State v. TrahanState v. Trahan
Margaret S. Sollars, Thibodaux, Counsel for Applicant.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Scott D. Peebles, Valentin M. Solino, Counsel for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:*
A trial judge may accept a defendant‘s guilty plea entered as part of a plea bargain regarding sentence but defer final disposition of the case until completion of a presentence report. See United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 674, 117 S.Ct. 1630, 1633, 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997) (“Guilty pleas can be accepted while plea agreements are deferred, and the acceptance of the two can be separated in time.“); see also
No party to the proceedings testified at the hearing on relator‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea filed shortly after he received an executory sentence of seven years imprisonment at hard labor, and for the majority on the court of appeal panel which affirmed his conviction and sentence, relator had merely an ungrounded hope or expectation he would receive more lenient treatment. State v. Trahan, 98-1442 (La.App.12/1/99), 752 So.2d 921. The majority observed that no direct evidence existed of what occurred between the trial judge and relator when the plea was entered and resolved the ambiguity in the record against relator in part because he “did not testify to [his] belief [that he would receive a probated sentence], nor did his attorneys maintain that he had been assured he would receive probation.” Trahan, 98-1442 at 6, 752 So.2d at 925. The dissent found the possibility that “the [hand-written note as to] sentence was added after the trial judge signed the [guilty plea] form” appeared “highly unlikely.” Trahan, 98-1442 at 2, 752 So.2d at 928 (Waltzer, J., dissenting). It also found the trial judge‘s silence at the hearing on relator‘s motion to withdraw his plea “striking, given the debate that occurred before him .... why did the trial judge simply not tell defendant and his lawyers that they were fabricating [a promise or belief] in an attempt to renege on the plea?” Id.
We agree with both the majority and dissenting views below that the failure
On remand, if the court determines that the trial judge and relator in fact entered into a conditional plea bargain premised on the anticipated results of the pre-sentence investigation, the court should then consider whether the contents of the presentence report provided the sentencing court with an objective basis for concluding that relator had simply gambled that the investigation would not disclose damning information and therefore had no more than a mere hope he would receive the sentence initially contemplated when he entered his guilty plea. If that objective basis existed, relator is not entitled to relief. State v. Deakle, 372 So.2d 1221, 1222 (La.1979) (“It is not unreasonable for the trial judge to refuse to allow defendant the luxury of gambling on what sentence he will be given, then withdrawing his plea if ... the sentence is not to his liking.“). However, if the contrary appears and relator had a reasonable basis for believing that the report‘s contents, if not its final recommendation, would not cast him in such a different light that the trial judge was justified in unilaterally canceling the contemplated sentence and imposing a harsher penalty, the court should allow relator to withdraw his guilty plea.
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is vacated and this case is remanded to the district court for purposes of reassigning relator‘s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a different district court judge for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
JUDGMENT REVERSED; CASE REMANDED.