STATE OF NEW MEXICO, v. JUDAH ELIJAH TRUJILLO
NO. S-1-SC-40328
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
July 9, 2026
Mary Marlowe Sommer, District Judge
Opinion Number:
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender
Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellant
Raúl Torrez, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Serena R. Wheaton, Assistant Attorney General
Albuquerque, NM
for Appellee
THOMSON, Justice.
{1} In the early morning hours of August 10, 2022, fifteen-year-old Judah Elijah Trujillo (Judah) met a stranger, sixty-year-old Samuel Cordero (Samuel), at Ragle Park in Santa Fe, New Mexico, for oral sex. The encounter culminated in Judah killing Samuel with a single gunshot to the back of his head. A jury convicted Judah of willful and deliberate first-degree murder, contrary to
{2} In this appeal, Judah raises two challenges to his murder conviction: (1) that the State‘s evidence was insufficient to support a finding of deliberate intent, and (2) that the district court erred by instructing the jury on motive because the pertinent instruction,
{4} However, because the jury was instructed on and found all of the essential elements of second-degree murder, we conclude that the interests of justice are best served by direct remand for entry of second-degree murder. State v. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, ¶ 43, 572 P.3d 974 (explaining that when “directing the disposition of a case after remand . . . the ultimate inquiry is whether retrial or resentencing is in the interests of justice“); see also State v. Haynie, 1994-NMSC-001, ¶ 4, 116 N.M. 746, 867 P.2d 416 (“[T]here is no need to retry a defendant for a lesser included offense when the elements of the lesser offense necessarily were proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in the course of convicting the defendant of the greater offense.“).
{5} Judah also claims that the district court erred when it instructed the jury on motive despite
{6} We agree with Judah that the district court erred in failing to adhere to the use note, and we take this opportunity to emphasize for district courts that use notes are binding on lower courts. Delfino v. Griffo, 2011-NMSC-015, ¶ 19, 150 N.M. 97, 257 P.3d 917 (“Use notes, though not part of the statute or jury instruction, are adopted by this Court and binding on district courts.“). However, Judah has failed to articulate how the instruction created “circumstances that shock the conscience or implicate a fundamental unfairness that would undermine judicial integrity if left unchecked.” State v. Mascareñas, 2000-NMSC-017, ¶ 17, 129 N.M. 230, 4 P.3d 1221 (text only)1 (citation omitted). Furthermore, our reversal of Judah‘s first-degree murder conviction ameliorates any unfairness underlying his conviction potentially caused by the motive instruction.
{7} There is no dispute that Judah shot Samuel. The State attempts to undercut Judah‘s sufficiency challenge by highlighting the sheer volume of evidence presented in its case-in-chief—including more than eighty exhibits, twenty witnesses, and records obtained both from a search engine and from a dating app. However, the bulk of the State‘s evidence at trial, including the testimony of more than a dozen law enforcement personnel, primarily served to eliminate any reasonable doubt that Judah was the person who shot Samuel at Ragle Park, took his phone, and tossed it alongside Rodeo Road. Therefore, much of the State‘s evidence at trial is peripheral to this appeal. Judah‘s exclusive challenge to first-degree murder is sufficiency with regard to deliberate intent. Accordingly, we focus on the evidence presented at trial, including Judah‘s own testimony, supporting that element.
A. Events Leading up to the Shooting
{8} Judah and Samuel met through Grindr, a dating app geared toward LGBTQ+ men and nonbinary individuals. Judah lied about his age to create his account, which indicated that he was nineteen at the time he connected with Samuel. In fact, he was fifteen. Samuel had multiple accounts and also lied about his age, making profiles that stated he was forty-nine and fifty-two rather than sixty. Judah testified that Samuel messaged him first around 3:00 p.m. on August 9, 2022, the day before
{9} Samuel, again, contacted Judah in the early hours of August 10, 2022, after his shift ended, to ask if Judah still wanted to meet. Judah agreed but said that they could not meet at his house anymore because his mother and sister were there. Samuel suggested they meet at Ragle Park, and Judah agreed as it was a public place.
