100 N.C. App. 234 | N.C. Ct. App. | 1990
Lead Opinion
We consider only the question of whether the evidence, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient to withstand defendant’s motion for judgment as of nonsuit.
Defendant in this case was convicted of second degree murder in the death of his wife. “Second-degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation.” State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 346, 279 S.E.2d 788, 803 (1981). An essential element of second degree murder is the intent to inflict an injury that results in death. Thus, “to convict a defendant of murder in the second degree, the State must prove that the defendant intentionally inflicted the wound which caused the death of the deceased.” State v. Williams, 235
Statements made by defendant only a few hours after the incident on 17 November 1988 indicate that the shooting was accidental. “When evidence introduced by the State consists of exculpatory statements of the defendant which are not contradicted or shown to be false by any other facts or circumstances in evidence, the State is bound by those statements.” State v. Meadlock, 95 N.C. App. 146, 149, 381 S.E.2d 805, 806 (1989). See also State v. Bolin, 281 N.C. 415, 189 S.E.2d 235 (1972); State v. Wagner, 50 N.C. App. 286, 273 S.E.2d 33 (1981). “The introduction in evidence by the State of a statement made by defendant which may tend to exculpate him, does not prevent the State from showing that the facts concerning the homicide were different from what the defendant said about them.” State v. Bolin, 281 N.C. 415, 425, 189 S.E.2d 235, 241-42 (1972). In this case, the State failed to show that the shooting did not correspond to defendant’s statement.
The statement of defendant, offered into evidence in this case by the State, is wholly exculpatory and is not contradicted or shown to be false by any other facts or circumstances in evidence. The testimony of the ballistics experts and the medical examiner does not contradict the statements of defendant in any significant way. Indeed, the evidence offered by the State more closely corroborates defendant’s statement than contradicts it.
We hold the evidence in this case is not sufficient to permit the jury to find that defendant intentionally shot his wife with a .22 calibre pistol causing her death. The case of State v. Bright, 237 N.C. 475, 75 S.E.2d 407 (1953), is distinguishable. There, the Court said, “[tjhere was evidence . . . that admittedly the defendant’s hand was on the trigger when the pistol was discharged.” Bright at 478, 75 S.E.2d at 408. Here, the exact words of defendant in his written statement, relied upon by the State, are as follows:
She got mad and said she was going to take everything I had down to my last screw, my business; everything. My dad’s gun was laying on the bed and she said she was even going to take it and grabbed it. I tried to grab it away from her and we stood up. About the same time I was trying to get*239 the gun away from her, she kicked me and I fell backwards and as I was falling backwards, I heard the gun go off.
No construction of the evidence in the present case will yield an inference that defendant’s hand was on the trigger or even that defendant had the gun or any part of it in his hand or in his control at any time immediately preceding the discharge of the weapon causing his wife’s death. The evidence here gives rise only to speculation, and the judgment must be reversed.
Reversed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence offered by the State does not contradict the defendant’s statement in any significant way. I believe the State’s circumstantial evidence does contradict the defendant’s statement and that reasonable minds might accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion that the defendant intended to inflict an injury on his wife which resulted in her death. See State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 651-52 (1982) (motion to dismiss must be denied if substantial evidence exists of each element of the crime and that defendant was perpetrator of the offense).
Specifically, the State offered the following competent evidence: that the bullet entered the victim’s head on the left side, traveled downward, and slightly forward from the back of the head to the front; that there was gunshot residue on the palm and back of the left hand of the victim and on the palm of the right hand of the victim; that no gunshot residue was found in the area of the wound itself; that the defendant was a hunter aware of correct gun safety and that the only loaded weapon found on the defendant’s premises after the killing had the safety on; that the weapon involved in the killing was tested and it was determined that the safety device functioned properly and the weapon did not discharge when struck against the floor; and that approximately two weeks before the victim was killed, the daughter heard a scream coming
The evidence in this case is very similar to the evidence offered by the State in a voluntary manslaughter case, State v. Bright, 237 N.C. 475, 75 S.E.2d 407 (1953). In Bright, the State offered the statement of the defendant that the killing was an accident. The Court held that the State’s other evidence showing “the absence of powder burns, the location and direction of the fatal wound, the conduct of the defendant, and his statement that he and the deceased were ‘scuffling’ at the time the pistol was fired” was sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the shooting was intentional and required submission of the issue to the jury. Id. at 478, 75 S.E.2d at 408. Likewise, here the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and in submitting the issue to the jury. As the State argues, a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that the weapon that killed the victim had the safety on and the defendant intentionally released the safety; that the victim was seated on the bed and that the defendant intentionally discharged the weapon while he was standing; and that the hands of the victim were in a position- parallel to the path of the bullet and not on the weapon at the time of its discharge.
As I find no prejudicial error in the remaining assignments of error raised by the defendant, I would affirm the conviction of second-degree murder.
