State v. TravisState v. Travis
Roumania Travis, Antonio Nasisi and William Juliano were convicted of conspiracy to violate the gambling statutes (
Defendant Travis was sentenced to three concurrent six-month terms in the Essex County Correction Center, а suspended two to three-year term at the State Correctional Institution for Women, and a $1,000 fine. Defendant Nasisi was sentenced to three concurrent terms of two to two and a half years in State Prison and a $1,000 fine. Defendant Juliano received two concurrent terms of two to two and a half years at State Prison and a $1,000 fine.
The threе defendants filed separate appeals which, on motion by the State, were consolidated.
A pretrial motion to suppress on the grounds the wiretap used in thе case was illegal was denied by the trial judge in a written, reported decision, State v. Travis, 125 N.J. Super. 1 (Cty. Ct. 1973).
All defendants contend the trial judge erred in his denial of the motion to suppress the wiretaр evidence on the ground that there had not been a lawful application for the court-authorized tap. The authorization of the wiretap in question was signed by Lеonard D. Ronco, an assistant prosecutor in the Essex County Prosecutor‘s Office, when the prosecutor was away on vacation during the month of August 1972 and had designated Ronco as the acting prosecutor. The order was signed by a Superior Court judge empowered to sign such orders.
We are of the view the pretrial motions to supрress were properly denied, essentially for the reasons expressed by the trial judge in State v. Travis, supra. Subsequent to his decision on the motions, the United States Supreme Court decided United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). In Giordano а wiretap application made before a federal judge stated that the specific Assistant Attorney General in charge of wiretap authorizations, and sо specially designated by the Attorney General pursuant to
The Supreme Court found that the statute (after which the New Jersey Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act,
However, although the court stated that “it is apparent that Congress desired to centralize and limit this authоrity where it was feasible to do so,” Id., 416 U.S. at 521, 94 S.Ct. at 1830, 40 L.Ed.2d at 357; it further noted that
Here, the prosecutor was unavailable since he was out of the county for the entire month of August. An acting prosecutor was appointed by him to exercise all of the duties of the office of prosecutor during thе prosecutor‘s absence.
Under the circumstances of this case his exercise of the power was within the comprehension of
During the course of his opening to the jury the prosecutor stated:
Again, you might ask, well, what led to this information that was the basis of this search warrant?
Well, on or about August 1, 1972, informаtion was received by certain law enforcement officers relative to the criminal activities of some of these defendants * * *
Motions for a mistrial were denied. Immediately thereafter the remarks were ordered stricken by the trial judge and the jury instructed to disregard the comment. All defendants urge prejudicial error. However, we are satisfied that in the context of this case and in light of the curative instruction, the remarks complained of were not sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt that the jury was led thereby to a result it otherwise might not have reached. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335-336 (1971). Cf. State v. Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973).
Defendant Nasisi‘s contention that the competency of the wiretap evidence was not demоnstrated because the evidence of the installation of the wiretap was insufficient is
We find no merit in defendant Nasisi‘s further contention the trial judge erred in permitting two of perhaps 80 or 90 taped calls to be played during the prosecutor‘s summation since this is no different from any attorney utilizing demonstrable evidence before thе jury in the course of summation. People v. Coontz, 119 Cal. App.2d 276, 259 P.2d 694 (Cal. D. Ct. App. 1953). Similarly, there is no substance to the argument that the expert‘s opinion, embracing as it did the hypothetical question posed, was improper, or that incorporated therein were many assumptions of fact not within the testimony. See State v. Boiardo, 111 N.J. Super. 219, 237-238 (App. Div. 1970), certif. den. 57 N.J. 130 (1970), cert. den. 401 U.S. 948, 91 S.Ct. 931, 28 L.Ed.2d 231 (1971).
Defendant Juliano asserts there was insufficient evidence to connect him with the conspiracy and to justify his conviction for maintaining a place for gambling. Our review of the record satisfies us there was sufficient credible evidence to sustain dеfendant Juliano‘s conviction. While circumstantial, it was nevertheless persuasive and such that the jury could properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Juliano was guilty of the crimes charged. State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258, 263 (1964); State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-459 (1971); State v. Seaman, 114 N.J. Super. 19, 29-30 (App. Div. 1971);
Review of the record together with the presentence reports reveals no abuse of discretion in the sentences imposed. State v. Tyson, 43 N.J. 411 (1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 987, 85 S.Ct. 1359, 14 L.Ed.2d 279 (1965); State v. Souss, 65 N.J. 453 (1974); State v. Leverette, 64 N.J. 569, 571 (1974); State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247 (1967), cert. den. 389 U.S. 830, 88 S.Ct. 96, 19 L.Ed.2d 89 (1967); State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197 (1960).
Affirmed.