{10} Data from Judah and Samuel‘s phones indicate that the two met at Ragle Park around 2:30 a.m. on August 10, 2022. Phone data shows both cell phones left the park after roughly fifteen to twenty minutes and then traveled to the house belonging to Judah‘s mother‘s boyfriend. Soon thereafter, both phones moved along Zia Road, with Samuel‘s phone ultimately ending up alongside Rodeo Road in a plastic bag.
B. The Shooting at Ragle Park
{11} Direct evidence of what occurred in those twenty minutes after Judah and Samuel first met at the park is limited. Much of the evidence the jury heard regarding what occurred that night was from Judah‘s own testimony. Before delving into Judah‘s account, we first focus on the evidence the State presented at trial.
{12} At roughly 4:30 a.m. on August 10, 2022, a local man walking his dog found Samuel‘s body under a pavilion at Ragle Park and called the police. Samuel was face-down with blood pooled around his head and torso. Investigators found Samuel‘s car keys in his pocket and his car still in the parking lot with his wallet inside. A single bullet casing was found roughly two feet back from where Samuel lay. The casing belonged to a bullet fired from a Smith & Wesson, the type of gun later recovered from Judah‘s mother‘s boyfriend‘s house.
{13} The State‘s forensic pathologist testified that Samuel died from a single bullet entering the back of his head at an upward trajectory and exiting his forehead between his eyes. The bullet entered just below the center of Samuel‘s head and slightly off to one side. Based on analysis of the entry wound, the State‘s forensic pathologist testified to how close she believed the shooter was behind Samuel. After explaining to the jury that firing distance generally falls into one of three buckets—contact, intermediate, and distant and/or indeterminant—she concluded the shot that killed Samuel was fired from a distant and/or indeterminant distance. The absence of any material from the gun on Samuel‘s skin ruled out both contact and intermediate distance, which is characterized by “inches to feet.” This means the shot that killed Samuel was fired from “feet to more feet” away.
{15} Sometime after shooting Samuel, Judah called his ex-girlfriend, Especial Garcia, who testified that Judah said he “did something bad” and that he sounded scared, but he never told her exactly what happened that night. Finally, security camera footage captured Judah returning to the house that night through the garage before leaving through the front door holding a clear plastic bag with Samuel‘s phone inside.
2. Judah‘s testimony
{16} Judah testified that he agreed to meet Samuel at Ragle Park because it was a public place. He also testified that out of roughly eight prior encounters from Grindr, all were in public because it made him feel safer. This was the first time he met with someone from Grindr at Ragle Park; he usually met people during the day in public restrooms and only once previously at night at his grandmother‘s apartment building.
{17} Before meeting with Samuel, Judah grabbed his mother‘s boyfriend‘s Smith & Wesson from the garage. Judah researched how to remove the gun lock and load the gun before going out. He placed the unlocked and loaded gun in the right-side pocket of his jacket. Judah testified that he always armed himself before meeting
{18} Judah arrived at the park and found it to be darker than he anticipated. No one was around. He approached Samuel, observing that he was over six feet tall and weighed roughly 300 pounds. Judah was five-and-a-half feet tall and weighed between 150 and 160 pounds.
{19} Samuel suggested the two go to the nearby baseball dugouts, which Judah described as “a dark, secluded area.” Judah refused, testifying that he was afraid if he went to the dugouts with Samuel, Samuel would rape him. When he refused, Samuel became angry and asked if Judah was just going to stand there. Stating he “felt frozen” and overwhelmed with anxiety, Judah thought he was not going to make it home that night.
