618 P.2d 46 | Utah | 1980
The present appeal consolidates three actions below. The respective defendants Kenneth Sharp (hereafter “Sharp”), George Christensen (hereafter “Christensen”), and James N. Tucker (hereafter “Tucker”) all appeal a conviction of auto theft.
All three defendants were, on April 18, 1978, in custody at the Utah State Prison, in the minimum security section. Defendant Tucker was serving time for a prior
At approximately 1:00 p. m. on April 18, defendants were sent to the site of a work detail on the prison grounds. Some two hours later, the work site was discovered abandoned. A head count at minimum security indicated that defendants were not present.
At about the time defendants’ absence from the prison area was discovered, three individuals matching defendants’ descriptions were seen in the town of Riverton, Utah, not far from the prison. A Mrs. Marcia Ruark testified that, around 3:00 p. m., she was in a retail establishment in Riverton when she heard an automobile start outside. Emerging from the store, Mrs. Ruark saw her 1971 Cadillac being driven away. She had not given anyone permission to use the car, and notified the police. Shortly thereafter, Riverton police officers located the vehicle and gave chase. The pursuit, which reached up to 90 miles per hour at times, finally went up nearby Butterfield Canyon. There, the police found the car abandoned. A search of the area surrounding the car located defendants Sharp and Christensen. Defendant Tucker was later apprehended while hitchhiking.
At trial, defendant Tucker testified that he had been intoxicated at the time the three left the prison grounds. He claimed that their departure was not together, but that he had met Sharp and Christensen in Riverton. Tucker asserted that, sometime later, he and Sharp were together when Christensen appeared with the automobile. The three, he claimed, intended to drive the car back to the prison, but then decided to drive around for a while first. When the police began to pursue them, the three panicked and attempted to escape.
We deal first with the appeal taken by defendants Sharp and Christensen from their conviction of the offense of aiding an escape. Under Utah law,
Sharp and Christensen first assert that the State failed to establish that defendants were acting with the requisite intent. As with all statutory criminal violations in this jurisdiction which are not predicated on absolute liability, the offense with which defendants Sharp and Christensen are charged requires a general intent to do the forbidden act.
The foregoing assertions are unfounded. Defendants Sharp and Christensen were not charged as parties in the crime of escape, but were charged as principals in
Defendants Sharp and Christensen next challenge their conviction for aiding an escape by arguing that no aid was afforded defendant Tucker prior to the time the three met in the town of Riverton, by which time the escape was complete. Therefore, they reason, they cannot rightly be charged with having furnished aid during Tucker’s actual escape.
This argument likewise misconstrues the nature of the offense with which the defendants were charged. A violation of the applicable statute occurs whenever aid is offered to an individual who is attempting, or has completed, an escape from official and lawful custody prior to discharge by due process of law.
Defendants Sharp and Christensen next suggest that the State failed to prove that they offered defendant Tucker aid in his escape, as that term is legally understood. It is their assertion that, in order to be properly charged as aiders and abetters of an escape, they must be shown to have been acting in prearranged concert with defendant Tucker, or with his awareness of their intent to furnish aid.
It is sufficient answer to this to point out, once again, that defendants Sharp and Christensen were not charged as parties to the crime of escape, but as principals in the crime of aiding escape. As such, any necessity of a prearranged conspiracy or an expression of intent to give aid is obviated.
Defendants Sharp and Christensen finally argue that their offense is prohibited by two separate and conflicting statutory provisions: that with which they were charged, and that prohibiting escape from official custody.
This argument misconstrues the nature of the statutes involved. The former prohibits the aiding of another individual in escaping from official custody, while the latter prohibits the effecting of one’s own escape. Where, as in the present case, an escaping prisoner assists another prisoner to escape, both statutes may be applicable. As such, they deal with distinct and separate acts, and are therefore not conflicting. The fact that defendants Sharp and Christensen were not charged in the present case with escape in no way impugns their conviction for aiding in defendant Tucker’s escape.
With regard to their conviction for theft of a motor vehicle, defendants make two essentially interrelated claims: (1) that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction relating to the lesser included offense of temporary deprivation of a motor vehicle,
Defendants correctly observe that the temporary deprivation, or “joy-riding,” provision is a lesser offense included in the offense of theft of a motor vehicle.
Conversely, the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to support the state’s burden of proving that defendants took the automobile with an intent permanently to deprive the owner thereof. This Court will overturn a verdict on the basis of evidentia-ry insufficiency only where, as a matter of law, reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt that one or more elements of the alleged offense has been proven.
Defendants’ convictions are hereby affirmed.
. In violation of U.C.A., 1953, 76-6-404.
. In violation of U.C.A., 1953, 76-8-310.
. Id.
. U.C.A., 1953, 76-8-310(2).
. U.C.A., 1953, 76-2-102 and 76-2-103.
. Citing U.C.A., 1953, 76-2-202, which states that “Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.”
. 30A C.J.S., Escape, Section 18.
. U.C.A., 1953, 76-8-309.
. 22 Utah 2d 343, 453 P.2d 146 (1969).
. U.C.A., 1953, 76-8-309(2)(b) specifies that individuals in the position of defendants Sharp and Christensen commit only a class B misdemeanor by effecting an escape.
. U.C.A., 1953, 41-1-109.
. State v. Lloyd, Utah, 568 P.2d 357 (1977); State v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d 360 (1977).
. U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-402(4); see also State v. Eagle, Utah, 611 P.2d 1211 (1980); State v. Hendricks, Utah, 596 P.2d 633 (1979).
. State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979).