(l)(fc) is not a when considered abstract inherently dangerous life and will not sustain con to human degree in under viction for murder the first formerly applied Moffitt, in v. rule. The rule stated and State (1967); Syl. progeny, Kan. 431 P.2d 879 and its ¶¶ 487, 553 (1976); Guebara, v. v. 220 Kan. P.2d 279 Birch, (1976); and State v. 221 Kan. (1976), disapproved P.2d 119 and overruled. question of retroactive-

There remains for consideration prospective application of the new rule declared herein. dis arriving proper in the factors to be considered cussion of Murray, Vaughn in solution be found 464-467, 521 are P.2d 262 We aware of some of the effects application may that retroactive have on the administration state, justice stating this and we realize no rule the courts of opposed operation, as to that of relation limits of the forward backward, possible injustice be declared without and hard can However, day ship cases. the rule as this declared shall in some pending on applied other cases govern case and be cases in is filed and to all future opinion in case the date presented timely question raised and has been which the trial court. convic- denying annulment of the the trial court

The order of conten- of nolo refusing withdrawal to allow tion and 51,420 herein, case, Appeal No. bicycle theft dere affirmed. charge, judgment on the of conviction 51,401 herein, is remanded and the case

Appeal is reversed No. for a new trial. Kan. 514, 431 C.J., Moffitt, dissenting. State

Schroeder, years. (1967), law Kansas for thirteen has been the in that case position its on the law The court reverses now felony is murder, underlying where the regarding proscribed by K.S.A. 21- a firearm 4204(1)(6). decision.

I to the law would adhere Moffitt dissenting join foregoing JJ., McFarland, Miller opinion.

Case Details

Case Name: State v. Underwood
Court Name: Supreme Court of Kansas
Date Published: Jul 18, 1980
Citation: 615 P.2d 153
Docket Number: 51,401, 51,420
Court Abbreviation: Kan.
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