OPINION
{1} In this appeal in a delinquency proceeding, we determine that even if we assume that the officers violated the rights of Child and his family under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution by entering their apartment without a warrant, thе district court properly denied Child’s motion to suppress evidence of Child’s actions attacking the officers within the apartment. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
{2} Police Officer Ferrin Smith and Detective Jason Smerglia of the Farmington Police Department responded to а 911 call of arguing and fighting and a “possible domestic violence situation,” including assault or battery on a household member, in an apartment near the caller. When Officer Smith first approached the apartment, the door was ajar and then shut. When Detective Smergliа arrived and Officer Smith knocked on the door, a woman, Child’s mother, opened the door. She was intoxicated and appeared as if she had been crying. Officer Smith attempted to gather information, as he would when investigating a possible domestic violence crime. He believed that the woman was “actively trying to keep [him] from seeing inside the apartment” and trying to close the door on him as he was talking to her. He became concerned that there had been a fight, that there were others in the apartment, and that sоmeone could have been injured. When he was explaining to the woman that he wanted to enter the apartment to make sure no one was hurt, he heard a male voice from the other side of the door yell at him, ‘What ... do you want? You don’t need to see inside thе ... apartment.” Because of the “very aggressive tone” of the voice, Officer Smith believed he needed to open the door to ascertain if he and Detective Smerglia, or the woman, was in danger of “an immediate battery.” He pushed the door opеn and observed Child walking aggressively toward Detective Smerglia and him, in such a way that he believed that he was in danger of “immediate battery.” Officer Smith and Detective Smerglia attempted to subdue Child in the doorway. In the effort, Child pulled his fist back as if he was ready to punch Deteсtive Smerglia.
{3} Child asked the district court to suppress evidence of Child’s actions after the officers entered the apartment. He contended that the officers’ entry into the apartment violated Child’s constitutional rights because the officers did not have a warrаnt, consent, or exigent circumstances. The State responded that the officers’ actions were proper because of: (1) the officers’ concern that someone may have been hurt within the apartment; (2) at least a reasonable suspicion thаt an assault against a household member had occurred; or (3) exigent circumstances, such as the officers’ concern for their own safety, the safety of Child’s mother, or the escape of persons in the apartment. The district court denied the motion. Child enterеd a plea and disposition agreement, admitting to the charge of battery on a police officer and reserving the right to appeal from the issues raised by his motion to suppress. In its judgment and disposition, the district court ordered Child to serve a period of probation of one year.
INAPPLICABILITY OF EXCLUSIONARY RULE
{4} The issue before us concerns the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained by the officers after entering the apartment. It focuses upon the ability of a police officer to respond to а threat of force, even if the officer is acting beyond constitutional parameters, and raises the question of whether evidence obtained in such circumstances is admissible in a criminal prosecution for the threatening conduct. Because we address only the legal conclusion of the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress, our review is de novo. See State v. Morales,
{5} The exclusionary rule enforces the constitutional protections of the home and person against unreasonable searсhes and seizures. Wong Sun v. United States,
{6} The circumstances of this case, in which officers testified about a battery upon them, have import. This Court addressed similar circumstances in State v. Chamberlain,
{7} Although Child’s actions are not as egregious, the same result applies in this case. We reach this conclusion giving consideration to our Supreme Court’s analysis in State v. Doe,
{8} As this Court did in Chamberlain, our Supreme Court in Doe also focused on policy concerns. Doe,
{9} This case is different from Chamberlain in the degree of the actions taken against the officers. It is different from Doe in that the officers taking action in Doe were not the same officers who took the alleged unlawful action. Nevertheless, the same policy concerns of Chamberlain аnd Doe counsel our decision. Even if we were to assume that the officers entered the apartment unlawfully, the societal interests of avoiding violence and in the orderly settlement of disputes do not countenance an attack on police offiсers, provided that the officers were acting “within the scope of what [they were] employed to do.” Doe,
{10} We lastly consider whether Gutierrez requires a different result under the New Mexico Constitution. Child argued to the district court that Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution, which requires a warrant to afford protection from an unreasonable search or seizure, has been interpreted more expansively than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Gutierrez, our Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for application to the New Mexico Constitutiоn and held that the state would be denied “the use of evidence obtained in violation of Article II, Section 10.” Gutierrez,
{11} However, this case is different from Gutierrez in that it does not involve the use of evidence obtained in violation of Article II, Section 10. Gutierrez,
MOOTNESS
{12} The State argues that Child’s appeal is moot because this Court cannot provide Child any rеlief. Child has satisfactorily completed his probation and there is no appeal bond. However, even if we were inclined to agree with the State about the absence of relief, we may address otherwise moot issues on appeal that are of substаntial public interest. Mowrer v. Rusk,
CONCLUSION
{13} We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
{14} IT IS SO ORDERED.