{20} At that point, Judah said that Samuel grabbed his left arm with his right hand, and when Judah “pulled [Samuel‘s] hand away,” his “body, it felt like it went out of shock, like it went into a self-defense kind of mode, it felt like it was acting on its own.” When Judah pulled his arm away, Samuel told him to stop, grabbed his arm a
C. Jury Instructions at Trial and Verdict
{21} The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter. Defense counsel did not request a self-defense instruction and none was given. The jury was instructed on motive,
II. DISCUSSION
{22} To support the first-degree murder charge, the State was required to present evidence supporting an inference that Judah “actually deliberated” before shooting Samuel. State v. Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 1, 22, 25, 145 N.M. 102, 194 P.3d 717;
{23} Therein lies the flaw at the core of the State‘s case: it asks this Court to pull discrete facts that, in context, supported deliberate intent in other cases, strip those facts of their context, and add them together to reach an inference of deliberate intent. In cases where the Court has cited, for example, the defendant bringing a gun or after-the-fact evidence as evidence of deliberate intent, those facts were always accompanied by evidence of actual deliberation that empowered the jury to make an inference rather than to merely speculate as to the defendant‘s mental state. That evidence is absent here.
A. Standard of Review
{25} When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence, the Court asks whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Holt, 2016-NMSC-011, ¶ 20, 368 P.3d 409 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “New Mexico appellate courts will not invade the jury‘s province as fact-finder by second-guessing the jury‘s decision concerning the credibility of witnesses, reweighing the evidence, or substituting its judgment for that of the jury.” State v. Garcia, 2011-NMSC-003, ¶ 5, 149 N.M. 185, 246 P.3d 1057 (text only) (citation omitted).
{26} That established, it is “the independent responsibility of the courts to ensure that the jury‘s decisions are supportable by evidence in the record, rather than mere guess or conjecture.” State v. Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, ¶ 4, 147 N.M. 537, 226 P.3d 636 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While appellate courts indulge
B. The State‘s Proffered Evidence of Deliberate Intent
{27} The State emphasizes the steps that Judah took to prepare the gun before meeting with Samuel and argues that Judah‘s account of the altercation is belied by the forensic evidence. At trial, in efforts to defeat the defense‘s motion for directed verdict, the State argued that the absence of evidence of a struggle, shown by a lack of foreign DNA on Samuel, and the fact that Samuel was shot in the back of the head were sufficient to support an inference of deliberate intent. In closing argument and in this appeal, the State leaned more heavily on the version of events derived from Judah‘s own testimony. The State challenges Judah‘s assertion that he was scared of Samuel by highlighting Judah‘s failure to flee. While this could be seen as evidence that challenges Judah‘s testimony that he was scared of Samuel, the State offers it as evidence of deliberate intent and does so without authority. In addition, the State relies on the fact that Judah took Samuel‘s cell phone, as well as his statement that he “did something bad,” to demonstrate consciousness of guilt, which it argues supports an inference of deliberate intent. Judah argues that the evidence of deliberate intent was wholly insufficient, limited to the fact that Judah prepared and
{28} Mindful of our obligation to refrain from parsing the evidence, we take this opportunity to explain why much of the State‘s evidence is plainly not probative of deliberate intent in this case. We then turn to the remaining evidence as a whole to explain why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, it falls short of proving deliberate intent.
1. Judah‘s failure to flee
{29} The State argues that Judah‘s failure to run from Samuel—a much older, larger, and presumably slower individual—after Samuel became aggressive supports an inference of deliberate intent. The State does not cite any cases in which failure to flee under comparable circumstances supported an inference of deliberate intent. Indeed, Judah‘s failure to flee, at most, indicates that he had time to deliberate, which is insufficient to support an inference of deliberate intent absent evidence that he actually did so. See Adonis, 2008-NMSC-059, ¶¶ 20-22 (stating that despite the killer having “an opportunity to deliberate, the burden remains on the [s]tate to produce evidence that tends to show that the killer actually did so” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
2. Consciousness-of-guilt evidence
{32} The State also argues that Judah disposing of Samuel‘s phone, telling Especial that he “did something bad,” and appearing calm on security camera footage after the killing support an inference of deliberate intent. These are all pieces of evidence that demonstrate consciousness of guilt, but they are not probative of deliberation in this case. The State‘s reliance on these facts exemplifies a problematic conflation of
{33} This Court has allowed some consciousness-of-guilt evidence to support an inference of deliberate intent. See id. In Flores, after analyzing over a dozen pieces of evidence supporting the jury‘s finding of deliberate intent—some of which arose after the killing—the Court observed that “[n]ot only may [a d]efendant‘s acts before and during the crime provide evidence of intent, evidence of flight or an attempt to deceive the police may prove consciousness of guilt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Since Flores, consciousness-of-guilt evidence has been occasionally conflated with evidence supporting an inference of deliberate intent. See State v. Arredondo-Soto, S-1-SC-35112, dec. ¶ 36 (N.M. June 2, 2016) (nonprecedential) (“Such evidence of flight or attempt at deceiving law enforcement can demonstrate consciousness of guilt that supports a conviction of deliberate intent.” (citing Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 22-23)). Indeed, the State asks the Court to conflate the two in this case.
