State v. TurnerState v. Turner
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Birch
OPINION
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH, JR., J.,delivered the opinion of the court,
in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J.; E. RILEY ANDERSON, JANICE M. HOLDER, and CORNELIA A. CLARK, JJ., joined.
We granted permission to appeal in this case pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure in order to determine whether the evidence adduced in the trial court sufficiently supports the defendant’s felony evading arrest conviction and whether a sentence of one year for fourth offense driving on a revoked license, a Class A misdemeanor, is valid. Because we view the evidence as sufficient to support the conviction for felony evading arrest (with risk of death or injury), and because a one-year term of confinement for the revoked license conviction is specifically authorized by statute, we af
I. Facts and Procedural History
In May 2002, the defendant, James Gary Turner, was indicted for felony reckless endangerment, 1 felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, 2 and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. 3 The reckless endangerment count was not prosecuted, and the defendant pleaded “guilty” to driving on a revoked license, leaving the determination of how many prior offenses he had committed to the trial court. The defendant pleaded “not guilty” to evading arrest with risk of death or injury.
At trial, Officer Christopher Jones of the Shelbyville Police Department testified that at approximately 10:00 p.m. on January 20, 2000, he and his partner, Officer Bruce Davis, saw the defendant drive through a red light at the intersection of Derry and Madison Streets. Jones activated the emergency equipment in an attempt to stop the defendant, but the defendant accelerated, passing a vehicle in a no-pass zone and ignoring a four-way stop sign. The defendant then drove through two red lights and finally stopped in his own driveway.
The defendant fled on foot, jumping a fence; Jones chased the defendant, but lost sight of him for a few minutes. Approximately four or five minutes later, the defendant approached Davis, who had remained with the defendant’s vehicle, and asked what the officers were doing in his driveway. While he admitted that the ve-hide was his, he denied having driven it that night. The defendant was then taken into custody.
Both officers estimated that the defendant’s speed during the chase was between fifty and sixty miles per hour at times. They testified that the area through which the defendant was speeding was a heavily-traveled residential neighborhood. Davis testified that he saw vehicles approaching the lights at the intersections through which the pursuit proceeded. Fortunately, those vehicles heeded the emergency equipment and yielded. Davis also testified that pedestrians generally use one of these intersections day and night. Finally, he acknowledged, however, that no vehicles had approached in the opposite lane when the defendant passed the vehicle in a no-pass zone and that no cars or people had been injured during the pursuit.
The defendant’s girlfriend, Gloria Evans, testified on his behalf. She acknowledged that the defendant had passed her vehicle during the chase while she was completely stopped at a four-way stop sign, but she denied that the defendant had placed her in any danger. She also testified that she did not see any other vehicles or individuals in the vicinity when this occurred.
The jury found the defendant guilty of felony evading arrest with risk of death or injury, a Class D felony. After finding two enhancement factors, 4 the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, standard offender, to concurrent terms of eight years for the felony evading arrest conviction and one year for the driving on a revoked license, fourth offense conviction.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Felony Evading Arrest
A. Standard of Review
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence by viewing “ ‘the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’ ” State v. Jackson, 173 S.W.3d 401, 408 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). We must determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Additionally, “ ‘the State is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and to all reasonable and legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn.2000)).
B. Analysis
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16 — 603(b)(3) (1997) provides that intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer is a Class E felony. A violation of this statute will constitute a Class D felony, however, if “the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other thh‘d parties.” Id.
The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he placed anyone in danger. Thus, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to elevate the evading arrest conviction to a Class D felony. The State asserts that Davis’ testimony that traffic was present at the various intersections through which the pursuit coursed sufficiently demonstrates that the defendant created a risk of death or injury to others, elevating the evading arrest conviction to a Class D felony.
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-603(b)(3) provides that a violation of this statute will constitute a Class D felony if the flight creates a risk of death or injury to innocent bystanders or other third parties. By the plain language of the statute, proof of actual injury or death is not necessary for conviction. All that need be shown is that the defendant evaded arrest and that in so doing, he created the risk of death or injury. See State v. Payne, 7 S.W.3d 25, 28-29 (Tenn.1999) (proof to show that a member of the public was in the zone of danger during a car chase could be made by showing that during the chase another motorist was driving on the street or that a pedestrian was walking down the sidewalk). Clearly, the defendant created a risk of death or injury to every driver and pedestrian in his proximity as he operated his vehicle heedless of the traffic signals. We conclude, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, that a reasonable juror could have found that the defendant’s conduct placed innocent bystanders or third parties at risk. Thus, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for Class D felony evading arrest.
III. One-year sentence for Driving on a Revoked License
A. Standard of Review
Questions of statutory construction are reviewed
de novo
with no presumption
B. Analysis
The trial court convicted the defendant of driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. That statute provides, in part, that: “A person who drives a motor vehicle ... when the person’s privilege to do so is cancelled, suspended, or revoked commits a Class B misdemeanor.”
The defendant argues that the penalty provided in this statute is illegal because it allows imposition of a felony sentence for a misdemeanor crime. In support of this contention, he cites the provided penalties for conviction of a Class A misdemeanor:
(e) The authorized terms of imprisonment and fines for misdemeanors are:
(1) Class A misdemeanor, not greater than eleven (11) months twenty-nine days (29) days or a fine not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500), or both, unless otherwise provided by statute;
The State asserts that the legislature intended, when defining a Class A misdemeanor, that certain misdemeanor offenses might merit a penalty of more than eleven months, twenty-nine days. It contends that the language, “unless otherwise provided by statute,” supports this proposition.
See
When construing facially conflicting statutes, this Court’s duty is to give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute’s intended coverage. State v. Davis, 173 S.W.3d 411, 413-14 (Tenn.2005) (citing State v. Jennings, 130 S.W.3d 43, 46 (Tenn.2004)). Statutes on the same subject must be construed together harmoniously, so that they do not conflict. In re Akins, 87 S.W.3d 488, 493 (Tenn.2002) (citing Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Woods, 561 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tenn.1978)). Finally, specific statutory language will control over a general conflicting statutory provision. See Arnwine v. Union County Bd. of Educ., 120 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tenn.2003).
First, we note that the increased penalty for subsequent violations of this statute took effect in 1992 when the legislature amended Tennessee Code Annotated
Next, we address the apparent conflict between the general definition of a Class A misdemeanor in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40 — 35—111(e)(1) and the one-year maximum confinement provision in Tennessee Code Annotated
Furthermore, we note that this is not the only statute that varies the penalty provided for a Class A misdemeanor. Several other statutes provide specific penalties for violations which do not follow the general definition of a Class A misdemean- or.
See
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for Class D felony evading arrest. In addition, we hold that the trial court did not err in sentencing the defendant to a one-year term of confinement for driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, since that sentence is a valid punishment for this Class A misdemeanor. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It appearing that the defendant, James Gary Turner, is indigent, the costs of this appeal are taxed to the State
Notes
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.The trial court found two enhancement factors applied — previous convictions in addition to those needed to establish the sentencing range and an unwillingness to comply with the terms of probation.
. We note that the 1992 amendment also increased the possible fines for a second or subsequent violation of this state from a maximum fine of $2,500 to a maximum fine of
$3,000. This maximum $3,000 fine is also more than is provided for in the section defining the general penalties for Class A misdemeanors.
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