98 Wash. App. 508 | Wash. Ct. App. | 1999
The Shoreline Division of the King County District Court selects its jury pool from the three zip code zones contiguous to the boundaries of the division, but not coextensive with the geographic area of the division. Prospective jurors come from King County, usually from within the Shoreline Division, but not necessarily. RCW 2.36.050
By complaints filed in the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court, the State charged each of the appellants with crimes. Prior to trial in the Twyman and Yirdaw cases, defense counsel moved to have the jury pools drawn from the entirety of King County.
In Vangeystel’s case, defense counsel objected to the composition of the jury pool after the voir dire process, but before the beginning of the testimony. The defense objection set forth on the record included counsel’s argument that the jury was drawn from only three zip code zones and not the county as a whole. On the other hand, counsel
All three defendants appealed their convictions to Kang County Superior Court, and all three cases were affirmed. A commissioner of this court granted review and consolidated the cases.
Initially, the appellants make much of the fact that in 1989, one year following the passage of RCW 2.36.050 by the Legislature, the King County Council unified the several autonomous district courts within its borders. Thus, the appellants argue the area from which jury pool selection must be made is the county as a whole, using the jury source and master jury lists as compiled by the King County Superior Court. The argument is not persuasive.
The King County District Court is divided into several divisions. So long as a fair and random jury panel selection is made from the master jury list, courts of limited jurisdiction may limit the jury pool to the geographical area served by the court. It defies reason to assume that the Legislature would allow for a geographical narrowing of jury panel selection and then require the pool be taken from the county as a whole. Indeed, the Supreme Court gave its tacit approval to geographic narrowing in the case of Carrick v. Locke
The purpose of the statutory scheme regulating jury selection is to ensure a fair and random selection of jurors.
Given this, the appellants claim that the jury pools empanelled through a narrower geographic area pursuant to RCW 2.36.050 violates Wash. Const, art. I, § 22. That provision clearly states:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed . . .
The appellants claim the issue is whether the statute impermissibly alters the right to have a jury of the county. In essence they argue that this language must be read “jury of the entire county.” That is not the case.
State v. Newcomb,
Here, the method ensured that jury selection from the master jury list, narrowed to a three zip code area sur
Finally, appellants assert that if the scheme allowing a geographical narrowing of jury selection for courts of limited jurisdiction is valid and the statute constitutional, then the exact method used by the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court does not comply with the statute. The appellants claim the use of three zip code zones to localize the jury list to the Shoreline Division permits the empanelling of some jurors from an area outside of the Shoreline Division, although still within King County. At the same time, appellants claim others living within the Shoreline Division are not used because they are not within the three zip code zones. Thus, they claim the statutory selection process is materially violated and there is no substantial compliance with the statute.
If statutory jury selection procedures are materially violated, a claimant need not show actual prejudice, rather it is presumed.
The manner of making up the jury lists indicated by the statute is merely directory, and need be only substantially complied with, to the end that a fair and impartial trial may be had. . . . [Sjuch statutes are directory and that the fact that the officer . . . failed to conform precisely to the statutory requirements, did not invalidate his act unless it appears that there is reasonable apprehension that the complaining party has been prejudiced. The purpose of all these statutes is to provide a fair and impartial jury, and if that end has been attained and the litigant has had the benefit of such a jury, it ought not to be held that the whole proceeding must be annulled because of some slight irregularity ....
This principle was affirmed more recently in State v. Rice.
Here, the procedure used by the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court did not materially depart from the statute. The use of the zip code zones is a reasonable way to gather a large cross section of jury persons to be used in a division of the district court. The appellants have not demonstrated a material departure and failed to demonstrate any actual prejudice.
The decisions of the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court as affirmed by the King County Superior Court on RALJ appeal are affirmed.
Cox and Ellington, JJ., concur.
“In courts of limited jurisdiction, juries shall be selected and impaneled in the same manner as in the superior courts, except that a court of limited jurisdiction shall use the master jury list developed by the superior court to select a jury
Court staff from the Shoreline Division told defense counsel that the jurors were selected from the master list provided by the King County Superior Court, and reduced to three Shoreline area zip codes within King County. There is no known dispute that these three zip codes extend slightly beyond the boundaries of the Shoreline Division, while not including a portion of Lake Forest Park, which is in the Shoreline Division area.
Although not actually critical to our determination here, Vengeystel’s motion to supplement the record is granted.
Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wn.2d 129, 145, 882 P.2d 173 (1994).
See RCW 2.36.054.
State v. Newcomb, 58 Wash. 414, 109 P. 355 (1910).
See State v. Tingdale, 117 Wn.2d 595, 600 n.3, 817 P.2d 850 (1991) (institution of 1988 legislative scheme of RCW 2.36 indicates random selection still required for jury lists and panels).
Id. at 600, 602; W.E. Roche Fruit Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 18 Wn.2d 484, 487, 139 P.2d 714 (1943).
State v. Rholeder, 82 Wash. 618, 620-21, 144 P. 914 (1914).
State v. Finlayson, 69 Wn.2d 155, 156-57, 417 P.2d 624 (1966).
State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 562, 844 P.2d 416 (1993).