143 Wash. 2d 115 | Wash. | 2001
Jerry Twyman, Donald Vangeystel and Taye Yirdaw were each convicted of criminal offenses in the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court, before juries drawn from pools selected from an area, consisting of three King County zip codes, generally coextensive with the Shoreline Division’s electoral district. Arguing that the
FACTS
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioners were tried before juries in the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court. In all three cases the pool of potential jurors was not chosen from the whole of King County, but rather was selected from three King County zip codes. These zip codes were roughly coextensive with the boundaries of the Shoreline Division’s electoral district, but excluded some district residents and included Seattle residents from outside the district’s population. Prior to trial, defense counsel for Twyman and Yirdaw moved to have the jury panels drawn from among the entire population of King County.
Following their convictions, the petitioners appealed to the King County Superior Court. Judge Maclnnes affirmed Twyman’s conviction,
ISSUES
(1) Did the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court substantially comply with the statute governing jury selection?
(2) Is a statute constitutional that allows a district court to select a jury pool from an area less than the entire county in which an offense is charged?
I
The first question we are confronted with is whether the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court substantially complied with the statute governing jury selection. RCW 2.36.050 provides that:
In courts of limited jurisdiction, juries shall be selected and impaneled in the same manner as in the superior courts, except that a court of limited jurisdiction shall use the master jury list developed by the superior court to select a jury panel. Jurors for the jury panel may be selected at random from the population of the area served by the court.[12 ]
Petitioners contend that “the area served by” the Shoreline Division of the King County District Court is all of King County, and that RCW 2.36.050 was violated in each of their cases where the entire county did not serve as the source for prospective jurors. It is true, as the Court of Appeals recognized, that, for administrative purposes, the King County District Court has been reorganized into a single unit “consisting of geographic divisions rather than autonomous districts.”
Petitioners make much of the fact that drawing jurors in these cases from three zip codes only imprecisely paralleled the actual boundaries of the Shoreline Division, excluding some of those who lived in the electoral district and including prospective jurors from outside the district (i.e., City of Seattle). Yet, as the State notes, the court was working from a list randomly selected from the entire county and then selecting the jurors from the zip codes closest to the division.
The manner of making up the jury lists indicated by the statute is merely directory, and need be only substantially complied with.... The purpose of all these statutes is to provide a fair and impartial jury, and if that end has been attained and the litigant has had the benefit of such a jury, it ought not to be held that the whole proceeding must be annulled because of some slight irregularity . . . .[23 ]
Here “[t]here is no suggestion that there was any exclusion of any class of citizen or weighting of the jury list or that the jury list was not a representative cross section of the community.”
In sum, we affirm the Court of Appeals in finding that no material departure in these three cases from the requirements of RCW 2.36.050 has been demonstrated, nor has any actual prejudice been shown as a result of substantial, though inexact, compliance with its terms.
Even if RCW 2.36.050 were substantially complied with, as we have held, petitioners argue that—in the alternative—it is unconstitutional. The issue is whether a statute that allows courts of limited jurisdiction to select jurors for jury panels “at random from the population of the area served by the court,”
In a case addressing the scope of the pool from which inquest juries are drawn, we have acknowledged that district court juries are drawn from a narrower population than inquest juries chosen from a “broader, countywide superior court source list.”
This dicta was consistent with our past holdings. For example, in State v. Newcomb,
We have written simply that “[a]n essential element in selecting jurors is the element of chance. The . . . people have found no better way and have made it the supreme test of sufficiency.”
Finally, petitioners heavily rely upon State ex rel. Fugita v. Milroy,
In sum, we affirm the Court of Appeals in finding that petitioners have failed to demonstrate that RCW 2.36.050 violates article I, section 22.
The Court of Appeals’ decision is affirmed in all respects. RCW 2.36.050 was substantially complied with in the selection of jury panels for these three consolidated cases, and petitioners have not demonstrated actual prejudice from the alleged failure to comply with it. Furthermore, RCW 2.36.050 conforms with article I, section 22 of our state constitution by preserving randomness in the selection of district court jury pools.
Alexander, C.J., Smith, Johnson, Madsen, Sanders, and Ireland, JJ., and Guy and Talmadge, JJ. Pro Tern., concur.
Clerk’s Papers at 22-26, 610-11.
Id..
Id. at 187, 514.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 788, 925.
Const. art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).
State v. Twyman, 98 Wn. App. 508, 512, 983 P.2d 703 (1999).
Id. at 510, 513 (citing RCW 2.36.050).
(Emphasis added.)
Twyman, 98 Wn. App. at 510.
Id. at 511.
RCW 3.38.070.
Id. (emphasis added).
RCW 3.38.050(6). Similarly, “[i]t also is the policy of this state to minimize the burden on the prospective jurors, their families, and employers resulting from jury service.” RCW 2.36.080(2).
RCW 3.34.060(1) (emphasis added).
RCW 2.36.050.
Resp’t’s Br. at 14-15.
RCW 2.36.050.
(Emphasis added.) See also State v. Tingdale, 117 Wn.2d 595, 600, 817 P.2d 850 (1991) (writing of a former jury selection statute: “[W]e have interpreted this statute to be directive only. No one method is required. As long as the method chosen preserves the element of chance in selection of the panel, it has been found to be proper.”) (citing State v. Rholeder, 82 Wash. 618, 620, 144 P. 914 (1914); State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court, 82 Wash. 284, 286, 144 P. 32 (1914)).
State v. Finlayson, 69 Wn.2d 155, 157, 417 P.2d 624 (1966) (emphasis added) (quoting Rholeder, 82 Wash. at 620); see also State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 562, 844 P.2d 416 (1993).
Finlayson, 69 Wn.2d at 156.
Id.
Id.
Rice, 120 Wn.2d at 562.
RCW 2.36.050 (emphasis added).
Const. art. I, § 22 (emphasis added).
Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wn.2d 129, 145, 882 P.2d 173 (1994).
Id. (emphasis added).
58 Wash. 414, 418, 109 P. 355 (1910).
Id., (emphasis added). However, in Newcomb the law in question did “not attempt to provide for a jury from any division or district less than the whole county.” Id. at 417.
Id. at 420 (emphasis added). Supporting the constitutionality of RCW 2.36.050 is the fact that while the Washington Constitution has, since its enactment, defined the jurisdiction of superior courts, see Const. art. IV, § 6, it was left to the Legislature to determine the powers, duties and jurisdiction of district courts. Justices of the peace were the historical antecedents of today’s district court judges. See RCW 3.30.015. Const. art. IV, § 10, provides:
The legislature shall determine the number of justices of the peace to be elected and shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace: Provided, That such jurisdiction granted by the legislature shall not trench upon the jurisdiction of superior or other courts of record, except that justices of the peace may be made police justices of incorporated cities and towns.
State ex rel. Murphy, 82 Wash. at 286 (emphasis added).
Pet. for Review at 12.
71 Wash. 592, 129 P. 384 (1913).
Id. at 593.
Id. at 597 (emphasis added) (citing State ex rel. Lytle v. Superior Court, 54 Wash. 378, 103 P. 464 (1909)).
Id. (emphasis added). This is quite apart from the perhaps more contemporary question of how randomness could possibly have been preserved by the police chief himself selecting a pool of 16 jurors for a criminal trial.
Id. That this language was not meant to disavow Newcomb’s limited construction of article I, section 22, just three years after Newcomb was issued, is plain from the fact that State ex rel. Fugita relied upon Newcomb. See id. at 597 (citing Newcomb).