{34} However, to support that proposition, Flores relied on State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 29-30, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718, which did not, itself, discuss consciousness-of-guilt evidence as at all pertinent to proving deliberate intent. See Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 23. Rather, Martinez solely addressed consciousness-
{35} Rather, such evidence must be closely scrutinized and is insufficient absent other evidence of deliberate intent or specific facts making the conduct highly probative of deliberation. See State v. Astorga, 2015-NMSC-007, ¶¶ 63-65, 343 P.3d 1245 (acknowledging that the defendant‘s statements that he “‘blasted that cop‘” “might have been insufficient” on their own but were probative of deliberate intent given the additional evidence of intent, including a strong motive to kill). Any such evidence is absent here.
{36} Judah‘s efforts to dispose of Samuel‘s phone and his scared statements to Especial that he had done “something bad” are not nested in additional facts showing deliberation, and they do not, themselves, even imply deliberation. Judah called his friend, sounding afraid, before waking his mother to drive him to throw Samuel‘s cell phone out of a car window. While indicative of consciousness of guilt, nothing about that evidence sheds light on his state of mind before or during his encounter with Samuel. See Slade, 2014-NMCA-088, ¶¶ 28-31 (concluding that hiding evidence, in that instance the murder weapon, and admitting to shooting the victim demonstrated consciousness of guilt but did not support an inference of deliberate intent).
{37} The State also argues that Judah did not appear panicked or remorseful on security camera footage of him after the killing presented at trial, which further supports an inference of deliberate intent. And while this Court has held that a lack of remorse can support a finding of deliberate intent, the cases in which it did so involve the defendant‘s overt expressions evincing a lack of remorse or the
3. The gun and the forensic evidence
{38} Having concluded that the evidence discussed above is simply not probative of deliberate intent, the State‘s case is left with the fact that Judah took a loaded gun to the meetup with Samuel and that Samuel ended up with a single gunshot to the back of his head without any apparent signs of struggle. Without evidence indicating actual deliberation, those facts are insufficient to support an inference of deliberate intent.
{40} We decline to adopt a rule that taking a firearm to an encounter, alone, supports an inference of deliberate intent to kill absent corroborating evidence of
{41} And in Adonis, the Court concluded that the defendant retrieving a gun—even when he did so with sufficient time to deliberate—was insufficient absent evidence of actual deliberation. 2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 22. The Court explained:
While the retrieval of a weapon before killing a victim could potentially give a killer an opportunity to deliberate, the burden remains on the
[s]tate to produce evidence that tends to show that the killer “actually did so.” In this case, the evidence fails. The [s]tate did not introduce any evidence about what [the d]efendant actually did before he shot [the v]ictim. For example, there was no eyewitness testimony about the events leading up to the shooting, nor was there any testimony from a co-conspirator, or any other witness, that could shed light on [the d]efendant‘s plan or motive to kill [the v]ictim. In short, the facts relied upon by the [s]tate only prove that [the d]efendant killed [the v]ictim intentionally, but fail to prove that [the d]efendant committed the killing with the deliberate intention to take [the v]ictim‘s life, which is necessary to prove first-degree murder.
