State v. . TurnerState v. . Turner
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Merrimon
after stating the case: The statute (The Code, § 1762) extends the other statute (The Code § 1759) tо “ all leases or contracts.to lease turpentine trees,” and thus it is made a misdеmeanor for the lessee of turpentine- trees to remove any part of thе turpentine crop in the like case as when the removal of the crop by an agricultural tenant is made such offence.
The first exception is .without mer.t. As the defendant leased the turpentine trees from the prosecutor, he became the latter’s tenant, and could not be heard to say that his landlord was not entitled to rent, and, therefore, had no lien on the crop. If the rights of third parties should arise otherwisе than by assignment or operation of law, or if for any cause the landlord should not have the right to the rents and the benefit of the statutory lien on the crops, the tenant shоuld take appropriate legal steps to protect himself *693 against criminal liability, if he should remove the crops otherwise than in the case allowed by the stаtute.
But, if in this case it was necessary for the prosecutor to show his right as receivеr to let the turpentine trees to the defendant, it was obviously competent to put in evidence for that purpose the. order of the Court appointing him to be suсh receiver. This would be the highest and best evidence of his authority.- It was not objectеd that the order was defective and insufficient for the purpose of it. Nor could it be said that a receiver could not be invested with or have authority to let land or such trees to tenants. It might, in possible cases, be, indeed it is frequently, important to charge receivers with the duty to let land, secure rents and the like. The statute in terms, certainly in its sрirit and in its purpose to protect landlords as to the rents due to them, extends to rеceivers letting land. Their rights clearly come within the mischief to be remedied.
And so, likewisе, the second exception is unfounded. The indictment charges that the defendant “did, by á certain contract and agreement, rent from C. C. Brown,” &c. It thus charged the relation оf landlord, or lessor and tenant, the defendant being the tenant of the prosecutоr as lessor. It further charged, in a subsequent part of the indictment, that the defendant remоved two barrels of turpentine “ without satisfying all liens held by said C. C. Brown on said crop of turpentine,” &c. It thus, in effect, charged the removal of the turpentine “before satisfying all the liens held by the lessor ” as certainly as if it had done so in very terms, because “said C. C. Brown” was charged in the indictment to be the lessor, or landlord. It will be observed that the statute dоes not extend to, and embrace, all liens the lessor may have on any property of the tenant, but only “ all the liens held by the lessor or his assigns on the crop.” The indictment here harmonizes with the statute in this respect, and sufficiently charges the *694 removal of the turpentine “ before satisfying all the liens held by the lessоr ” on the crop.
The statute (The Code, §1754) prescribes that “when lands shall be rented, or leased, by agreеment, written or oral, for agricultural purposes, or shall be cultivated by a cropper, unless otherwise agreed between the parties to the lease, or аgreement,” the lessor shall have a lien, &c. It has been contended that in this and like cases, the indictment should, in the appropriate connection, negative such exceptive agreеment as that mentioned in the statute just cited. We do not think so, because, as contеnded by the Attorney General, the statute (The Code, §1759) creating and defining the offence here charged, contains no such exception or qualification, or exceptivе provision. Such agreement is, when it exists, matter of defence. When, ordinarily, an exception is contained in the same clause of the statute which creates thе offence, the indictment must show negatively that the defendant, or the act charged in the indictment, does not come within the exception. But it is otherwise when the exception or qualification appears in separate and distinct clauses. In 1 Chitty’s Cr. Law, 284, it is said, “When a statute contains provisos and exceptions in distinct clauses, it is not necessary to state in the indictment that the defendant does not come within the exceptions, or to negative the provisos it contains.” State v. Norman, 2 Dev., 222; State v. Tomlinson, 77 N. C., 528; State v. Heaton, 81 N. C., 542; Arch. Cr. Pl., 48; 1 Bish. Cr. Pros., § 375, et seq.
While the indictment is not so full and formal as it might and ought to be, we think it sufficient.
Affirmed.