State v. TropezState v. Tropez
Defendant, David Tropez, appeals his conviction of attempted possession of cocaine, in violation of
David Tropez was charged with possession of cocaine in violation of
Sargeant Cannatella testified as to the arrest, at both the motion hearing and the trial. He stated that a сonfidential informant, who had proved reliable in the past, called him on the night of August 29, 1986. The informant told him that David Tropez and Major Brown were involved in cocaine trafficking and that they were conducting their transаctions in the 3700 block of Hamburg Street. The officer proceeded to the location at 10:30 P.M. When he turned the corner on to Hamburg Street in an unmarked police car, Cannatella testified that he saw the defendant standing near a car on the passenger‘s side. Major Brown was in the car on the driver‘s side. The officer testified that a third male standing nearby yelled police and fled on foot.
Cannatella testifiеd that he pulled his police car in on an angle behind the car by which the defendant was standing. As Cannatella exited from the car, he stated at trial that he was drawing for his weapon. Major Brown exited the car he was in and put his hands on his head. The police officer stated that he observed the defendant walk toward him, hesitate and turn around again as if he was going to walk away. Cannatella saw the defendant throw аn object to the ground. Cannatella ordered both men to freeze and put their hands on top of the car. He walked around the car to the defendant, and retrieved the object from the ground. Cannatеlla stated that based on his experience, the object thrown down appeared to contain cocaine. He immediately informed the defendant that he was under arrest.
Both suspects were tаken to the police station. Major Brown was subsequently released. Tropez was charged with possession of cocaine.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE
Sargeant Cannatella testified at the motion hearing and at trial concerning the confidential informant and the subsequent arrest of Tropez. In determining whether a ruling on a motion to suppress is correct, an appellate court is not limited to evidence adduced at the hearing on the suppression motion but may also consider pertinent evidence given at trial. State v. Harris, 444 So.2d 257 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied, 445 So.2d 1234 (1984). Therefore, this court will review the entirety of Sargeant Cannatella‘s testimony about the events that led to the arrest of the defendant.
The issue in this case is whether the police had the legal authority to seize the abandoned contraband. If the authority existed, the cocaine could be admitted at trial. However, if the cocaine was illegally seized, it could not be used at trial even if this results in the reversal of this conviction.
To determine if the police could seize the abandoned property, we must determine if the detention of the defendant was legal. If the detention was an investigatory stop, the admissibility of the evidence would depend on the legality of the stop. A law enforcement officer is permitted to stop any person in a public place “whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committеd, or is about to commit a felony or a misdemeanor.”
In the instant case, we find enough reasonable suspicion to justify such a stop. The police had information from a confidential informant who had proved reliable in the past. This informant identified the defendant by name to be in the 3700 block of Hamburg Street trafficking in drugs. Officer Cannatella knew the defendant. The officer testified that he found him at the location specified by the informant standing on the side of a parked car. Cannatella testified that as he was exiting his car to investigate he observed the defendant throw an object to the ground. He told the defendant to freeze and put his hands on the car. He walked up behind him and reached down and picked up the plastic bag that had been abandoned. The officer believed the bag to contain cocaine and told the defendant that he was under arrest.
It is only when a citizen is actually stopped without reasonable cause or when that stop is imminent that the right to be left alonе is violated thereby rendering unlawful any resultant seizure of abandoned property. State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222 (La.1979). Because the officer had enough reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop, the abandoned property could be lawfully seized. We find that the denial of defendant‘s motion to suppress the evidence was proper.
MULTIPLE BILL
The defendant was adjudicated to be a multiple offender. His original sentence
At the multiple bill hearing, the State introduced a docket master and minute entry of the prior conviction showing that on October 17, 1978, the defendant was sentenced to eighteen months in parish prison. The sentence was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for three yеars.
The State must produce prima facie evidence that five years has not elapsed since the date of discharge from custody of the predicate offense.
The Third Circuit examined the issue of the State‘s burden of proof to evidence the absence of the five year cleansing period in State v. Bennett, 524 So.2d 1297 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1988), appeal after remand, 544 So.2d 661 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1989). The State offered a 1978 bill of information and the minutes of court to prove defendant‘s prior felony conviction. The defendant had an actual jail sentence imposed for the previous conviction. The court stated that under
We find that, as in Bennett, the State, in the instant case, failed to present prima facie proof of the actual date of discharge from State custody. The defendant sentence was suspended but he was placed on three years probаtion.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
The defendant argues that his sentence was excessive. He was found guilty of attemptеd possession of cocaine and sentenced to the maximum sentence of two and one-half years. In order to insure adequate review by the appellate court, there must be an indication in the record that the trial court considered both the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reаsons, we affirm the defendant‘s conviction holding
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; REMANDED.