Id. (quoting State v. Taylor, 2000-NMCA-072, ¶ 22, 129 N.M. 376, 8 P.3d 863). Here, the State‘s evidence was similarly devoid of any information about what Judah “actually did before he shot [Samuel].” Id. The jury heard virtually no evidence regarding the events leading up to the encounter outside of Judah‘s own testimony, which was devoid of any indication that he deliberated before firing the gun.
{42} Instead of offering evidence of deliberation before the shooting, the State focuses on discounting Judah‘s version of events. To that end, the State relies heavily on the absence of Judah‘s DNA on Samuel and contends this proves there was not a struggle, and it emphasizes the improbability that Judah fired once over his shoulder and hit Samuel in the head. Those facts, according to the State, discredit Judah‘s story and support an inference of deliberate intent.
{43} However, as Judah argues, the forensic evidence does not necessarily contradict his account. He testified that Samuel grabbed his wrist twice and punched
{44} Ultimately, the State failed to present evidence that enabled the jury to piece together a story of when or why Judah would have formed the deliberate intent to kill Samuel. While the jury is free to disbelieve Judah‘s story, they are not permitted to conjure an alternative story based wholly on speculation. Here, the jury would have to assume that one of two scenarios played out in order to reach deliberate intent. In scenario one, Judah planned to kill Samuel all along and took the gun to the meetup with that intent; that scenario requires speculation because the State did not present any evidence of a plan or motive, and we have just said that taking the gun, on its own, is insufficient. In scenario two, the jury would have to believe that Judah did not arrive with the intent to kill Samuel but that at some point in their interaction he formed the deliberate intent to do so. But, again, the State did not present any evidence of what actually happened at Ragle Park outside of the
{45} Finally, the single shot to the back of Samuel‘s head does not advance a clear theory of deliberate intent. It is true that the single shot supports either scenario discussed above, but that is only because a single shot to the back of the head supports a finding of an intentional killing under the circumstances of this case. However, there is no evidence of deliberation that distinguishes the intentional killing in this case from a killing that is intentional but rash and impulsive. As was the case in Adonis, “the facts relied upon by the State only prove that [Judah] killed [Samuel] intentionally, but fail to prove that [Judah] committed the killing with the deliberate intention to take [Samuel‘s] life, which is necessary to prove first-degree murder.” 2008-NMSC-059, ¶ 22. The State failed to meet its burden to show actual deliberation, and this Court, accordingly, reverses Judah‘s conviction for first-degree deliberate intent murder.
{46} Because the jury was instructed on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder and the State adequately proved that charge, we exercise our discretion to remand this case for entry of second-degree murder. Revels, 2025-NMSC-021, ¶ 43 (“[W]hen the jury has already found the elements of a lesser included offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the interests of justice are better served
{47} The jury instructions addressed a killing which Judah was indicted for—murder. The jury was also instructed on second-degree murder and was asked to determine whether Judah killed Samuel, whether he knew that his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, and whether he acted without sufficient provocation. See
{48} The evidence analyzed above was not sufficient to show deliberation. That does not mean, however, that the State failed to adequately prove second-degree murder. Judah testified that he fired a shot over his shoulder in Samuel‘s direction—testimony sufficient to conclude that Judah “knew that [his] acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to [Samuel].”
{49} Thus, the interests of justice are best served by direct remand for entry of second-degree murder as opposed to retrial on second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.
{50} Finally, because it is a third-degree felony to tamper with evidence of either a capital felony or a second-degree felony, there is no ambiguity as to the level of tampering of which Judah is guilty in this case.
III. CONCLUSION
{51} Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of deliberation, we reverse Judah‘s first-degree deliberate intent murder conviction and elect to remand the case for entry of second-degree murder. We affirm Judah‘s tampering
{52} IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID K. THOMSON, Justice
WE CONCUR:
JULIE J. VARGAS, Chief Justice
MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Justice
C. SHANNON BACON, Justice
BRIANA H. ZAMORA, Justice