State v. UiState v. Ui
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Hayash1
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
HAYASH1,
Defendant-appellant Allielua Ui appeals from an order approving fees totaling $4,000 for his court-appointed attorney, $1,553.50 less than the amount requested; appеllant contends the authorization of only part of the fees requested was the result of the trial court’s misinterpretation of the excess payment provision of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 802-5(b) (Supp. 1982). The State, while supporting the lower court’s interpretation of the statute, questions this court’s jurisdiction to entertain this appeal under
I.
Appellant was charged with three class A felonies. 1 The circuit court, pursuant to a recommendation by the public defender, appointed private counsel to reprеsent appellant.
Following a mistrial of the case, appellant’s court-appointed counsel moved for approval of attorneys fees totaling $5,553.50 pursuant tо
II.
Appellant contends
Any party deеming himself aggrieved by the judgment of a circuit court in a criminal matter, may appeal to the supreme court, subject to chapter 602 in the manner and within the time provided by the Hawаii Rules of Criminal Procedure. The sentence of the court in a criminal case shall be the judgment.
Thus, the statute affords a party, deeming himself aggrieved by the judgment of a circuit court, the right to appeal.
The appeal in the instant case is from an order granting part of the attorney fees requested. The State сontends the order is not an appealable order under the statute, citing
State
v.
Johnston,
63 Haw. 9, 619 P.2d 1076 (1980) for the proposition that an appeal may only be had from a sentence of the cirсuit court. In
Johnston,
this court dismissed an appeal brought from an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment, holding that “such order [was] interlocutory and [was] not a
final order or judgment.
It [was] therefore not one that [was] appealable under HRS sec. 641-11
.“Id.
at 11, 619 P.2d at 1077. (emphasis added). Thus,
Johnston
did not definitively rule that an appeal under
The State also challenge‘s appellant’s standing to bring this appeal since appellant is allegedly not aggrieved by thе order. An aggrieved party is “[o]ne whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of, or whose pecuniary interest is directly affected by a decree or judgment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 60 (5th ed. 1979). Similarly, this court has held an “aggrieved party” in the civil context is “one who is affected or prejudiced by an appealable order.” Montalvo v. Chang, 64 Haw. 345, 351, 641 P.2d 1321, 1326 (1982).
Appellant does nоt aver that he is in any way affected or prejudiced by the order but rather that he “has an interest in seeing that his court appointed attorney is properly compensated both for his fees and expenses.” (Defendant-appellant’s Reply Brief at 1).
The only thing we can surmise from the case 2 cited by appellant for the proposition that he has a protectable interest in this aрpeal is “inadequately” compensated counsel impaired his right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions.
One of the rеasons for requiring that assigned counsel be reasonably compensated is to assure quality representation for indigent defendants. 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice commentary to seс. 5-2.4. The concern for the quality of representation afforded an indigent defendant flows from the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 984, 988-89 (1978).
Although in a given case a defendant’s right may be impaired if his court-appointed counsel is not adequately compensated,
see People
v.
Randolph,
35 Ill.2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966), this does not seem to be such a case. In the instant case, the indiсtment against appellant has been dismissed with prejudice, no doubt, as a result of his counsel’s diligent and able efforts. Moreover, that appellant is not challenging the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation is further evidenced by the fact that the record on appeal consists only of the documents
Although this court lacks jurisdiction under
III.
The statutory provision in question is the last sentence of
Payment in excess of any maximum provided for under paragraphs (1), (2), and (5), where extended or complex representation is needed, may be made for good cause shown on the record by the appointing judge, but shall not exceed an amount twice the maximum аllowable fees for such representation.
Appellant contends this sentence means payment in excess shall not exceed twice the maximum. Since this was a class A felony case providing for a maximum fee of $2,000, the limit of the excess рayment should be $4,000, thus, entitling counsel to a possible total fee of $6,000 ($2,000 maximum + $4,000 excess payment).
Conversely, the State argues the sentence means total payment shall not exceed twice the maximum, thus, payment to counsel could not exceed $4,000. The circuit court, agreeing with the State’s interpretation, approved fees of only $4,000.
“[0]ur primary duty [in interpreting and applying statutes] is to ascertain the intention of the legislaturе and to implement that intention to the fullest degree.” Keller v. Thompson, 56 Haw. 183, 189, 532 P.2d 664, 669 (1975). “The intention of the legislature is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” In re Hawaiian Telephone Co., 61 Haw. 572, 577, 608 P.2d 383, 387 (1980). However, “where the language of a statute is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning,... judicial construction and interpretation are warranted,” Id. at 578, 608 P.2d at 387, and “[c]ourts may take legislative history into consideration in construing a statute.” Life of the Land v. City and County, 61 Haw. 390, 447, 606 P.2d 866, 899 (1980).
Appellant contends the language of the statute unambiguously limits the
excess payment
and not the
total payment
to an amount twice the maximum fees allowable under
The bill provides:
(3) That payment in excess of and up to twice the amount in the schedule of fees is allowed when the case is extended or complex;
Sen. Stand. Comm. Rpt. No. 4, in 1981 Senate Journal Special Session, at 28; House Stand. Comm. Rpt. No. 24, in 1981 House Journal Special Session, at 43.
The above-quoted sentence illustrates that although the legislature intended to allow for payment in excess of the scheduled fees in certain cases, it only allowed for payment of up to twice the amount of the scheduled fees, as the circuit court correctly concluded.
Appeal is dismissed.
Notes
The only question raised on appeal by appellant is the proper construction of the excess payment provision of
The case, State v. District Court, 85 Nev. 241, 453 P.2d 421 (1969), cited by appellant deals with an indigent defendant’s constitutional right to have his counsel reimbursed for out-of-pocket expenses incidental to preparing defendant’s defense, and, thus, is not applicable to the instant case. Although appellant’s counsel had to pay the $50 filing fee for this appeal as his request to have costs waived on appeal was denied, the propriety of such denial has not been questioned by appellant.